RISK-INFORMED DECISION MAKING AND THE REGULATION OF SMALL MODULAR REACTORS by Dusevic, Andrew J
  
 
 
RISK-INFORMED DECISION MAKING AND THE REGULATION 
OF SMALL MODULAR REACTORS 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the 
College of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of LL.M. 
In the College of Law 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon 
 
By 
Andrew Dusevic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright Andrew Dusevic, April 2019. All rights reserved.
i 
 
PERMISSION TO USE 
 
In presenting this thesis/dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Postgraduate 
degree from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this University may make 
it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying of this 
thesis/dissertation in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by 
the professor or professors who supervised my thesis/dissertation work or, in their absence, by the 
Head of the Department or the Dean of the College in which my thesis work was done. It is 
understood that any copying or publication or use of this thesis/dissertation or parts thereof for 
financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due 
recognition shall be given to me and to the University of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which 
may be made of any material in my thesis/dissertation. 
 
 
DISCLAIMER 
 
Reference in this thesis/dissertation to any specific commercial products, process, or service by 
trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, 
recommendation, or favouring by the University of Saskatchewan. The views and opinions of the 
author expressed herein do not state or reflect those of the University of Saskatchewan, and shall 
not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. 
 
Requests for permission to copy or to make other uses of materials in this thesis/dissertation in 
whole or part should be addressed to: 
 
 Head of the College of Law 
 15 Campus Drive 
 University of Saskatchewan 
 Saskatoon, SK S7N 5A6 
  
 OR 
 
 Dean 
 College of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies 
 University of Saskatchewan 
 116 Thorvaldson Building, 110 Science Place 
 Saskatoon, Saskatchewan  S7N 5C9  Canada 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis argues that small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs) can be regulated within the 
existing Canadian nuclear regulatory framework in light of existing regulatory principles, and that 
regulatory flexibility and the development of risk management practices will be crucial to 
accommodate the many challenges associated with their regulation. SMRs are characterized by 
their small size, modularity and innovative approaches to design. Though advantageous, these 
novel characteristics introduce uncertain and novel risks that pose challenges to Canada’s risk 
assessment and risk management practices. The most significant challenge to Canada’s regulators 
is how SMRs can be safely regulated while imposing regulations that have the appropriate scope, 
detail and content for each proposed SMR project. 
 This thesis argues that Canada’s risk-informed decision-making process must be bolstered 
to mitigate the variability and uncertain risks of SMRs. Emphasis is placed on the utilization of 
the graded approach to accommodate the variability of SMR projects and demonstrate that 
associated risks meet regulatory objectives. In addition to the graded approach, this thesis proposes 
risk management approaches that may better utilize uncertainty analyses to ensure that 
conservative measures are appropriate and that regulatory objectives are satisfied. A method to 
elicit and assess expert judgment for risk-informed decision-making is proposed to alleviate risk 
uncertainty and fill gaps in risks. Using these tools, regulators may better accommodate the risks 
of SMRs without relying on conservative measures to justify the satisfaction of regulatory 
requirements. 
 This thesis also investigates how type certification of SMR designs can be used to 
streamline the licensing process to take advantage of their quick construction and installation 
times. Type certification is the process of certifying a design such that reproductions of that design 
are assumed to meat regulatory requirements thereby reducing the depth of analysis for subsequent 
risk assessments of the same reactor. In the type certification process, the assurance that SMR 
designs can be reproduced by the manufacturer consistently and accurately is a significant concern. 
The examination of the aviation industry and maritime transport industry yield effective strategies 
for assuring the reproducibility of SMR designs that may be implemented within Canada.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1.1 Background 
 Small modular reactors (“SMRs”) are nuclear fission reactors with a power generation of 
300 MWe or less1 and are characterized by their modularity, small size, innovative design and 
approaches to safety. SMRs can vary greatly in design features, size and cooling types.2 
Additionally, the modularity of SMRs provides them with significant advantages, such as reduced 
durations for on-site construction, increased containment efficiency and increased security and 
safety. Though the design of SMRs may vary between vendors, many SMRs achieve high levels 
of safety through their innovation, safety features and approaches to power generation. As a result, 
many SMRs provide greater levels of safety than traditional large nuclear power plants. The 
advantages of SMRs make them an inexpensive alternative to conventional nuclear power plants 
and a viable energy option to replace non-sustainable sources. 
 SMRs and conventional reactors differ in energy output and size. Canada’s smallest 
commercial reactor in commission is 515 MWe at the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station, 
though the cumulative net power output of this facility’s 6 reactors is 3100 MWe.3 Comparatively, 
SMRs at most output 300 MWe and may be deployed as a single reactor or as multiple reactors in 
a fleet. Additionally, SMRs may employ drastically different technology and approaches to energy 
production than conventional nuclear reactors used in Canada. All installed commercial reactors 
in Canada are CANDU reactors, aptly named after its use of a deuterium oxide moderator and 
(originally) uranium fuel. However, SMRs may be scaled down versions of existing technologies 
or may be completely new Generation IV technologies.4  
                                                 
1 See World Nuclear Association, “Small Nuclear Power Reactors” (October 2018) online: World Nuclear 
Association website <world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/small-
nuclear-power-reactors.aspx> [perma.cc/S6C6-UJ97]. 
       2 Dis-16-04, infra note 120 at 3. 
       3 International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Power Reactors in the World, Reference Data Series No 2, 
2016 Edition (Vienna: IAEA, 2016) at 33. 
4 Giorgio Locatelli, Mauro Mancini, & Nicola Todeschini, “Generation IV nuclear reactors: Current status and 
future prospects” (2013) 61 Energy Policy 1503 (Generation IV reactors are those that are being researched by the 
Generation IV International Forum. Generation IV reactors include very high temperature reactors, sodium fast 
reactors, super-critical water cooled reactors, gas cooled fast reactors, lead cooled fast reactors and molten salt 
reactors at 1503) 
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The innovative design features of SMRs can vary significantly and include novel 
approaches to power generation, safety, security, automation, application and much more. It is 
unclear how many different SMR designs are currently in development, but Canada’s nuclear 
regulator, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (the “CNSC”), is currently reviewing the 
designs of ten different SMR reactor types.5 Other sources have listed more than 40 unique 
designs.6  
SMRs have broad applications and are advantageous for Canada’s natural resource sector, 
remote communities and utilities. For example, Bruce Power, the Mining Rehabilitation and 
Applied Research Corporation, and Laurentian University have signed a five year $1-million 
agreement to develop strategies to deploy SMRs for remote communities and mining operation 
that lack sufficient access to power grids.7 Furthermore, the decreased costs and clean nature of 
SMRs are advantageous for utilities seeking to offset dependence on greenhouse gas-emitting 
sources, such as coal and fossil fuels, or to expand their capacity. The applicability of SMRs for 
Canada is heightened by the Canadian government's acknowledgement of the role of nuclear power 
in Canada’s “greener energy system.”8 SMRs have the potential of filling this role as the energy 
industry advances, but first Canada must develop effective regulations to accommodate the 
technology. 
Canada currently operates 22 pressurized heavy-water nuclear power plants which are all 
based on the CANDU reactor design. The CNSC’s experience has laid solely with CANDU 
reactors since the beginning of its development in the late 1950s. Though regulations are developed 
to be technologically neutral, they are inescapably shaped by the CNSC’s experience with 
CANDU reactors. To appropriately accommodate SMRs, industry and regulators agree that 
                                                 
5 Canada, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, “Pre-Licensing Vendor Design Review” (18 July 2018), 
online: CNSC website <nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/reactors/power-plants/pre-licensing-vendor-design-review/> 
[https://perma.cc/89CU-677H]. 
6 Ux Consulting Company, LLC, “Small Modular Reactor List” (last visited October 21st 2018), online: Ux 
Consulting website <https://www.uxc.com/smr/uxc_SMRList.aspx> [perma.cc/ZZZ5-9QBF]. See also World 
Nuclear Association, “Small Nuclear Power Reactors” (September 2018), online: World Nuclear Agency website 
<world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/small-nuclear-power-
reactors.aspx> [perma.cc/FA4D-GQBX]. 
7 Wendi Punkkinen, “Bruce Power signs $1 million MOU for sustainable energy research group” (6 April 2018) 
online: Bruce Power website <www.brucepower.com/sustainable-energy-research-smr-mou/> [perma.cc/JRS2-
ST4H]. 
8 Canadian Nuclear Association, “Canada’s Nuclear Energy Future” (2017) 3:1 Public Newsletter, online: 
Canadian Nuclear Association website <cna.ca/news/canadas-nuclear-energy-future/>. 
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regulations need to be restructured to provide additional flexibility to account for their variability 
of design.  
The CNSC has commenced regulatory plans to ready themselves for the regulation of 
SMRs. Consultation between the CNSC and the nuclear industry has yielded insight into the 
regulation of SMRs within the Canadian regulatory framework. Notably, the CNSC and the 
nuclear industry agree that regulations need further clarification for their application to SMRs and 
that regulations need to be less prescriptive so that they can better accommodate all types of SMRs.  
The CNSC has broadly characterized the challenges of regulating SMRs into two 
categories: “Novel technologies” and “Novel approaches to deployment.”9 Both categories address 
significant challenges that will vary with each reactor design. The novel risks and deployment 
strategies of SMRs pose challenges to the CNSC’s decision-making process and licensing 
strategies. Canada needs to address these challenges so that SMRs are effectively and efficiently 
regulated to meet Canada’s energy needs. 
The risks posed by SMRs can be categorized into novel risks and uncertain risks. Novel 
risks are those that may be adequately quantified but are unfamiliar to the CNSC and may require 
unconventional approaches to mitigate. For example, the safety assessments performed by 
Canadian regulations are developed based on its experience with CANDU reactors and thus poorly 
consider the inherent safety of SMR designs. Uncertain risks are those that are not quantified or 
are encumbered with significant uncertainty and challenge the CNSC’s ability to make decisions 
confidently. Risk uncertainty is common for SMRs as many designs are still under development.  
The novel deployment and modularity of SMRs pose challenges to conventional licensing 
practices. For instance, the deployment of SMRs in fleets, on the same site or separated by large 
geographic areas, is not capable of being considered within current licensing structure. 
Furthermore, the inspection of the reactor and components of SMRs is difficult as the pre-
construction and modularity of the reactor limit the access of inspectors.  
Overall, SMRs provide improved safety features, economic advantages, broad application 
to various industries and are advantageous for Canadians. However, Canada’s current regulatory 
                                                 
9 Kevin Lee, “Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission: Readiness for SMRs” (presentation delivered at the 
International SMR and Advanced Reactor Summit 2018, 17-18 March 2018) [unpublished]. 
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regime is shaped by the CNSC’s expertise with the regulation of CANDU reactors. This thesis 
aims to show that these challenges can be overcome through regulatory flexibility and by 
bolstering risk management approaches. That is, to successfully regulate SMRs within the existing 
framework, the CNSC must provide regulatory flexibility so that SMRs can be evaluated within 
the scope of their design. Additionally, regulatory tools to appropriately and proportionally assess 
the risks associated with SMR designs are needed to streamline the assessment under the current 
framework. Finally, licensing strategies are needed to accommodate the novel deployment 
strategies of which SMRs are capable. A list of abbreviations at page vii and a glossary at page 
129 are provided for the reader’s reference for when terms and abbreviations become difficult to 
keep track of, or where further information is needed. 
 
1.2 Outline 
This thesis argues that SMRs can be regulated within the existing Canadian nuclear 
regulatory framework, in light of existing regulatory principles, and that challenges associated with 
that regulation can be accommodated through regulatory flexibility and by bolstering risk 
management approaches. The chapters are aligned first to set out the framework of Canadian 
regulations and the challenges that arise with the application of the framework to SMRs. Second, 
the analysis of this thesis investigates how some of these challenges can be mitigated by providing 
additional regulatory flexibility, risk management strategies and expert judgement. Finally, the 
thesis concludes with the examination of licensing strategies of the aviation industry and maritime 
transport industry to accommodate mass-produced complex technologies. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis introduces Canada’s nuclear regulatory regime, the challenges of 
regulating SMRs and important regulatory fundamentals that underpin Canada’s regulations. It is 
important to establish the regulatory framework so that the readers understand how the CNSC 
develops nuclear regulations, what objectives inform those regulation and how they apply 
regulatory principles for the safe regulation of nuclear power facilities. This chapter also explains 
in detail what constitutes risk-informed decision making and how it applies to SMRs. Risk-
informed decision-making forms the foundation for the regulatory strategies and tools suggested 
within this thesis. 
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Chapter 3 discusses the approaches to address the risks and variability of SMRs within 
regulations and is broken down into three segments. The first segment recommends the use of 
performance-based regulation and the graded approach to achieve the regulatory flexibility 
necessary to regulate SMRs. The second segment suggests the use of uncertainty analysis within 
risk management practices to ensure the prudent application of conservatism by the graded 
approach and other regulatory principles. Uncertainty analysis is an integral tool for regulators to 
ensure the economical application of conservatism – i.e. without over or under confidence – and 
the satisfaction of regulatory objectives.  The final segment develops and recommends an expert 
elicitation method capable of being integrated within current policies to quantify uncertain risks 
of SMRs. Expert elicitations can produce accurate risk distributions that can be relied upon within 
probabilistic and deterministic risk assessments. 
The final chapter examines how type certification can be integrated into Canada’s 
regulatory regime to accommodate the novel deployment strategies of SMRs. Type certification is 
the regulatory activity of certifying designs and ensuring their reproducibility for future 
assessments, thereby reducing assessment duration and workload. The maritime transport industry 
and the aviation industry are studied for this purpose, as they lend insight into the type certification 
of complex products with high-consequences events. This chapter also provides surprising insight 
into the regulation of complex designs produced in mass and has instructional value for the CNSC 
if they choose to add a type certification regime into their regulatory framework. 
The approach of this thesis is not to address the challenges of SMRs on an individual basis, 
but to bolster regulatory approaches so that regulations can accommodate all SMRs, despite the 
specifics of their design. In this way, the regulation of SMRs avoids an ad hoc process. This 
approach also avoids prescriptive requirements which increase the rigidity of regulations.  
This thesis is novel because it argues at length that Canadian regulations can regulate SMRs 
successfully within existing regulatory principles economically and expediently. The CNSC has 
made broad statements regarding the regulations of SMRs but has not delved into their regulation 
with any specificity. This thesis presents an in-depth and never before completed assessment of 
the regulation of SMRs. This thesis has advantages and application for Canada as it provides 
regulatory strategies for the safe and effective regulation of SMRs. Although this thesis is aimed 
at how Canada can accommodate SMRs within their regulations specifically, the strategies 
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suggested provide regulatory flexibility employable for all reactor types including advanced 
reactors, such as Generation IV reactors, and other established designs. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 This thesis aims to develop regulatory strategies within the existing policies of the CNSC 
and consults materials published by the CNSC and international bodies, and examines regulatory 
theory generally. The regulatory documentation, licensing strategies and other materials published 
by the CNSC are heavily consulted to provide both the skeletal framework of Canada’s nuclear 
regulation applicable to SMRs and to provide insight into what strategies may be inserted to 
improve the regulation of SMRs. Furthermore, material published by international nuclear 
agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency are 
consulted to provide additional perspective on how to regulate nuclear power plants. These 
materials are germane to Canada’s regulation as Canada has entered into many conventions and 
agreements with these bodies which inform fundamental aspects of Canada’s regulations. Thus, 
these international materials provide persuasive insight into Canada’s regulations. 
 Regulatory theory, in the general sense, is consulted to expound on the principles and 
doctrines adopted by the CNSC. Regulatory theory provides insight into the advantages and 
disadvantages of regulatory principles adopted by the CNSC, and is used to assess the methods 
and strategies suggested within this thesis. Regulatory theory as it applies to nuclear regulation is 
also consulted; however, the literature in this area is limited. For this reason, regulatory theory is 
examined where applicable. 
 Finally, this thesis consults with literature on the type certification approaches taken by the 
Federal Aviation Administration of the United States and by the maritime shipping industry. The 
aim of reviewing this literature is to provide insight into type certification approaches of other 
regulatory bodies governing complex domains. In particular, literature criticizing the type 
certification structures of these industries are examined to illustrate some of the challenges and pit 
falls of this type of regulation. The aim of this study is not to develop a detailed type certification 
structure of Canada’s nuclear industry, but to highlight its strengths and weaknesses. 
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The claims made in this thesis are supported by the material relied upon and mentioned 
above. Though attempts are made to support claims using academic and other objectively neutral 
literature, such material, as it applies to the nuclear industry, is limited. As a result, many claims 
of this thesis are informed and supported by materials provided by the CNSC, international 
organisations and stakeholders within Canada’s nuclear industry. Though this thesis intends and 
attempts to provide an objective discussion of the material, it is acknowledged that some material 
relied upon may knowingly or unknowingly be biased towards private interest. To balance 
competing interests, this thesis examines the material relied upon in an objective and fair manner, 
with a close eye on the intention, influence and actions of the authors where appropriate.   
 
1.4 Scope 
This thesis examines Canadian nuclear regulations to bolster them for the regulation of 
SMRs. This thesis relies primarily on the regulatory documentation of the CNSC to develop a 
framework to safely and appropriately regulate SMRs. Additionally, this thesis examines literature 
on regulation generally and specific to nuclear regulation to develop strategies to regulate novel 
and complex nuclear technology. Additionally, this thesis examines risk assessment, risk 
management and risk elicitation literature to develop regulatory strategies to mitigate the 
challenges arising with the risks associated with SMRs. Finally, literature regarding the maritime 
transport industry and the aviation industry are consulted to illustrate how type certification can 
be implemented into Canadian nuclear regulation and the complications it may create with 
Canada’s nuclear regulations. 
 The CNSC has authority over all aspects of nuclear regulation and provides extensive 
regulatory documentation of their expectations. Extensive analysis is conducted on the CNSC’s 
regulations to provide a framework in which to make recommendations for the regulation of 
SMRs. This analysis is integral as regulatory strategies and recommendations made within this 
thesis are evaluated based on their impact on the regulation of SMRs and their integration within 
the existing framework.  
  This thesis does not aim to develop regulations for specific SMR designs but aims to 
bolster regulations so that they may regulate all SMRs without any specificity. By maintaining a 
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broad scope, this thesis avoids inflexible prescriptive requirements that would hinder the regulation 
of SMRs generally. To otherwise develop regulations specific to each SMR design would be an 
insurmountable task considering the number of SMR designs currently in development. Any 
reference to specific SMR designs within this thesis is done only to provide examples and should 
not be taken as developing regulations specific to that design.  
 This thesis does not examine the approaches taken to regulate SMRs in other countries 
because of the limitations to the length of this thesis and the lack of specificity the regulations of 
other countries may have to Canada’s regulatory framework. However, it is noted that SMRs have 
gained international popularity as evidenced by the yearly held International SMR & Advanced 
Reactors Summit, and that many countries have begun considering the deployment of SMRs. The 
United Kingdom10 and the United States11 , for example, are two countries where the industry is 
pushing for the deployment of SMRs. This thesis suggests that the CNSC look into the approaches 
taken by other countries for the regulation of SMRs, if it has not already, to ensure it employs the 
most effective approach.  
 This thesis considers the guidance provided by the Nuclear Energy Agency of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. These international bodies provide valuable insight into Canada’s regulations and the 
regulation of nuclear power generation generally. Additionally, Canada’s regulations embody the 
international commitments entered into with these international bodies. Thus, the guidance 
provided by these bodies provide persuasive insight into Canadian regulations. 
 This thesis examines the use of type certification by the Federal Aviation Industry of the 
United States and by international maritime transport. These two industries are used as examples 
for the type certification process of complex systems that risk catastrophic failure for the purpose 
of considering what approaches may be appropriate for the certification of SMR designs. This 
thesis does not perform a case study on these industries but use them as an example of how type 
certification may be carried out for complex systems and the challenges that arise. The two 
                                                 
10 See World Nuclear News “UK institute proposes SMR deployment schedule”, World Nuclear News (29 
September 2016) online: <www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/UK-institute-proposes-SMR-deployment-
schedule> [perma.cc/RFK8-H5VE]. 
11 See World Nuclear News “US group Calls for SMR support”, World Nuclear News (12 October 2017)  online: 
<www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/US-group-calls-for-SMR-support> [https://perma.cc/Q69P-67HC]. 
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industries provide dissimilar approaches to assessment for type certification and outline challenges 
of implementing a similar system in Canada.  
 This thesis examines in depth how SMRs may be better accommodated within Canadian 
regulations but is limited by the maximum page amount and the complexity of the subject matter.  
The subject matter of this thesis is complex and discusses engineering, regulatory theory, 
regulatory law, and statistics. This thesis attempts to present these subjects to the reader in a 
digestible manner and therefore may lack in-depth discussions of some aspects. Additionally, this 
thesis deliberately does not address the legal issues relating to the consultation or involvement of 
Indigenous peoples that may arise during the assessment, licensing, or planning of SMR projects, 
but recognizes that some may exist.  
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Chapter 2: The Regulatory Approach of the CNSC  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The Nuclear Safety and Control Act charges the CNSC with the duty to establish and 
enforce national standards in the areas of health, safety and the environment and to fulfill Canada’s 
international obligations.12 To achieve these objectives, the CNSC is provided broad powers to 
regulate nuclear activities within Canada, including the power to develop regulations.13 As such, 
the CNSC has developed a regulatory framework that aims to satisfy the objectives of the NSCA. 
This framework embodies “performance-based regulation” and “risk-informed decision-making” 
to assess nuclear activities, which are integral regulatory aspects for the regulation of SMRs and 
are explained thoroughly in the following section.  
The following analysis discusses how the regulatory framework ensures the safety 
objectives of the NSCA are satisfied and how SMRs pose challenges to that process. An overview 
of these objectives, the nuclear licensing process of Canada, and the regulatory principles that 
underpins Canada’s regulatory framework is provided to define the backbone of Canada’s nuclear 
regulatory framework. The analysis provides an in-depth discussion of the important regulatory 
principles used by the CNSC to make risk-informed decisions to provide fundamental insight into 
how regulations may be expanded and developed to accommodate SMRs. The discussion 
illustrates the challenges SMRs pose to regulation and the regulatory principles in which SMRs 
must submit.  
The purpose of this chapter is to outline Canada’s regulatory framework and how SMRs 
are to be regulated therein. The analysis demonstrates the dissonance between SMRs and the 
current regulatory framework. Novel risks and alternative deployment strategies of SMRs pose 
challenges to Canada’s nuclear regulatory framework because of the specificity of Canada’s 
regulations to CANDU reactors – that is Canada’s regulations promulgate requirements, objectives 
and expectations specific to CANDU technologies. Conversely, SMR designs may implement 
                                                 
12 Arslan Dorman, Robert W Morrison, & GB Doern, Canadian Nuclear Energy Policy: Changing ideas, 
institutions, and interests (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) at 103. See also Nuclear Safety and Control 
Act, SC 1997, c 9, s 8(1) [NSCA]. 
13 Dorman, ibid. 
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automation, be safe by design, be premised on fundamentally different approaches to nuclear 
power generation or use other novel and innovative technologies. As a result, some expectations 
may not apply, such as containment requirements, exposure to radiation, and waste disposal 
practices. Additionally, the CNSC may face risks unfamiliar to them or that lack certainty. This 
Chapter argues that regulatory flexibility and bolstering of the framework may aid to address the 
differences between the technologies and accommodate the challenges posed by SMRs to 
Canada’s regulations.  
 
2.2 Overview of the role of the CNSC 
 The regulatory framework developed by the CNSC is a mixture of performance and 
prescriptive-based regulation.14 Prescriptive regimes provide specific requirements for the 
issuance of licenses or certificates approving the regulated activity to be carried out.15 
Performance-based regimes place the onus on the operators to prove that set targets are satisfied.16 
Set targets are typically aspirational goals such as reducing risk as low as reasonably achievable, 
or ensuring that risks are reasonable.17  
Under the NSCA, the CNSC is empowered to develop regulatory requirements as it sees 
fit. The CNSC determines the regulatory requirements to be met by applicants seeking to obtain a 
licence to site, construct, operate, decommission or abandon a nuclear facility. Licences and 
certificates set out binding conditions to which licensees must comply. The requirements of 
licenses are set out in the regulations developed by the CNSC, whereas regulatory documents are 
supplementary and provide greater detail on what must be achieved by the licensee or an applicant 
seeking a license. These regulatory documents provide in-depth guidance on how to successfully 
meet the regulatory requirements of the CNSC. 
                                                 
14 Kevin Lee, “The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission: Readiness Activities to regulate Small Modular 
Reactors” (Paper delivered at the 26th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering, 22–26 July 2018) 
[unpublished] at 3. 
15 Nuclear Energy Agency Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, The Characteristics of 
an Effective Nuclear Regulator, Nuclear Regulation NEA No 7185 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2014) [Nuclear 
Energy Agency, Characteristics of an Effective Regulator] at 25. 
16 Dorman, supra note 12 at 98. 
17 Ibid. 
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2.2.1 The establishment of the CNSC 
The CNSC is established by the NSCA to regulate all nuclear activities within Canada. In 
this role, the CNSC is required by the NSCA to limit risk to a reasonable level, to provide licenses 
only to those who are qualified to carry on the nuclear activity and ensure the satisfaction of 
Canada’s international obligations. To achieve these objectives, the CNSC is given a broad set of 
powers including the authority to develop regulations, issue licenses and to enforce those licenses. 
The discussion of how the CNSC derives its authority and objectives provide fundamental 
background information on how the CNSC impose their regulations and make their decisions. 
As Canada’s nuclear regulator, the CNSC embodies the fundamental purpose of the NSCA 
to “limit to a reasonable level … the risks to national security, the health and safety of persons and 
the environment that are associated with the development, production and use of nuclear energy” 
and to implement the measures Canada has agreed to respect through its international obligations.18 
To accomplish this, the CNSC has devised an extensive regulatory framework that assesses the 
safety of nuclear activity applications based on a myriad of goals, objectives, risk management 
practices and risk assessments. The onus is on the proponent to demonstrate that their proposed 
activity satisfies regulatory expectations, upon which the proponent will be issued a license. 
Section 24(4)(a) and (b) of the NSCA authorize the CNSC to issue or otherwise provide a 
license to an applicant where the applicant is “qualified to carry on the activity that the licence will 
authorize the licensee to carry on” and where the applicant makes “adequate provisions for the 
protection of the environment, the health and safety of persons and the maintenance of national 
security and measures required to implement international obligations to which Canada has 
agreed.”19 Section 24(4)(a) and (b) place the onus on the applicant to prove that the activity being 
licensed meets the objectives and requirements of the NSCA and Canada’s international 
obligations. Section 24(4)(a) and (b) is fundamental to Canada’s regulatory framework and forms 
the basis for its mixture of performance and prescriptive-based regulation.20 
Canada’s international obligations provide imperative regulatory requirements for the 
applicant. Canada has ratified many treaties and conventions, most of them arising out of 
                                                 
18 Supra note 12 s 3(a)–(b). 
19 Ibid, s 24(4)(a)–(b). 
20 Lee, supra note 14 at 3. 
13 
 
agreements of safeguards and measures entered into with the International Atomic Energy 
Association (the “IAEA”)21 and the Nuclear Energy Agency.22 These agreements and other 
international commitments are embodied within the nuclear regulations.  
The regime set out by the NSCA establishes the CNSC as an arms-length government 
regulatory agency to ensure that Canada’s international commitments are met and that national 
standards in the areas of health, safety and the environment are enforced.23 Through this authority, 
the CNSC has devised an extensive regulatory framework to ensure that licenses are issued to 
proponents who demonstrate that their activity pose reasonable risk. 
 
2.2.2 Licensing phases of SMRs 
Under Canadian regulations, SMRs are considered a Class IA nuclear facility and thus must 
meet the regulatory requirements promulgated within regulations regarding those types of 
facilities. Under the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations there are five licensing phases within 
the life cycle of a Class IA reactor.24 Additionally, applicants are required to obtain licenses to 
possess, use, transport and store nuclear substances. The following is an overview of the licensing 
process applicable to SMRs. 
A license is required for the site preparation, construction, operation, modification, and 
decommissioning or abandoning of a Class IA facility.25 Such licenses are issued to an applicant 
depending on whether the applicant has met the conditions set by the NSCA and the requirements 
prescribed by the regulations. The onus is on the applicant to demonstrate that they are qualified 
to carry on the activity that the licence authorizes and that there are adequate provisions for 
maintaining the objectives of safety, security and standards required by Canada’s international 
obligations.26 In assessing an application for a license, the CNSC places scrutiny on the activity 
                                                 
21 The IAEA is an autonomous organisation established independently of the United Nations and serves as an 
intergovernmental for nuclear cooperation amongst countries. 
22 The NEA is a specialised agency within the OECD that promotes development of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes. 
23 Dorman, supra note 12 at 103-104. 
24 Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations, SOR/2000-204, ss 3–8. 
25 NSCA, supra note 12 ss 9, 21(1), 26(e). See also ibid, ss 4–8. 
26 Ibid s 24(4)(a)–(b). 
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commensurate with its risk, which is an exercise of the graded approach and is discussed further 
in the following section. 
 An environmental assessment (EA) must be performed before obtaining a license for the 
siting of a reactor; however, a proponent may complete an EA and the application for a license to 
site simultaneously. Currently, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012,27 is the 
governing legislation for the completion of EAs. Under the CEAA the CNSC is the responsible 
authority for carrying out environmental assessments. However, this responsibility will soon be 
reduced to a minor consultative role as the CEAA will be repealed once Bill C-69 receives Royal 
Assent and enacts the Impact Assessment Act.28 Under the IAA, assessments of nuclear activities 
regulated under the NSCA are referred to a joint review panel consisting of members appointed by 
the Minister of the Environment, rather than to the CNSC.29 
Vendor design reviews (VDRs) is an optional pre-licensing process established in 2008 by 
the CNSC and provides a preliminary assessment of reactor designs to inform the vendor of the 
overall acceptability of the design.30 The determinations made in a VDR do not bind or influence 
the later decision to issue or otherwise provide a licence.31 The VDR evaluates whether the design 
complies with applicable regulations and provides certainty by providing clear feedback, 
identifying technical issues, reducing significant changes to the design later on in the application 
process and reducing the amount of time to assess the design during the review of applications.32 
The objective of pre-licensing engagement is to increase regulatory clarity for applicants. 
 The CNSC may issue, renew, amend, replace or suspend a license. Additionally, the CNSC 
may prescribe and enforce licensing conditions to satisfy the requirements of the NSCA. However, 
the onus is on the applicant to demonstrate that regulatory requirements are satisfied and that they 
have adequate provisions to meet the objectives of the NSCA. To make this determination, the 
                                                 
27 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, c 19, s 52. 
28 Canada, Bill C-69, An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to 
amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2018 
[Bill C-69].  
29 Ibid, cl 43(a). 
30 Canada, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Pre-licensing Review of a Vendor’s Reactor Design, GD–385 
(Ottawa: CNSC, May 2012) at 1. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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CNSC has produced regulatory documents that outline its policies, which include measures, 
procedures and requirements that applicants must demonstrate or otherwise satisfy. 
 
2.2.3 Regulatory Documents 
Regulatory documents detail and provide guidance on what licensees and applicants must 
accomplish to satisfy regulatory requirements. Regulatory documents are produced through a 
transparent and consultative process between the CNSC and stakeholders and form the foundation 
of licensing assessments. Regulatory documents produced by the CNSC are numerous and amount 
to more than 70 documents, with more continuously being developed. Regulatory documents 
provide guidance for all nuclear activities including SMRs. 
 Important regulatory documents for the regulation of SMRs include RD-367: Design of 
Small Reactor Facilities,33 Design of Reactor Facilities: Nuclear Power Plants34 and the Licence 
Application Guide: Licence to Construct a Nuclear Power Plant.35 RD-367: Design of Small 
Reactor Facilities provides design specifications and safety requirements for facilities containing 
a reactor with a power level of less than 200 megawatts thermal, which only some SMRs may fall 
within.36 Though Design of Reactor Facilities: Nuclear Power Plants37 and Licence Application 
Guide: Licence to Construct a Nuclear Power Plant38  provides guidance specific to commercial 
water-cooled nuclear power plants, some aspects are also applicable to SMRs.  
Licence application guides outline the information that should be submitted by the 
applicant in support of the licence sought. Common to all license application guides are the safety 
and control areas (“SCAs”), which are technical topics the CNSC employs to “assess, review, 
verify and report on regulatory requirements and performance across all regulated facilities and 
                                                 
33 Canada, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Design of Small Reactor Facilities, RD-367 (Ottawa: CNSC, 
June 2011) [Canada, Design of Small Reactor Facilities]. 
34 Canada, Design of Reactor Facilities, infra note 75. 
35 Canada, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Licence Application Guide: Licence to Construct a Nuclear 
Power Plant, RD/GD-369 (Ottawa: CNSC, August 2012). 
36 Supra note 33 at 1. 
37 Supra note 34 
38 Supra note 35 at i. 
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activities.”39 The 14 SCAs specify considerations to be addressed by license applicants. In their 
assessments of license applications, the CNSC considers the measures taken by the applicant to 
address the SCA proportionate to the risk associated with the activity. This approach to assessment 
is known as the graded approach and is discussed further in this chapter. 
There are numerous types of regulatory documents produced by the CNSC that provide 
information and guidance for applicants attempting to license SMRs. Licence application guides 
are one type of regulatory document and provide direct guidance on what needs to be addressed 
and considered in a licence application. Other regulatory documents may consider aspects of 
regulation such as regulatory fundamentals, probability safety assessment practices, public 
involvement and more. Regulatory documents provide the foundational information and guidance 
of the CNSC’s expectations for the regulation of nuclear activities. 
 
2.2.4 Public Involvement   
 The CNSC considers the views of the public and stakeholders in all licensing decisions in 
accordance with their mandate to regulate in the best interest of Canadians. There are three primary 
areas where the public is engaged to address their concerns regarding a nuclear project or activity. 
First, the public is involved in environmental impact assessments according to the CEAA. Second, 
public hearings are held prior to granting licences by the CNSC. Finally, the CNSC requires that 
proponents engage in a public information disclosure program that necessitates public engagement 
commensurate with the complexity of the project and public perspective. These public engagement 
strategies are consistent with the objectives of the NSCA and the duties of the CNSC. 
 The CNSC is mandated by the NSCA to regulate in the interest of the public, which includes 
addressing the concerns of the public and informing them of the effects of nuclear activities on the 
environment, and the health and safety of the public.40 The Regulatory Policy: Regulatory 
Fundamentals further outlines the objectives of the CNSC’s engagement with the public, and 
directs the CNSC to: 
                                                 
39 Canada, Canadian Nuclear safety Commission, Glossary of CNSC Terminology, REGDOC-3.6 (December 
2016) at 100 [Canada, Glossary of Terminology]. 
40 NSCA, supra note 12 s 9(b). 
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1. Carry out its mandate in the interest of Canadians; 
2. Communicate openly and transparently with stakeholders in an objective fashion while 
respecting Canada’s access to information and privacy laws; 
3. Provide stakeholders with the opportunity to be heard in accordance with the prescribed 
rules of procedure; 
4. Consult with stakeholders when establishing priorities, developing policies, and planning 
programs and services; 
5. Interact with foreign nuclear regulators and appropriate national and international 
organizations, and cooperate with other jurisdictions; and 
6. Operate in an effective and efficient manner.41 
 
 Currently, environmental impact assessments are governed by the CEAA, which provides 
opportunities for the public to engage with proponents and government agents. The CEAA requires 
notices or reports to be made available to the public at numerous points during the assessment 
process and invites public participation during the screening phase,42 the completion of the impact 
assessment43 and when making the decision to refer assessments to a review panel.44 Additionally, 
as the responsible authority for impact assessments under the CEAA, the CNSC must establish a 
participant funding program to facilitate the participation of the public in environmental 
assessments of nuclear activities.45 The requirement to establish a participant funding program is 
echoed within the NSCA. 
 Proponents are instructed by regulations to develop a public information and disclosure 
program to facilitate the participation of the public.46 The aim of the program is “to ensure that 
information related to the health, safety and security of persons and the environment, and other 
issues associated with the lifecycle of nuclear facilities are effectively communicated to the 
public.”47 The proponent determines the development of the objectives, strategy, protocol and 
scope of the program; however, the program is overseen and approved by the CNSC.48 
                                                 
41 Canada, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Regulatory Policy: Regulatory Fundamentals, P-299 
(Ottawa: CNSC, April 2015) at 2 [Canada, Regulatory Fundamentals]. 
42 CEAA, supra note 27 s 9(c). 
43 Ibid ss 24, 19(1). 
44 Ibid s 38(2)(b). 
45 Ibid s 58(1). 
46 NSCA, supra note 12  ss 21(1)(b.1) and (e).  
47 Canada, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Public and Aboriginal Engagement: Public Information and 
Disclosure, REGDOC-3.2.1 (Ottawa: CNSC, May 2018) at 2. 
48 Ibid. 
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Importantly, the level of public engagement by the proponent is commensurate with the 
complexity of: 
• the level of public interest they generate 
• the design, construction and operation of the nuclear facility and activities being 
licensed 
• the risks to the health and safety of persons and the environment associated with 
the facility and activities.49 
Further requirements specific to the engagement of Indigenous Peoples are found in Public and 
Aboriginal Engagement: Aboriginal Engagement.50 
 In addition to the public information and disclosure program, the CNSC provides an 
opportunity for the public to participate in a public hearing with respect to the granting of a licence, 
or where it is in the public interest to do so.51 Public hearings allow the public and stakeholders to 
learn about the nuclear activity and provide an opportunity to be heard in front of the CNSC.52 In 
keeping with their mandate to regulate within the best interest of the public, the CNSC must 
address the concerns raised during the public hearing, and elsewhere, before deciding to grant a 
licence. 
 The weight given to public and stakeholder concerns can be ambiguous. The NSCA 
requires that all issues or comments raised during public hearings be addressed by the CNSC and 
includes hearings conducted during environmental assessment as per the CNSC’s responsibility 
under the CEAA. However, it is not clear whether a review panel exercising the powers of the 
CNSC when conducting an impact assessment under IAA will have this same obligation. 
Furthermore, acting in the interest of the public may not always coincide with public concern or 
opinion. The public may be biased, have incomplete information, or be poorly informed of the 
risks involved in the deployment and operation of a nuclear facility.53 The CNSC balances the 
public’s interest with objective assessments and information, and will rely on expert opinion when 
                                                 
49 Ibid at 4. 
50 Canada, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Public and Aboriginal Engagement: Aboriginal Engagement, 
REGDOC-3.2.2 (Ottawa: CNSC, February 2016). 
51 NSCA, supra note 12 s 40(5)(a)–(b).  
52 Canada, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Information Dissemination: Licensing Process for Class I 
Nuclear Facilities and Uranium Mines and Mills, REGDOC-3.5.1, Version 2 (Ottawa: CNSC, May 2017) at 3. 
53 See Cass R Sunstein, “Beyond the Precautionary Principle” (2003) 151 U PA L Rev 1003 (Sunstein explains 
that public concerns of nuclear power are not linked to the actual risk of those hazards and that those concerns are 
unproportionate to the quite low risks associated with the technology at 1045 and 1051).  
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faced with uncertainties.54 The balancing of these considerations in the assessment of a nuclear 
activity is done under the risk-informed decision-making model employed by the CNSC, which 
employs a myriad of regulatory principles to ultimately make decisions regarding the granting of 
licenses. 
 Acting in the interest of the public is a paramount obligation of the CNSC and forms an 
important aspect of the regulatory framework. The CNSC achieves public participation through 
multiple levels of public consultation, discourse, and disclosure. This practice aims to ensure that 
the public is informed of the proposed projects and its risks. In the regulation of SMRs, public 
opinion poses significant, though necessary, challenges, especially considering that literature has 
concluded that the public is more opposed to the regulation of novel technologies than pre-existing 
and more familiar technologies, products or activities.55 Thus, public engagement becomes 
increasingly more important when regulating SMRs to ensure that the public is accurately and well 
informed of its novelty and risks. Additionally, the public’s trust may be bolstered where SMRs 
are regulated under a robust and effective regulatory framework. Proposed regulations of SMRs 
must, therefore, embody and consider these aspects in order to successfully deploy SMRs. 
2.2.5 Conclusion 
The above provides a brief outline of the structure of Canada’s nuclear regulatory 
framework. The CNSC plans to proceed with the regulation of SMRs under the same framework, 
albeit with minor variations. To ready Canada for the deployment of SMRs, the CNSC plans to 
release additional regulatory documents to inform proponents of their expectations on how to 
satisfy the regulatory requirements.  
Public opinion poses significant challenges and concerns for proponents. Early and 
thorough engagement of the public by proponents will be imperative to achieving favourable 
public opinions of their nuclear activities. Nuclear power plants already have an established public 
bias, while the novelty of SMRs inspires additional concern. For SMRs to be successfully and 
effectively deployed in Canada, public engagement must form an important consideration of the 
regulations. Regulatory theorists have addressed these issues in different ways and have proposed 
                                                 
54 Canada, Regulatory Fundamentals, supra note 41 at 2. 
55 See generally Sunstein, supra note 53 (Sunstein discusses the precautionary principles, its misuse by the 
public and how its use has been criticized for stifling progress). 
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regulatory measures to address these issues; however, the matter remains problematic. It remains 
that this issue should be considered when evaluating regulatory approaches to SMRs to ensure 
effective measures are implemented. 
To accommodate SMRs in the regulation, the above outlined regulatory process may 
remain the same; however, supporting regulatory documents may be developed or adjusted for this 
purpose. Not all regulatory documents need to be evaluated, but the regulatory principles employed 
within them may be. Approaches to risk-informed decision-making implemented by the CNSC 
may be expanded and re-purposed to accommodate SMRs. These approaches include the graded 
approach, the precautionary principle deterministic and probabilistic risk assessments and the 
reproducibility principle. These approaches are discussed in the following section. 
 
2.3 Regulatory principles and fundamentals of the CNSC’s decision-making  
The CNSC practices risk-informed decision-making (RIDM) which is an overarching 
deliberative process that measures risk against a set of performance or safety objectives, along 
with other considerations, to inform their decisions.56 RIDM contemplates whether activities meet 
regulatory requirements while recognizing the relevant role of human judgement, technical 
assessment and best available information.57 RIDM is an overarching organizing philosophy that 
implements a myriad of decision-making tools and risk assessment approaches. Its application is 
not directly expressed by any of the CSNC’s regulatory documents but may be gleaned by 
considering the CNSC’s overarching decision making process. 
The CNSC employ RIDM so that they may confidently make decisions in light of the safety 
objectives provided within the NSCA and other relevant legislation. Notably, these safety 
objectives are aspirational in nature and thus are not easily demonstrated. For example, the primary 
safety objective of the NSCA requires that risks to the environment and the public are kept at 
reasonable levels, while others center on keeping radiation exposure as low as reasonably 
achievable, ensuring that there is no adverse impact to the environment, and that all reasonably 
practical measures are taken. As aspirational goals do not outright provide prescriptive regulatory 
                                                 
56 Enrico Zio & Nicola Pedroni, Fondation pour une Culture de Sécurité Industrielle, Risk-informed decision-
making processes, (Toulouse, France: FONCSI, December 2012) at 4. 
57 Ibid. 
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requirements, the CNSC employs RIDM to assess the safety of proposed activities to ultimately 
arrive at a decision they believe qualitatively meet these objectives. 
The regulatory documents produced by the CNSC provide insight into the administration 
of RIDM and the principles its process employs. Regulatory principles such as grading, 
probabilistic and deterministic risk assessment, the precautionary principle, defence in-depth, 
control cool and contain and others permeate throughout the CNSC’s regulation and form integral 
aspects of the RIDM process. These principles help the CNSC assess the risk of proposed projects 
and whether applicants satisfy the safety objectives. 
The following discussion explains how the safety objectives of the NSCA are met within 
the RIDM structure prescribed by the CNSC’s regulations. Importantly, the discussion illustrates 
how the graded approach is administered and its implications to the regulation of SMRs.  
 
2.3.1 Safety objectives of the CNSC 
The NSCA and other pertinent legislation provide safety objectives that are aspirational in 
nature. These safety objectives consist of a primary objective and three complementary safety 
objectives. The primary safety objective requires that the risk of nuclear activities be limited to 
those that are reasonable, while complementary safety objectives provide aspirations in the areas 
of radiation exposure, environmental effects and technology. Both the primary and complementary 
safety objectives permeate all aspects of nuclear regulation, such as regulatory standards, 
behaviour modification or enforcement, and information gathering.58 The CNSC employs RIDM 
to assess the safety of proposed activities and to ultimately arrive at a decision they believe 
qualitatively meet these objectives. 
The primary safety objective is prescribed within the NSCA and mandates that risk be 
limited “to a reasonable level and in a manner that is consistent with Canada’s international 
obligations, of the risks to national security, the health and safety of persons and the 
                                                 
58 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, & Martin Lodge The Oxford handbook of regulation (Oxford New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010) at 358. 
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environment...”59 Limiting risk to a reasonable level imparts no prescriptive requirements for how 
this objective is met, but is an aspirational objective of performance-based regulation. 
Whether the risk of a proposed project is mitigated to a reasonable level is determined 
discretionally by the CNSC on best practices and the performance of the proposed project.60 The 
safety objective of “reasonable risk” is interpreted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (the “OECD”) as a qualitative criterion revealed in practice over several years.61 
The CNSC takes the same approach, citing the Federal Court of Appeal decision of Canada v 
Berhad as guidance on the statutory mandate regarding safety.62 Canada v Berhad explains that 
safety is not measured quantitatively, rather “[i]t is judged according to an assessment of an 
acceptable risk: ... [a]n acceptable risk is essentially a value-based proposition determined by 
policy and/or by those authorized by governments to judge safety and/or by those exposed to the 
risk...”63 The CNSC provides Berhad as support and justification for reliance on best practices and 
performance-based considerations for making regulatory decisions.  
The CNSC prescribes three additional safety objectives that are complementary to the 
primary objective. These objectives are the radiation protection and acceptance safety objective, 
the environmental protection safety objective, and the technical safety objectives.64 These 
complimentary objectives must be satisfied before the CNSC may grant a license and inform the 
overall primary objective of whether risks are limited to a reasonable level. 
The radiation protection and acceptance safety objective originates from the Radiation 
Protection Regulations, which provides that the exposure of radiation within the reactor facility 
during anticipated operational occurrences, or any planned release of radiation, be kept as low as 
reasonably achievable (ALARA), taking into account social and economic factors, through the 
                                                 
59 Supra note 12 ss 3(a), 24(4). 
60 Canada, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, “How does the CNSC define safety?” (11 August 2014) 
[Canada, Defining Safety], online: <nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/resources/educational-resources/feature-articles/how-
does-the-cnsc-define-safety> [perma.cc/252D-8JQJ]. 
61 Nuclear Energy Agency Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Nuclear Regulatory 
Decision-making, (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2005) [Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Regulatory Decision-making] 
at 17. 
62 Canada, Defining Safety, supra note 60. See also Canada v Berhad, 2005 FCA 267, [2005] FCJ No 1302 
[Berhad].  
63 Berhad, ibid at para 122. 
64 Canada, Design of small reactor facilities, supra note 33 at 4. 
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implementation of different control processes and planning.65 The CNSC has published a 
regulatory guide for keeping radiation exposure ALARA.66 This guide explains that ALARA is 
achieved not only by respecting appropriate dose limits, but requires explicit efforts to reduce 
radiation exposure below dose limits where practical.67 Whether measures are practical will 
depend on social and economic factors. The fundamental safety function of “control, cool and 
contain” is an important factor in assessing whether this safety objective is satisfied and is 
discussed further in section 2.3.3. 
The environmental protection safety objective finds its impetus in the CEAA and the NSCA 
and requires applicants to demonstrate that their proposed nuclear activity poses no significant 
adverse effects to the environment during normal operation and anticipated operational 
occurrences, and where design basis accidents occur.68 This complementary safety objective will 
persist when the IAA replaces the CEAA despite the removal of the CNSC as the responsible 
authority to perform impact assessments because the IAA continues to proscribe detrimental effects 
to the environment.69 However, it is unclear how the CNSC will satisfy itself that this objective is 
met once it is removed as the responsible authority for impact assessments. Under the IAA the 
CNSC will have a far more limited capacity to assess whether this safety objective is satisfied and 
will rely upon the determinations of a review board who may not be as experienced as they are 
with the evaluation of nuclear activities.70 
Finally, the technical safety objective prescribes that the design of facilities take all 
reasonably practical measures to prevent all accidents in the reactor facility and that appropriate 
measures are in place to mitigate those accidents if they occur.71 This includes risks of very low 
                                                 
65 Radiation Protection Regulations, SOR/2000-203 s 4(a). See also Packaging and Transport of Nuclear 
Substances Regulations, 2015, SOR/2015-145, s 18(1). 
66 See Canada, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Keeping Radiation Exposures and Doses ‘As low as 
Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)’, G-129, Revision 1 (Ottawa: CNSC, October 2004). 
67 Ibid (Licencees are expected to reduce doses ALARA proportional to the magnitude of projected or historical 
doses, where relevant social and economic factors, and the views of the public are balanced with the benefits 
obtained at 2–3, 7). 
68 Ibid at 14. See also CEAA, supra note 27, s 52. 
69 Bill C-69, supra note 28 (the IAA maintains that there be no significant adverse effects to the environment at 
Part 1 cl 15(a)). 
70 See Andrew Dusevic, “The role of the CNSC under the proposed Impact Assessment Act” (2018) 6:3 Energy 
Regulation Quarterly 33 at 33–35.    
71 Ibid. 
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probability.72 In practice, this safety objective is met primarily through the practice of defence-in-
depth. The CNSC has a defence-in-depth framework for this purpose and is discussed more 
thoroughly in section 2.3.3.  
As the name suggests, the complementary safety objectives support the primary objective 
of limiting risk to reasonable levels. Complementary safety objectives impart appropriate 
aspirational goals to the areas of environmental, radiological and technical safety, which form 
important consideration for ensuring the primary goal that the proposed activity does not introduce 
unreasonable risk. This interaction is illustrated by the SCAs which cover various aspects of 
environmental, radiological and technical control. The assessment of these SCAs by the CNSC 
ultimately determines whether the risk of the proposed activity is reasonable. Thus, 
complementary safety objectives promote the broader objective of preventing unreasonable risk. 
The lack of operational history and gaps within risk assessments of SMRs frustrates that 
ability of proponents to demonstrate that risks meet safety objectives. When addressing SCAs, 
applicants must demonstrate with determinability that risks are mitigated to a reasonable level73 
which becomes difficult where there are gaps in risk assessments or where novel approaches 
outside the scope of the CNSC’s experience are used to address the SCAs. The traditional method 
of managing these risks is to implement conservative measures like the use of defence-in-depth 
and safety margins. However, these measures may employ a level of conservatism 
disproportionate to the actual risk, or may not actually be necessary for the safe operation, but are 
required by regulations.  
Additionally, the CNSC has developed prescriptive qualitative and quantitative safety 
goals for radiation protection and technical safety. These safety goals aim to limit the risks posed 
by the operation of the plant through quantitative assessments of the frequency of radiological 
release and frequency of core damage.  To limit the societal risks posed by the operation of a small 
reactor facility two qualitative safety goals have been established: 
                                                 
72 Ibid. 
73 Canada, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Licence Application Guide: Licensing Small Modular 
Reactor Facilities (DRAFT), REGDOC-1.1.5 (Ottawa: CNSC, October 2017) [Canada, REGDOC-1.1.5] at 14. 
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1. Individual members of the public are provided a level of protection from the 
consequences of reactor facility operation such that there is no significant 
additional risk to the life and health of individuals. 
2. Societal risks to life and health from reactor facility operation should not 
significantly add to other societal risks.74 
 The qualitative safety goals are achieved upon the demonstration of the accompanying 
quantitative safety goals.75 Quantitative safety goals are a measure of the plant’s accident 
preventive capabilities characterized by the frequency of core damage and release of radioactive 
material.76 Core damage frequency is a sum of all event sequences that may result in significant 
core degradation. The small release frequency and large release frequency metrics are the sum of 
all events that may require temporary or long-term evacuation of the local population, 
respectively.77 Expression of core damage frequencies are expressed by the chance of event per 
year and exclude malevolent acts but include events that may occur during operation and external 
events such as earthquakes.78 The CNSC’s regulatory documents provide guidance on how these 
calculations are to be completed and prescribe maximum release frequencies.79 
The safety objectives are aspirational goals informed through years of practice and 
expectations found within the regulatory documents. The basic level of the CNSC’s safety 
objectives are paramount and must be satisfied regardless of any cost or consideration.80 However, 
challenges arise with the determination of whether SMRs meet these safety objectives, as there is 
no historical data on which to judge these novel reactors. Additionally, Canada’s regulatory regime 
has been tested, for the most part, only by commercial CANDU reactors and has little experience 
in regulating other types. It is argued that the novel and unprecedented risks associated with SMRs 
cannot be addressed in full using conventional risk assessment mitigation practices designed for 
heavy water-cooled reactors, such as the CANDU. Re-evaluation of the regulatory framework is 
                                                 
74 Canada, Design of Small Reactor Facilities, supra note 33 at 7. See also Canada, Canadian Nuclear Safety 
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necessary to overcome issues related to SMRs. To do this, the CNSC has begun adapting and 
expanding its regulatory documents and regulatory procedures to accommodate SMRs. The belief 
is that these safety objectives may be still met by re-considering the regulatory practices that 
underpin it. 
 
2.3.2 Risk-informed decision-making and the regulatory principles that underpin it  
RIDM is implemented by regulators to ensure confident decisions and is an overarching 
organizing philosophy that implements a myriad of decision-making tools and risk assessment 
approaches. Cornerstones of the RIDM process applied by the CNSC include risk assessment, 
conservative decision-making and the principle of proportionality. These key elements are not 
themselves expressly prescribed within the regulatory documents; rather, they are espoused within 
the regulatory measures such as the precautionary principle, deterministic risk assessment, 
probabilistic risk assessment, and the graded approach. Understanding how these principles are 
implemented to inform the decision-making process provide insight into how the regulatory 
framework may be adapted or developed to address concerns of regulating SMRs.  
The RIDM model integrates both deterministic and probabilistic risk assessment and other 
relevant factors to assess proposed nuclear activities objectively and to make appropriate 
decisions.81 More specifically, RIDM “ensures that the significant risks associated with the 
decisions are identified, understood, and characterized and that appropriate measures are taken to 
control these risks.”82 Unlike risk management, RIDM considers all relevant factors, such as cost-
benefit arguments, regulatory documents, experience, codes and standards in the areas of licensing, 
compliance, planning and resource allocation.83 RIDM considers all perspectives on an objective 
basis but also “[r]ecognizes the role of professional judgement, especially in areas where there is 
a lack of standards.”84 The CNSC makes its assessments on a thorough assessment of factual 
                                                 
81 Enrico Zio, supra note 56 at 4. 
82 A Bujor, Risk-informed Decision-making – Approach for Consideration of Time-at-Risk, (Ottawa: Canadian 
Nuclear Safety Commission, 2010) at 1. 
83 Ibid at 4.  
84 Canada, Regulatory Fundamentals, supra note 41 at 2. See Canada, “REGDOC-1.1.5”, supra note 73 (“[t]he 
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evidence, but also emphasizes the judgement of experts when faced with uncertainty.85 The RIDM 
model integrates deterministic risk assessments and probabilistic risk assessment with other 
consideration to form a robust decision-making model. 
RIDM is an advantageous model for regulating SMRs. The RIDM process acknowledges 
the utility of human judgement in decisions and avoids technocentrism as a basis for decision-
making.86 RIDM avoids inevitable technical gaps in information through human judgement,87 
which is advantageous for novel technologies that are encumbered by gaps in their risk 
assessments such as SMRs. This approach is more effective and robust than its predecessor which 
was mostly a deterministic assessment and relied heavily on the conservative regulation of system 
designs and operation.  
The utility of the RIDM model will depend on how it is implemented by the regulator. The 
approach taken by the US Nuclear Regulator, for example, employs a structure built upon 
mandatory and legal requirements, such as plant specifications; deterministic requirements, which 
ensures the satisfaction of defence-in-depth measures and the maintenance of safety margins; 
probabilistic risk insights, which assesses all initiating events and estimates risk; and other factors 
which include costs-and-benefits analyses and more.88 The RIDM model employed by the CNSC 
is much the same, except that the Canadian regulator places additional emphasis on the 
perspectives of stakeholders.  
A mainstay of the RIDM model is its integration of deterministic risk assessment and 
probabilistic risk assessments, and thus necessitates comment. The deterministic approach assesses 
risk on less quantifiable criteria such as political or security considerations and focuses on 
engineering principles such as safety measures, redundancy and diversity to prevent the 
consequences of an event.89 The purpose of the deterministic approach is to identify a group of 
failure event sequences leading to credible worst-case accident scenarios, predict their 
consequences and design safety measures to prevent and mitigate those consequences.90 In 
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contrast, probabilistic risk assessments employ quantitative, or semi-quantitative methods, to 
estimate the likelihood of all accidents and are not limited to assessments of worst-case scenario 
accidents such as the deterministic approach.91 Probabilistic risk assessments do not supplant 
deterministic assessments; rather they are used to support them.92 The integration of both 
assessment types by the RIDM model provides a rational and quantitative approach to uncertainty. 
An integral approach to address uncertainty and risk within the RIDM model is to make 
conservative decisions. Conservative decision-making underpins many regulatory principles 
employed within RIDM such as deterministic assessments, the precautionary principle and the 
graded approach. Conservative decision-making aims to place the reactor and its facilities in a 
condition known to be safe or that have reasonable risks. Deterministic risk assessment, the 
precautionary principle and the graded approach each provide a different aspect to conservative 
decision-making that significantly affects how the risks of a proposed project are to be mitigated 
and assessed.  
Elements of conservative decision-making are exemplified within deterministic 
approaches where the assessment mandates the necessity of measures such as defence-in-depth, 
safety margins or other like-wise precautionary practice to mitigate risks to reasonable levels.93 
Invocation of conservative decision-making assures that risks are reasonable and that regulatory 
objectives are satisfied. Regulatory objectives necessitate the application of conservative decision-
making despite the impact it may have on the costs of the proposed project.94  
The precautionary principle is used by policymakers to justify conservative decision-
making where the risks of the activity remain unknown. Though the principle is not expressly 
mandated within the NSCA as it is in the CEAA and IAA, it is woven throughout the framework 
developed by the CNSC.95  Continuous improvement, adoption of best practices, transparency and 
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public scrutiny are aspects of the principle that form paramount features of Canada’s nuclear 
regulations.96 Under the CEAA the CNSC, or a review panel as will be the case under the IAA,97 is 
expressly mandated to conduct environmental impact assessments in a manner that applies the 
precautionary principle.98 It is noted, however, that the IAA and CEAA do not specify or provide 
guidance on the strength or variety of the principle to be used.  
The CNSC does not explicitly define the version of the precautionary principle it aims to 
employ; however, it is evident that the CNSC’s regulations have adopted a weak form of the 
principle. Stewart has identified four versions of the precautionary principle that are prominent 
throughout legal instruments, government and international declarations and other documents.99 
They are as follows: 
1. The Non-Preclusion Precautionary Principle: Scientific uncertainty should not 
automatically preclude regulation of activities that pose a potential risk of 
significant harm. 
2. The Margin of Safety Precautionary Principle: Regulatory control should 
incorporate a margin of safety; activities should be limited below the level at which 
no adverse effect has been observed. 
3. The Best Available Technology Precautionary Principle: Activities that present an 
uncertain potential for significant harm should be subject to best technology 
available requirements to minimize the risk of harm unless the proponent of the 
activity shows that they present no appreciable risk of harm. 
4. The Prohibitory Precautionary Principle: Activities that present an uncertain 
potential for significant harm should be prohibited unless the proponent of the 
activity shows that it presents no appreciable risk.100 
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Of these definitions, Stewart’s second definition, the “Margin of Safety Precautionary 
Principle,” most closely resembles the precautionary principle embedded in the regulations of the 
CNSC because it is consistent with the use of conservative decision-making to ensure reasonable 
risks. Stewart characterizes this definition on the weaker end of the continuum because of its failure 
to specify the form of regulation that should be adopted but instructs that margin of safety should 
be adopted.101 This definition is consistent with Canada’s regulations which aim to limit risk to 
reasonable levels through different measures including the requirement of safety margins. 
Measures carried out by conservative decision-making are to be inversely proportional to 
the level of understanding of risk and safety, which is an application of the principle of 
proportionality.102 The proportionality principle is most notably utilized within the graded 
approach. The graded approach, as applied by the CNSC, is a framework of decision-making tools 
and rules consistent with principles espoused by the IAEA. The graded approach assures the 
administration of regulatory requirements in proportion to the risks of the associated nuclear 
activity.103  
The graded approach instructs that regulatory requirements be applied in accordance with 
the circumstances, and the “likelihood and possible consequences of, and the level of risk 
associated with, a loss of control.”104 The circumstances considered are those presented within the 
14 SCAs mentioned previously. These include the relative risks to health, safety, security and the 
environment, and characteristics of the activity, such as reactor power, fuel design and more.105 
Moreover, the degree of scrutiny placed on the nuclear activity by the CNSC is informed by a 
number of considerations, including the technical assessments of submissions, relevant research 
and information supplied by the parties, cooperation with other regulators and the safety history 
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of the licence applicant.106 From the perspective of the CNSC, the goal of the graded approach is 
to ensure the satisfaction of fundamental safety objectives in a risk-informed manner 
commensurate with the risk complexity and novelty of the project.107 
The primary responsibility for safety remains with the licensee and those conducting the 
regulated activities at all times.108 Accordingly, the graded approach allows for applicants to 
propose alternative methods of meeting regulatory requirements so long as they can demonstrate 
a reasonable level of risk and that regulations are satisfied.109 The onus of proving and 
demonstrating that measures proportionally address risk is placed on the applicant. Thus, the 
graded approach provides the opportunity for SMR proponents to deviate from conventional risk 
practices, so long as they can proportionally demonstrate the activity’s safety.   
The CNSC determines the safety of a project by applying the graded approach which 
considers the degree of novelty, complexity and potential harm posed by the activity 
commensurate with the measures used to reduce risk to a reasonable level.110 Industry and the 
CNSC have highlighted the graded approach as an important regulatory tool for regulating SMRs. 
However, many vendors and proponents of SMRs have called for more clarity on the principles 
application to SMRs, as they point out that SMRs often lack historical operational data which is 
an important consideration in its application.111   
 RIDM is an effective model for nuclear regulators to make well-informed decisions 
regarding nuclear activities. Its application to SMRs is beneficial because it strikes a balance 
between many inputs and implements the graded approach which provides a technological neutral 
assessment of safety commensurate with the degree of novelty, complexity and potential harm. 
The graded approach is an effective model because it supports transparency and robustness within 
the regulatory process, and considers the best available information arising from research and 
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stakeholder input. In addition, the graded approach provides a balance with conservative decision-
making which naturally has an implicit bias against novelty and innovation. However, to 
effectively regulate SMRs there must be a balance struck between the graded approach and 
conservative decision-making that moves away from conventional approaches and accommodates 
novel designs, automation, modularity, and other innovative features. 
 
2.3.3 The fundamental safety function of “control, cool and contain”  
The fundamental safety principles of “control, cool and contain” are a safety philosophy 
that minimizes risk to the public and environment through the implementation of design measures. 
These measures include the application of defence-in-depth and containment barriers which may 
not be effectual for SMRs. Conventional approaches to obtaining the fundamental safety functions 
assume ubiquitous application to all reactor designs. Proponents claim that this approach may 
cause compatibility challenges depending on the design of the SMR. 
The application of the fundamental safety function of “control, cool and contain” refers to 
the control of the reactor power, the cooling of the reactor fuel, and the containment of radioactivity 
using safety mechanisms and measures to achieve safety objectives. Achieving this safety function 
requires that risks of radiation are ALARA and that measures implemented are independent, 
diverse, separate and redundant.112 An important strategy to achieve the functions of “control, cool 
and contain” is the execution of defence-in-depth in conjunction with the CNSC’s regulatory 
expectations. 
Not only is defence-in-depth a tool of deterministic and conservative regulation, but its 
administration is a fundamental safety function of “control, cool and contain.”113 Defence-in-depth 
is administered through overlapping measures to prevent and mitigate risks to design related safety 
and security activities.114 The CNSC has defined five levels of safety objectives pertinent to 
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establishing defence-in-depth. Level one prevents deviations from normal operation and prevents 
failures of systems, structures and components. Level two prevents anticipated deviation 
occurrences in normal operation from escalating to accident conditions through detection ant 
interceptive systems. Level three minimizes the consequences of accidents. Level four ensures that 
any release of radioactive material by severe accidents is ALARA. Level five mitigates the 
consequences of radioactive releases that may result from accident conditions.115 Each level of 
defence should be effective independent of each other. 
Furthermore, each level is achieved through multiple and diverse provisions.116 
Regulations and related documents leave little ability for proponents to deviate from conventional 
approaches of defence-in-depth. Additionally, difficulty arises for SMRs as approaches to defence-
in-depth are discretionally assessed by the CNSC based on operational history, which may be 
lackiong, and the complexity and novelty of the technology.   
A mainstay of defence-in-depth is the erection of multiple physical barriers to prevent and 
contain the uncontrolled release of radioactive materials. Physical containment is conventionally 
considered necessary for the overall success of the practice of defence-in-depth.117 Physical 
barriers include physical containment but may also take the form of a fuel matrix, cladding or other 
additional barrier types.118  
However, barriers pose unique challenges for some SMR designs. Some vendors have 
claimed physical barriers are unnecessary where reaction mechanisms are incapable of resulting 
in the release of materials, with some claiming that they may also impede heat transfer thereby 
increasing risks.119 The practice of defence-in-depth presupposes that conventional approaches of 
this measure are ubiquitous, which arises from the CNSC’s exclusive experience with CANDU 
reactors.  
The fundamental safety function of “control, cool and contain” has traditionally been 
achieved through robust precautionary systems such as defence-in-depth, physical barriers and 
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other practices. The rigidity of the current framework and the invocation of conservatism creates 
a pseudo prescriptive regime which leaves little room for innovation. To combat this, regulatory 
flexibility is necessary so that precautionary measures can be specifically tailored for each reactor 
design. Flexibility may be added to the fundamental safety principle by using the graded approach 
to determine the scope, content and details of “control, cool and contain.” The application of the 
graded approach for this purpose would consider the research and development, documentation 
and other proof of safety of the reactor commensurate to the complexity, risks and claims of the 
proponent. 
 
2.3.4 Conclusion  
 The nuclear regulatory framework of Canada is developed with the focus on the safety 
objectives promulgated within the NSCA and other relevant regulations and legislation. The CNSC 
is established as Canada’s nuclear regulator to carry out the mandate of the NSCA and its safety 
objectives. To do this, the CNSC assesses the license applications by considering whether the 
applicant is qualified to carry on the activity sought and whether the applicant has made adequate 
provisions for the protection of the environment, the health and safety of persons and national 
security, and that they maintain Canada’s international obligations. The regulatory framework 
developed by the CNSC implements a hybrid prescriptive and performance-based regulatory 
scheme to achieve these objectives. 
 The CNSC resolves license applications within the RIDM process developed through their 
regulatory expectations. RIDM produces well-informed decisions through the consideration of 
many inputs and the application of both deterministic and probabilistic risk assessment, as well as 
regulatory principles such as proportionality and conservative decision-making. The principle of 
proportionality is a mainstay of the graded approach. Conservative decision-making is embodied 
within the practices of the precautionary principle, the graded approach and deterministic risk 
assessment. These principles form integral aspects of the RIDM and have implications on the 
deployment of SMRs. 
 The novelty and unfamiliarity of SMRs imply risk uncertainty and complexity untested by 
Canada’s nuclear regulations. Conservative decision-making directs regulators to be especially 
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precautious of nuclear activities with uncertain risk, which it attempts to mitigate using 
conventional approaches traditionally used for heavy water reactors. For SMRs, these conventional 
approaches may not be practical or applicable. However, the graded approach provides flexibility 
for those attempting to license SMRs and may be used to offset conventional regulations and 
demonstrate that SMR activities meet the safety objectives of Canada’s regulations.  
The graded approach provides SMRs with the opportunity to incorporate novel and 
innovative design features to address risks. However, the lack of referential operational history 
creates difficulties for grading SMRs. Difficulties are exacerbated as proponents will need to 
document and demonstrate the safety of SMRs to a higher degree, as it must be proportional to its 
complexity and novelty. To ensure that grading is not applied disproportionaltely, it is suggested 
that the CNSC clarify the graded approach’s application to SMRs and that risk management 
practices employ measures to ensure that scrutiny is applied proportionally. Additionally, methods 
to mitigate risk uncertainty should be considered, such as the use of expert elicitations to fill gaps 
within risk assessments.    
Furthermore, conservative decision-making approaches, such defence-in-depth and other 
precautionary measures used to obtain fundamental safety function of “control, cool and contain,” 
should be more flexible to accept novel and innovative approaches to risk. The graded approach is 
indispensable for providing regulatory flexibility, and its application should consider the research 
and development, documentation and other proof of safety of the reactor commensurate with the 
complexity and claims of the proponent. 
 The fundamental regulatory principles discussed in this section must also be respected 
when making recommendations and suggestions later in this thesis. Recommendation of risk 
management approaches, such as the use of uncertainty analyses and expert judgement for risk 
assessment discussed Chapter 3, and type certification, discussed in Chapter 4, must respect and 
be capable of being integrated with these principles. The purpose of this thesis is to not modify or 
remove these underpinning principles, but to make recommendations that develop and bolster them 
so that they may better accommodate SMRs.  
Canadian regulations have been developed to be technology neutral; however, their 
development is skewed towards the regulation of CANDU reactors. Canadian regulations attempt 
to be sufficiently broad to anticipate alternative approaches to power generation. However, 
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Canada’s regulations have been developed based on the CNSC’s expertise with heavy water 
reactors because of their experience with CANDU technologies. Thus, despite attempts to create 
technologically neutral regulations, elementary aspects of the regulations may not be applicable to 
reactor designs that implement fundamentally different technology. Many of these issues raised 
above are echoed in some capacity by the stakeholders and proponents. As a result, the CNSC has 
begun a campaign to ready its regulations for SMRs and other advanced reactors. 
 
2.4 The fit of SMRs in Canada’s regulatory framework (or the lack thereof) 
 The CNSC has made significant efforts to consult with industry on how to appropriately 
regulate SMRs. In May of 2016, the CNSC published the discussion paper “DIS-16-04: Small 
Modular Reactors: Regulatory Strategy, Approaches and Challenges” to commence a discourse 
with industry and stakeholders to address the growing interest in deploying SMRs in Canada.120 
DIS-16-04 raised key regulatory challenges for licensing and deploying SMRs in Canada and 
called for comments from industry and stakeholders. On January 31st, 2017, the CNSC held a 
workshop with those who commented on DIS-16-04 and other interested stakeholders, which is 
summarised within the Stakeholder Workshop Report: Periodic Review of the Nuclear Security 
Regulation in December 2017.121 Additionally, in September 2017, the CNSC summarized and 
responded to the comments received on DIS-16-04 with the “What We Heard Report.”122 
 In the “What We Heard Report,” the CNSC outlines the concerns raised by stakeholders in 
response to DIS-16-04 and addresses how it aims to improve and clarify regulations. A clearer 
explanation of the graded approach and how it will apply to SMRs was a common concern amongst 
industry stakeholders. As a result, the CNSC hosted a workshop in November 2017 to consult 
stakeholders and advise them of the application of the graded approach to SMR facilities. The 
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synopsis of the November 2017 workshop is published; however, the bulk of it reiterates what is 
discussed previously in this chapter regarding the RIDM process.123  
 Notwithstanding the CNSC’s acknowledgment that SMRs pose unique challenges for 
Canada’s regulations and RIDM, they purport that Canada’s regulatory framework is sufficiently 
robust to accommodate SMRs and seemingly ignore the proponent’s calls for more certainty and 
clarity. The CNSC claims that the graded approach provides a technologically neutral and 
competent solution for addressing risk. However, this thesis argues that Canada’s regulations can 
be further developed to more effectively regulate the deployment of SMRs through the balancing 
of conservative decision-making and the graded approach. Additionally, approaches to mitigate 
and manage novel risks and risk uncertainties of SMRs are required.  
 It is common for regulators of complex domains, such as nuclear power generation, to work 
closely with industry so that regulation is developed with sufficient expertise. THowever, care 
must be taken so that the regulator continues to make decision in the public interest and not in the 
private interests of the industry. Thus, the recommendations made by industry and the results of 
the discussions between the CNSC and industry are scrutinized within this section objectively to 
ensure that the intentions and effects remain in the interest of the public. This section also discusses 
how regulatory capture may occur and how transparency, accountability and clarity and other tools 
are important to stave off capture when pursuing the points raised by industry. 
 
2.4.1 Issues raised by DIS-16-04 
 DIS-16-04 raises seventeen key challenges of regulating SMRs, which are primarily 
attributed to the uncertainty accompanying the novel approaches and technology implemented by 
SMRs. The bulk of the seventeen key challenges can be summarized into five categories. These 
regulatory challenges are specific to SMRs, but not every SMR will have the same regulatory 
challenges. Upon outlining these regulatory issues, it becomes clear that the most effective 
approach to regulating SMRs is to develop a flexible and robust framework that address SMRs on 
a case by case basis. 
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 The 17 key regulatory challenges raised in DIS-16-04 may be categorized into the 
following: 
 Novel fuels and refuelling processes 
 Gaps in the safety claims of vendors 
 Overseeing the design, manufacturing, and installation of SMRs  
 Reduction in staff and automation of the processes 
 Relocatable and replaceable reactors, or reactors used in fleets 
 
 Novel fuels and refuelling processes encapsulate issues regarding cooling of novel fuels, 
methods of refuelling, and the management of the waste produced by such fuels. Novel fuel types 
vary and may include metallic and graphite-based fuel concepts, which consist of a fuel kernel 
encased in a carbon or metallic matrix, fuels dissolved within the coolant, or subcritical fuels. The 
traditional model of refuelling a nuclear reactor is to perform individual fuel element replacement 
on site.124 However, refuelling approaches will vary with each fuel type. For example, pebble bed 
reactors utilizing graphite fuel designs may be refuelled during operations, while heavy water 
reactors such as CANDU reactor designs will be required to be shut down.125 In addition, graphite 
fuels propose significant challenges to waste management due to the difficulty of separating wastes 
from its carbon matrix, and approaches to cooling the fuel during operation and in the event of an 
accident.126 These challenges are exacerbated as designs and safeguards may not be fully proven 
by vendors or the proponent, creating additional uncertainty. 
 Gaps in the safety claims of vendors pose significant challenges for regulating and 
assessing SMRs because it is difficult to demonstrate that performance-based regulations are 
satisfied. The General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations require that an application for a 
licence provide “a description and the results of any test, analysis or calculation performed to 
substantiate the information included in the application.”127 Extensive documentation is needed to 
demonstrate “the credibility of a safety claim, effectiveness of a safety approach or the informing 
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of long-term considerations in the conduct of licensed activities.”128 Though the CNSC makes 
deference to expert opinion in the face of uncertainty, it will be difficult to overcome the scrutiny 
applied by the graded approach and conservative decision-making because of the prevailing 
complexity of SMRs. Additionally, the gaps in the claims of vendors may affect many different 
considerations of a reactor facility, such as the reliability of novel construction materials and the 
risks associated with automation. 
 A significant advantage of SMRs is its reduction in staff, offsite monitoring, increase in 
automation and other passive features; however, current regulations are incapable of appropriately 
appreciating the risks associated with those advantages. The practice of “minimum complement 
of qualified workers” in a nuclear facility ensures that the plant is operated safely and assures that 
emergency response is adequate.129 Proponents of SMRs that incorporate these advantages will be 
required to demonstrate with a high amount of confidence that the facility can be operated safely 
commensurate with the risks and complexity of the automated system. 
The CNSC also highlights the challenges involved with overseeing the design, 
manufacturing and installation of SMRs due to the modularity of the facility.130 SMRs are to be 
installed on site using modules manufactured offsite, thus frustrating the CNSC’s ability to 
perform inspections of the reactor and facility. Sealed reactor modules pose significant challenges 
as inspectors are unable to conduct inspections of the reactor to permit its installation.131 
Modularity increases the quality of construction, lowers manufacturing times and overall reduces 
the time required to bring the facility into operation.132 For Canada to take advantage of SMRs, 
modularity must be accommodated for within the regulations. 
 The size and modularity of SMRs provide unique deployment capabilities for SMRs, such 
as deployment in fleets, and use as a relocatable and replaceable reactor.133 There are two central 
regulatory issues raised for these unique deployment strategies. First, environmental assessments 
become complicated where SMRs are deployed as fleets over a large geographical area, or where 
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the reactor may be relocated or replaced.134 Though the IAA removes the CNSC as the responsible 
authority for impact assessments, the CNSC must still ensure the protection of the environment in 
satisfaction of the objectives of the NSCA. Second, conventional licensing strategies for 
decommissioning and waste management are set up for individual and stationary reactors but are 
not equipped for transportable reactors and multiple reactor sites.135 To accommodate the novel 
deployment approaches the CNSC may require new approaches to decommissioning and waste 
management. For example, transportable SMRs may perform site decommissioning and reactor 
decommissioning as separate activities and under separate licenses.136 Additionally, multiple 
reactor sites may seek to replace complete reactor modules as a refurbishment exercise considered 
under normal waste management operations.137  
 Challenges raised by the discussion paper not capable of being categorized in the above 
classes include the risks associated with using alternative construction material, what emergency 
zones are appropriate, whether existing defence-in-depth regulations are clear and appropriate for 
the prevention and mitigation of accidents, updating regulations for demonstration reactors and the 
appropriateness of the regulations for fusion reactor systems.138 
 The above is not an exclusive list of challenges posed by SMRs. The SMR industry is in 
its infancy but boasts more than 50 designs currently in development.139 Thus the issue is not how 
to regulate in response to the above issues, but how to set up a framework that can accommodate 
all nuclear technologies, including those yet to be conceived, and in any deployment strategy. As 
one respondent puts it, the “prominent concerns with the regulation of SMRs is how can the 
regulatory process be aligned to permit offsets in regulatory requirements for such aspects … while 
acknowledging the burden of proof on the proponent to establish the effectiveness of the novel 
technology.”140 Regulatory flexibility was a common concern of the feedback received from 
stakeholders and was addressed by the CNSC in the “What We Heard Report.” In this report, the 
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CNSC proposes a robust grading system where the adaption of regulatory expectations can be 
demonstrated as safe by the proponent.  
 
2.4.2 Responses to DIS-16-04 and consultation with stakeholders 
 The “What We Heard Report” summarizes the responses by stakeholders to DIS-16-04. A 
common theme among responses was the lack of clarity in the licensing process for SMRs and 
how the graded approach will apply. Additionally, responses criticized precautionary measures 
such as defence-in-depth and made recommendations to how regulations may improve, such as 
the addition of reproducibility and safety in design.  Overall, the consensus was that the challenges 
posed by SMRs were not insurmountable and that the current regulation can be amended to 
accommodate the challenges posed by SMRs by using the graded approach effectively.141 
 Stakeholders raised concerns about how the graded approach is to apply to SMRs and how 
its implementation may create a common understanding. Additionally, stakeholders suggested that 
emphasis should be given to the research and development programs of vendors where there is a 
lack of historical operational data.142 The CNSC agreed that the graded approach must be clarified 
for its application to SMRs. The CNSC also emphasized that the onus is on the proponent to 
demonstrate the safety of the activity, which can be achieved through extensive supporting 
information and documentation.  
  Stakeholders also criticized the application of defence-in-depth, accident mitigation, and 
emergency planning zones for SMRs based on their obvious relevance to water-cooled reactors.143 
SMRs emphasize the prevention, control and protection levels of defence-in-depth and on inherent 
passive safety features and safety by design.144 On this note, the CNSC was less interested in 
amending conventional approaches, stating that there already exists a level of flexibility within 
these measures.145  
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 Additionally, stakeholders recommended the principle of reproducibility as an approach to 
streamlining SMR licensing. The principle of reproducibility can be a practical approach to the 
siting, licensing and regulation of SMRs as the SMR business may operate in a standardized and 
repeatable manner.146 The successful verification of reproducibility by the aerospace and 
shipbuilding industry provides insight into how it may be affirmed for the production of SMRs.147 
On this note, the CNSC responded that they would remain open to discussing alternative 
approaches to licensing to increase efficiencies, however, reiterated that the demonstration of the 
safe operation of the facility remains paramount.148 
The workshops and consultations carried out by the CNSC are discussions carried out 
amongst industry stakeholders, including the CNSC, SMR vendors, utilities and groups 
representing the interests of the public. Although most issues are acknowledged by all 
stakeholders, recommendations and suggestions made by industry are balanced by the CNSC’s 
regulatory approach. The CNSC regulates transparently, are accountable to the public and other 
stakeholders and provide clarity for their regulations so that they may be administered fairly and 
consistently.  
 Overall the feedback given by stakeholders regarding the critical challenges of regulating 
SMRs raised in DIS-16-04 was that regulations need to be clarified and that there must be an ability 
to offset conventional regulatory practices to safety and risk by demonstrating the innovative and 
novel approaches taken by SMRs. On this point, the CNSC held that the graded approach would 
be a sufficient means to offset conventional regulatory practice and that the acceptance of safety 
claims will rely heavily on the quality of information to support the claims, especially where 
assessing passive features, variation to defence-in-depth practices and emergency planning zones 
of the proposed facility.149 Additionally, the CNSC suggest that the utilization of vendor design 
reviews and workshops administered by the CNSC can help resolve these challenges.150  
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2.4.3 Changes in response to DIS-16-04 and consultation with stakeholders 
 The CNSC has begun marketing themselves as an SMR friendly regulator and has been 
working with stakeholders to bolster their technical knowledge and to make regulations more 
accommodating for SMRs. The CNSC’s strategy to ready themselves for SMRs is to increase 
regulatory certainty, raise awareness and establish technical readiness and priorities.151 As a part 
of this strategy, the CNSC has held two workshops on improving and clarifying regulations, and 
have drafted a Licence Application Guide for Small Modular Reactors. These are small steps in 
the overall accommodation of SMRs. 
 January 31st, 2017 the CNSC held a workshop regarding potential amendments to the 
Nuclear Security Regulations,152 resulting in the report “Stakeholder Workshop Report: Periodic 
Review of the Nuclear Security Regulations” the following month.153 Consultations with 
stakeholders determined that both the industry and CNSC agreed that revisions and amendments 
made to the NSR should be framed to be consistent with performance-based regulations.154 Also, 
regarding defence-in-depth, it was suggested that the CNSC apply the graded approach consistent 
with the recommendations of the IAEA. Discussion regarding clarity also arose, with participants 
suggesting that emphasis be placed on “security by design” and that regulators provide clarity to 
what is expected to achieve objectives and what evidence is needed to support proposals.155 Other 
discussions centred on security response forces, offsite monitoring, and additional guidance related 
to detection, delay and response options for SMRs located in remote locations.156 The CNSC has 
not yet begun to make these amendments. 
 The CNSC also held a workshop to provide greater clarity on the application of the graded 
approach on November 24th, 2017. The information workshop provided guidance on how the 
graded approach would apply to SMRs and focused on the application of the graded approach 
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within the RIDM process. The content of the workshop follows closely the discussion in the 
previous section regarding the graded approach. Emphasis was placed on how the CNSC articulate 
requirements and guidance within their regulatory documents and that it is ultimately the onus of 
the proponent to demonstrate proportionality of the measures taken to mitigate the corresponding 
risks. 
 The CNSC is developing a Licence application guide for SMRs. REGDOC-1.1.5, Licence 
Application Guide for Small Modular Reactor Facilities sets out the guidance for proponents 
making applications to the CNSC to obtain a licence to prepare a site, construct and operate an 
SMR in Canada.157 This document identifies the SCAs and other considerations that are to be taken 
into account during the assessment of licence applications.158 However, at this time REGDOC-
1.1.5 remains in draft form and is currently out for public consultation.  
 REGDOC-1.1.5 identifies the 14 SCAs and raises considerations for applications to 
construct or operate an SMR.159 Each description of the relevant SCA includes reference to 
relevant regulatory documents and remains, for the most part, consistent with other licence 
application guides. However, REGDOC-1.1.5 acknowledges that conventional approaches to 
SCAs may be incompatible for some SMR designs, and provides the opportunity for applicants to 
offer unconventional approaches where: 
1. The alternative approach would result in an equivalent or superior level of safety to that 
of the approach stated in the requirement  
2. The application of one or more CNSC requirement(s) would conflict with other rules 
or requirements.  
3. The application of one or more CNSC requirement(s) would not serve the underlying 
purpose of the requirement(s) or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of 
the requirement(s).160 
REGDOC-1.1.5 requires that “alternative approach[es] must demonstrate equivalence to the 
outcomes associated with the use of the requirements set out in this regulatory document.”161 
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Furthermore, the evidence required to demonstrate the satisfaction of regulatory requirements must 
increase proportional to the uncertainties in the risk.162 Thus, REGDOC-1.1.5 provides that 
applicants may offset regulatory requirements where the desired outcome is demonstrated under 
the scrutiny of the principle of proportionality. 
At the International SMR and Advanced Reactor Summit 2018, the CNSC raised the issue 
of the application of defence-in-depth to SMRs and conceded that conventional approaches might 
not apply; however, they reiterated that applicants must demonstrate that defence-in-depth is 
assured.163 They determined that shutdown requirements of some SMR designs, for example, are 
not required to prevent fuel failure because of inherent safety features and, thus, do not need a 
graded safety shut down system.164 Moreover, some SMR designs do not require an emergency 
core cooling system as residual nuclear heat from the reactor can be removed passively during 
operation and accident events.165 Some vendors claim that traditional concrete physical 
containment is unneeded and may interfere with the heat transfer of the reaction thereby increasing 
risk rather than alleviating it.166 The CNSC reframed the issues for control, cooling and 
containment to the question of what is needed from vendors or proponents of these novel 
technologies to demonstrate the intent of these design requirements.167 
Overall the CNSC asserts that the key to developing a supportive and effective regulatory 
framework for SMR deployment is to actively work and consult with proponents to provide 
transparency, certainty and clarity while adapting the framework to be increasingly performance-
based to accommodate the innovative approaches of SMRs. The CNSC emphasizes the use of the 
graded approach for assessing SMR applications that deviate from conventional methods to safety. 
In this approach, proportionality is used to ensure that the novel safety features of SMRs meet the 
safety objectives of the CNSC. An increased use of grading reflects the agreement of both the 
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CNSC and stakeholders that amendments to the NSR should be more performance-based because 
performance-based regulation necessitates the use of the graded approach. 
 
2.4.4 Regulatory capture and pursuing recommendations of industry 
 The Fukushima nuclear accident that occurred in 2011 has been largely attributed to 
oversights arising from regulatory capture, corruption, collusion and nepotism.168 The Fukushima 
accident serves as warning for all nuclear regulators as nuclear regulators are uniquely susceptible 
to capture because of the closeness at which they work with industry. For the regulation of SMRs, 
the risk of capture is heightened as regulators must work even closer with industry because of their 
unfamiliarity and lack of expertise with SMR technologies. Therefore, it is useful to understand 
briefly how regulatory capture arises, whether pursuing the suggestions made by industry and the 
CNSC heightens those risks, and what the CNSC can do to avoid that capture. 
 Regulators of complex domains are inevitably affected by weak regulatory capture arising 
from the need of the regulator to work with industry.169 This cooperation is needed so that the 
regulator can obtain the expertise or training only available from the industry to competently 
govern over the complex activities being regulated.170 Weak capture occurs where regulation 
remains positive overall, that is the interest of the public is maintained, except that the net social 
benefits of the regulation are diminished as a result of special interests.171 Studies of regulatory 
models indicate that as the complexity of the actions being regulated increase, the more prone the 
regulator is to industry influence.172 Thus, as the CNSC embark on the regulation of SMRs, their 
lack of expertise in the area heighten the potential of industry influence.  
 The co-operation of industry with the regulator is not prima facie capture – in fact, some 
models suggest that, in the regulation of complex domains, pro-firm biases may be part of an 
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optimal regulatory design where public interest is preferred.173 To determine if regulatory capture 
is present, the intention of policy must be examined to determine the true intentions, which may 
be deduced from the actual effects of the regulation.174  
 The cooperation between the CNSC and the industry and acting upon the suggestions of 
industry does not itself constitute regulatory capture. Whether capture is introduced is determined 
by how the CNSC implement the suggestions and what interests those suggestions benefit. For 
example, suggestions that the CNSC clarify how the graded approach and the principle of 
proportionality apply to SMRs will indicate capture where it is extended to prioritize private 
interest over that of the public. However, clarity may help alleviate capture, as it also helps to hold 
all proponents to the same standard and is open to the public to see and criticize. It is argued that 
the clarification of these two principles has little regulatory capture value. 
 On the other hand, suggestions of type certification of SMR technology is in the interest of 
the industry as it expediates licensing times and is decreases licensing costs. However, there is 
concern that relying on the suggestions of industry presents opportunities for regulatory capture. 
Thus, the CNSC must ensure their decision making remains independent from the industry’s 
influence and that the interests of the public are maintained. Whether capture exists will depend 
on the effects the policy has on the public interest. Chapter 4 discusses how type certification may 
be implemented within the current framework in a manner that does not obscure licensing 
objectives and is in the interest of the public. 
 In the circumstances, the lack of expertise poses the largest potential for capture. It is 
suggested that the CNSC expand their expertise in SMR technologies in manner that relies on the 
industry as little as possible. This can be done by increasing the base salary to attract experts and 
compete with the private sectors, developing career paths and educational opportunities for key 
personnel independent of industry.175  
 The CNSC already have an existing ethics policy that prevent biases towards industry and 
promote transparency, accountability and clarity. Examples of the practice of transparency by the 
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CNSC include the publishing of discussion papers and workshops completed with stakeholders, 
and the involvement of the public and Indigenous peoples within the process. Accountability is a 
value embedded within the CNSC code of ethics, which states that the CNSC is committed to 
exercising their authority in a responsible manner that maintains public trust and confidence and 
being accountable for their “decisions, actions and advice.”176 Clarity is promoted through the 
CNSC’s dealings with industry and its robust library of regulatory documents outlining their 
expectations. 
 The CNSC’s cooperation with industry does not by itself indicate capture but is a common 
and possibly critical method for the regulation of complex domains. CNSC is not immune to 
capture and has been criticized in the past for introducing possible capture.177 Additionally, the 
complexity of SMRs and the lack of the CNSC’s familiarity with the technology motivates further 
cooperation with industry, thereby introducing more potential for capture. For this reason, 
suggestions considered within this thesis are explored objectively and with consideration of the 
interests they benefit. Additionally, it is suggested that the CNSC build up their expertise, 
preferably without deference to industry, and to continue and bolster their practice of 
accountability, transparency and clarity.  
  
2.4.5 Conclusion 
 DIS-16-04 created discourse between industry stakeholders and the CNSC to facilitate the 
transparent development of regulations for SMRs. The result of DIS-16-04, and the subsequent 
workshops and readiness activities, illustrate two critical points for the regulation of SMRs. First, 
the graded approach for SMRs is a significant consideration when offsetting pre-existing 
regulatory requirements, the success of which will depend on the quality and credibility of 
supporting information. The lack of clarity on how this approach will accommodate SMRs poses 
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challenges, but the CNSC plans to resolve this issue through continued consultation with industry 
and the participation of proponents in the pre-licensing vendor design review program.178  
Second, the CNSC is open to implementing additional regulatory approaches where 
appropriate. In their response, the stakeholders suggested that the principle of reproducibility 
would be effective for the regulation of SMRs in Canada and streamlining the licensing process. 
On this point the CNSC appears to be open to alternative approaches to licensing; however, the 
CNSC is concerned about the implementation of those methods within the framework.179 
Notwithstanding, the CNSC has stated no plans of implementing alternative regulatory procedures 
at this time. 
 The CNSC believes that Canada will be able to safely regulate SMRs once they have 
developed the expertise and have made the appropriate amendments to the current regulations. 
However, it is unclear on what steps the CNSC plans to take to reduce licensing times and take 
advantage of the SMRs’ fast manufacturing and installation times. Arguably, by bolstering the 
current framework with the implementation of the graded approach, adding regulatory flexibility, 
implementing reproducibility and assuring that conservatism is implemented commensurate with 
the risks, SMRs can be regulated effectively and their advantages can be exploited for the benefit 
of Canadians. In making these changes, it will be important to promote impartiality and 
independence from the industry to avoid capture by developing their own expertise, clarifying their 
requirements and being transparent and accountable to the public. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The current Canadian regulatory framework, though aimed to be technologically neutral, 
was developed to fit the conventions of CANDU reactors and creates dissonance with the 
regulation of SMRs. Though the underpinning regulatory principles and approaches of Canada’s 
regulations are applicable to SMRs, such as probabilistic and deterministic risk assessments, 
RIDM, the graded approach and others mentioned in this chapter, the execution of these principles 
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are done in accordance with the CNSC’s experience with CANDU technology. That is, regulatory 
objectives are formed with CANDU reactors in mind, which may not be applicable to SMRs.  
The dissonance between SMRs and current regulatory policies create challenges for 
proponents trying to license novel SMR designs. Aspects of Canada’s regulations may not be 
capable of being met by SMRs as they consider extraneous considerations made irrelevant by the 
SMRs design. As the proponent may not be able to demonstrate the satisfaction of these objectives, 
the proposed designs are met with conservatism and precaution that may be irrelevant or 
disproportionate to the actual risks. To alleviate these issues, there needs to be sufficient regulatory 
flexibility so that SMRs can be assessed with appropriate scope and detail. 
Furthermore, Canada’s regulations poorly manage novel and uncertain risks, which 
exacerbates the precaution and conservatism applied. It is not suggested that Canada abandon its 
risk averse approach to regulation. However, it is argued that Canadian regulation may better 
manage risk using other risk management approaches and by bolstering already existing regulatory 
principles. In this way the CNSC may better accommodate SMRs without imposing 
disproportionate amounts of conservatism. 
The CNSC has not made attempts to provide a framework specifically for SMRs. Instead, 
it has attempted to shoehorn the regulation of the technology within the existing framework. 
Stakeholders and the CNSC agree that the current framework may regulate SMRs in a manner that 
ensures the safety and protection of the public and the environment. However, whether this is the 
most effective approach for deploying SMRs is questionable as regulations are tailored to the 
regulation of CANDU reactors.  
This thesis argues that SMRs can be successfully regulated within the existing framework 
in light of existing regulatory principles and regulatory bias towards CANDU reactor types. This 
can be accomplished by adjusting regulations to embrace regulatory flexibility and alternative risk 
management techniques so that SMRs may be regulated according to their design. Chapter 3 
discusses how Canada’s regulation can become increasingly flexible to accommodate SMRs and 
suggests risk management practices to help mitigate risks associated with SMRs. Chapter 4 
discusses type certification and how the CSNC can employ type certification to streamline the 
licensing of SMRs and how type certification can be integrated within the existing framework.   
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Chapter 3: Regulating Risks and Uncertainty 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 SMRs impart a new frontier for Canada’s nuclear industry but are accompanied by 
uncertainty, novel and complex technology and other regulatory hurdles. These aspects impose 
difficulties for the CNSC who attempt to make decisions within the RIDM process confidently. 
To overcome these issues, the CNSC must investigate alternative approaches to regulation, safety 
assessment and uncertainty.  
 Regulators and the nuclear industry promote performance-based regulation as a critical 
approach for the regulation of SMRs. Accordingly, the CNSC has begun shifting regulations to 
reflect that sentiment. The goal of this shift is to do away with conventional prescriptive practices 
and develop a more performance-based regulatory regime. Performance-based regulations allow 
for the assessment of new nuclear reactor designs according to their specification and not 
expectations relevant to CANDU reactors. Industry and the CNSC have begun this shift with 
amendments made to the NSR. However, this shift needs to be pervasive throughout regulations 
and regulatory expectations.  
 The CNSC provide regulatory expectations for the probabilistic and deterministic risk 
assessment of all nuclear activities. However, the scope, content and details of these expectations 
are specific to CANDU reactors and are not fully appropriate for SMRs. The reliance on 
convention creates significant difficulties for SMR proponents attempting to deploy reactors that 
implement novel safety approaches. For example, SMRs may not require the same practices 
applied to CANDU reactors such as defence-in-depth, barriers or other precautions because they 
are safe by design. This thesis argues that the scope, detail and content of safety assessment should 
be specific to the reactor to in accordance with promoting regulatory flexibility. 
 To mitigate risk uncertainty, the CNSC applies comprehensive conservative measures 
without considering other risk management tools. However, uncertainty can be used strategically 
within risk management for purposes advantageous to the overall assessment of SMRs. 
Uncertainty may be used to compare and analyze risk management approaches, ensure that safety 
objectives are met, provide credibility to decisions and determine the amount of conservatism 
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needed. Using uncertainty in this way provides regulators confidence when regulating SMRs and 
ensures that conservatism is being fairly applied to mitigate risks.  
 Another approach to mitigate uncertainty is the use of expert judgement. The use of expert 
judgement within the regulation of nuclear activities is not new.180 However, the elicitation of 
expert judgment to produce probabilistic risk distributions is not contemplated within current 
regulations. Expert elicitations may be relied upon where there are gaps in risk assessments, where 
mathematical models inaccurately characterize the novelty of nuclear reactors, where parameters 
are unknown or where there is no operating data.181 This chapter proffers a two-step process for 
eliciting risk distributions from experts and demonstrates how it may interact within Canada’s 
regulatory framework. 
 The following discussion raises attempts to alleviate the fundamental challenges of 
regulating SMRs. The discussion of flexibility highlights how the CNSC may be more adaptable 
to SMR variation so that all designs may be appropriately regulated. Additionally, it is suggested 
that risk management utilize uncertainty analyses and the use of expert elicitation to fill gaps where 
they exist to address the challenges of uncertainty. Under a flexible regulatory structure, the 
combination of these suggestions allows the CNSC to appropriately consider all aspects of SMR 
designs without bias and with confidence.  
 
3.2 Types of regulatory bases 
 In its current state, Canada’s nuclear regulations impose both prescriptive and 
performance-based regulations.182 Prescription-based frameworks prescribe comprehensive and 
detailed standards applied equally to all activities regulated within that framework.183 
Alternatively, performance-based schemes set out aspirational objectives and impose safety 
criteria that conform to those objectives rather than imposing prescriptive requirements. 
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 There are multiple bases for nuclear regulatory frameworks in addition to prescriptive and 
performance-based schemes. The three most common for nuclear regulations are prescriptive-
based, performance-based and process-based regulations.184 Frameworks such as outcome-based 
and self-assessment based are less common in the nuclear industry. Each basis has advantages and 
disadvantages and applicability for different scenarios. The following is a discussion of the 
regulatory basis Canada currently administers, the implications that arise when shifting regulation 
to embody a more performance-based regulatory framework and the advantages and disadvantages 
of different regulatory bases for SMRs. 
 
3.2.1  Prescriptive-based, performance-based and process-based regulation 
 The nuclear regulations of Canada utilize a mixture of performance-based and prescriptive-
based regulation. With the enactment of the NSCA in 1997, Canada introduced increasing 
prescriptive regulation, a noted trend within Canadian regulation at the time.185 Since its 
enactment, Canada has maintained this mixture, which has served the industry well. However, 
with the anticipation of SMRs and other advanced reactors, the CNSC has begun shifting 
regulations towards performance-based approaches. An overview of the strengths and drawbacks 
of these regulatory bases are important for determining what aspects of the current mixture produce 
challenges for the regulation of SMRs.   
 Barraclough and Carnino have classified nuclear regulation into three overall approaches: 
process-based, performance-based and prescriptive-based.186 The regulation regime favoured by 
the CNSC’s regulatory predecessor, the AECB, was largely performance-based. However, the 
enactment of the NSCA provided approaches that were more prescriptive than in the past, with a 
noted trend towards increased prescription-based regulations.187 Since then, the CNSC has 
maintained a regulatory approach that mixes all three approaches. 
                                                 
184 Ibid. 
185 Dorman, supra note 12 at 96. 
186 Ian Barraclough & Annick Carnino, “Safety Culture Keys for Sustaining Progress” (1998) 40:2 IAEA 
Bulletin – Quarterly QJ Intl Atomic Energy Agency 27 at 29–30. 
187 Ibid.  
54 
 
 Process-based regulation hinges safe operation of the nuclear power plant on effective 
organizational processes of the licensee for the operation, maintenance, modification and 
improvement of the facility.188 The organizational system is developed from the perspective of the 
facility’s internal logic and remains flexible so that the facility may adapt operations to their 
history, culture and business strategy.189 This approach can provide an in-depth understanding of 
the licensee's performance and may be used by regulators to identify key processes that lead to 
safe performance.190 However, process-based regulations face difficulties in evaluating and 
defining adequate processes for complex systems, such as those associated with SMR facilities. 
Additionally, processes are only effective where linked to process outcomes, which are not always 
straightforward to determine.191 Though process-based regulations provide flexibility for SMR 
licensees to accommodate the novelty and innovations of their facilities, risk uncertainties of SMR 
designs increase the complexity of the facility. As a result, this creates challenges of evaluating 
and defining appropriate processes.  
 Performance-based regulation forms the primary structure of Canada’s nuclear regulatory 
framework and provides licensees flexibility due to safety criteria conforming to safety objectives 
rather than prescriptive requirements. Performance-based regimes set out targets for reactors with 
the onus on the operators to meet them – prevention of unreasonable risk and ALARA are 
examples of this.192 This approach is especially suited for the design phase of nuclear power plants 
as it provides flexibility for demonstrating the safety of the design.193 For these reasons, industry 
and the CNSC has supported this regime as the best approach to regulating SMRs. The flexibility 
available within the design phase provides applicants with the ability to deviate from the 
convention so long as they comply with safety objectives. 
 Prescription-based regulation provides a comprehensive and detailed regime based on 
standards and regulations that apply equally to every nuclear installation.194 Under this regime, 
regulation occurs through inspection and reporting to ensure compliance, where penalties are 
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imposed for non-compliance.195 Prescriptive regulations provide difficulties for operators as 
regulations are inflexible to accommodate modifications or unconventional operations.196 
Prescriptive regulations are challenging for regulating SMRs because it provides not only 
inflexibility for applicants to meet the requirements but also difficulties for the decision-maker to 
anticipate the wide variety of requirements needed to regulate the plethora of possible SMR 
designs. 
 Canada implements process-based, performance-based and prescription-based regulations 
for different aspects of their regulatory regime, with the predominant approach being performance-
based. Performance-based regulation is being further encouraged with the revision and 
amendments of regulation as the Canadian nuclear industry prepares for the deployment of SMRs 
and other advanced reactors. This regulatory shift finds impetus from the challenges posed by 
prescriptive-based regimes to unconventional reactor designs and operation. The inflexibility of 
prescriptive systems provides little ability for proponents to approach regulatory requirements in 
novel and innovative ways. The flexibility provided by performance-based regulation provides the 
most favourable regulatory strategy for SMRs out of the three most common approaches.  
 
3.2.2 Performance-based regulation and the standardization of convention 
 Despite being touted as technologically neutral, Canadian nuclear regulations have 
developed with the CANDU reactor as the single point of reference, and, thus, existing regulations 
have an inherent bias against other nuclear generation bases. This bias is exacerbated by Canada’s 
long history of regulating CANDU reactors and the nuclear industry’s tendency to impose 
conservative decision-making on uncertain or unfamiliar technologies. This bias towards 
convention poses a significant challenge for the regulation of SMRs, despite attempts to make 
regulations performance-based. To mitigate this bias, the CNSC must continuously develop as a 
regulator and develop risk management procedures that do not solely rely on conservative 
measures. 
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Inexperience with alternative reactor designs encourages biases in favour of conventional 
approaches, and at its extreme may standardize conventional approaches within the regulatory 
framework. Since the initial deployment of the CANDU reactor in 1962, Canada’s experience with 
nuclear reactors has been specific to CANDU reactor designs which have not only shaped 
Canadian regulations but has established conventions for mitigating and ensuring reasonable risk. 
The CNSC’s inexperience of novel reactor designs may provide challenges to proponents who 
attempt to destabilize those conventions through innovative and novel approaches. This challenge 
is bolstered by the systematic bias created by the principle of proportionality and conservative 
decision-making. 
Conservative decision-making and proportionality favour conventional approaches to 
address risks because it places greater scrutiny on innovative approaches and restricts the exposure 
of the decision-maker to new technologies. The graded approach scrutinizes nonconventional 
approaches according to their complexity and novelty. As a result, convention is favoured over 
novel measures to address safety. Favouring convention also sustains regulatory inexperience and 
maintains the dependence of the regulator on conventional measures as there is less incentive to 
deploy novel designs. This cyclical conservatism can result in a deadlock that may mirror the 
challenges of prescriptive-based regulatory regimes. 
Prescriptive-based regulatory regimes impose an inflexible framework of requirements that 
create challenges for proponents who try to license novel products.197 The inflexibility that may 
arise out of conservative decision-making and the dependence on conventions create similar 
challenges.198  This issue may impact the application of the graded approach as regulators are 
inclined to impose greater conservatism than is necessary because of their lack of experience with 
the technology. This fear is present in the industry’s concern that the lack of operating experience 
with novel designs will result in the misapplication of the graded approach.199  
 The lack of diversification of nuclear reactors within the United States exemplifies this 
concern. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission traditionally relied on prescription-based 
regulations which placed a heavy burden on proponents to conform reactors to their regulatory 
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requirement and provided little freedom to modify reactor operations.200 Prescription-based 
regulation is the primary reason why American utilities have ordered no new power reactors since 
the 1970’s.201 For this reason, the U.S. has been shifting towards more risk and performance-based 
regulations.202  
 To address these concerns, the CNSC has affirmed that they will develop their internal 
knowledge and understanding of nuclear technologies while also increasing performance-based 
regulation.203 The development of expertise and knowledge of novel nuclear technologies will aid 
with redefining reference points and developing an understanding of the regulation of SMRs. 
However, the substantial number of SMRs and the continual progression of the nuclear industry 
pose challenges for the advancement of the expertise necessary to regulate SMRs. Furthermore, 
experience and knowledge of this technology do not offset the inclination of the regulator to 
practice what they are most familiar with. Arguably, promoting more performance-based 
regulation an ensuring that appropriate levels of conservatism are applied is the best approach to 
reduce bias and encourage innovative and novel designs.   
 
3.2.3   Conclusion 
 The CNSC and industry agree that performance-based regulation is the most suitable 
regulatory base to regulate SMRs. Performance-based regulations evaluate applications on 
whether they meet overarching safety objectives on a case by case basis. Performance-based 
regulations provide flexibility for applicants who attempt to adapt SMR designs to meet safety 
objectives in novel ways. However, conservative decision-making, proportionality and the graded 
approach in addition to lack of experience create the fear that regulators will be biased towards 
conventional approaches to safety and design, rather than being open to novel and innovative 
design.  
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 The OECD remarks that experience, transparency, clarity and continuous self-
improvement are key characteristics for balanced and unbiased decisions.204 However, this does 
not address the possible systematic bias created by conservatism. Instead, regulators must further 
investigate how performance-based regulations can further the directives of RIDM and what risk 
management strategies are available to the regulator for regulating SMRs. In addressing these 
issues, the CNSC has acknowledged that they are open to alternative regulatory strategies.  
 
3.3 Safety analyses and addressing uncertainty and gaps in risk assessments 
 Performance-based regulation is the most effective bases for regulating SMRs; however, 
the regime is only as robust as the regulatory practices it embodies. The RIDM process is an 
essential element to performance-based regulations because it informs the regulator of whether the 
proponent has met relevant safety objectives. If not, the current framework seeks to apply 
precautionary measures in reaction to uncertainty. It is important to evaluate what aspects of the 
RIDM process are deficient in its application to SMRs for the development of a more robust 
system.205 
 A significant concern is how uncertainty may be correctly addressed within the RIDM 
process to ensure that measures, and the extent of their application, are appropriately applied.206 
The novelty and complexity of SMRs in addition to the uncertainty inherent within many designs 
suggests that the graded approach will highly scrutinize them. To overcome these issues this 
section discusses the uncertainty that SMRs pose, the shortcoming of the risk assessment policies, 
and how to employ uncertainty as a risk management tool. The resulting discussion explores how 
risks are currently used in risk assessment policies of the CNSC and make recommendations on 
how current approaches can accommodate SMRs. 
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3.3.1 The uncertainty of SMRs 
 The CNSC has outlined the uncertainties associated with SMRs and how they pose 
challenges to regulation in DIS-16-04. Uncertainty creates significant concern for regulators 
because of the need for certainty and predictability in their decisions. Nuclear regulators have 
relied on conservatism and other precautionary measures to accommodate uncertainty. However, 
this approach sheds very little light on the issues at hand and neglects other available recourses.   
 DIS-16-04 identifies risk uncertainty as a key challenge for regulating SMRs.207 
Uncertainty impacts the accuracy and confidence of regulatory decision-making as regulators 
cannot be certain of the risks involved with the plant performance under normal operating 
conditions and accident conditions.208 Fundamentally, two aspects of these challenges pose a 
concern for regulators. First, risks may be unknown, inaccurate or incomplete thus affecting the 
certainty of safety analyses on which regulatory decision-making depends.209 Second, 
management of risks become challenging, even where risks are sufficiently certain, as the content 
and extent of measures taken to manage those risks may not be clear or may be unconventional 
and, therefore, beyond the experience and expertise of the regulator. 
 Uncertainty may arise because of gaps within risk assessments or inaccurate analysis 
models and parameters. Gaps within risk analysis arise because of a lack of research and 
development into the design. Model uncertainty may be significant depending on the novelty and 
complexity of the reactor technology and system design. Model uncertainty arises from 
oversimplification of reality, relationship errors, neglect or exclusion of relevant variables, and 
failure to account for correlations that cause seemingly unrelated events to occur much more 
frequently than would be expected by chance.210 Thus, model uncertainty will vary with the level 
of understanding of the system and may be significant for proposed SMR facilities that have a high 
level of complexity and novelty. Parameter uncertainty arises from a lack of accurate data for use 
within risk models. Where accurate and practical data is missing, risk assessors may use less 
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accurate data derived from theory or expert judgement.211 Parameter uncertainties are common 
within risk assessments and increase with novelty and complexity. 
 The OECD outlines in their article “Nuclear Regulatory Decision-making” strategies for 
regulators when making decisions in the face of uncertainty.212 The article explains that it is 
common for regulators to face unreliable safety analyses because of risk uncertainty or lack of data 
for the technology, and provides a series of steps to follow in such circumstances.213 The article 
first suggests that the regulator do its best to collect and assess available information, which may 
require solicitation of additional information from the operator or vendor.214 Second, it suggests 
that the regulator assess where gaps occur and raise implications that may result from not filling 
those gaps.215 The article recommends that regulators explore conservative bounds to overcome 
data uncertainties.216 Finally, the article suggests the use of conservative actions such as defence-
in-depth and safety margins, and the judgement of experts and senior regulatory staff to 
accommodate uncertainty.217 Though the suggestions made by the article are helpful, they do very 
little to develop a robust and experienced scheme.  
“Nuclear Regulatory Decision-making” provides regulators with a sensible yet impotent 
outline of steps to manage uncertainty. The outlined steps provide no real depth and do not develop 
the issues. For example, the approach fails to address the amount of conservatism in the application 
within step two and three, or how much reliance to place on expert judgement. The outline fails to 
consider different types of uncertainty such as model and parameter uncertainty or gaps within risk 
assessments. Instead of developing risk management strategies, the article ultimately suggests the 
use of conservative measures to address uncertainty.  
 To address the uncertainties presented by SMRs the CNSC must promote further 
performance-based regulation within safety assessment policies. Currently, the policies are framed 
to address the safety of CANDU reactors and rely heavily on conservative or precautionary 
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measures to address uncertainty. Though reliance on conservative measures is not misguided, this 
thesis argues that the current regulatory policy overlooks alternative methods of addressing 
uncertainty conducive to the regulation of SMRs while giving deference to practices specific to 
the regulation of CANDU reactors. Overall, this creates needless and disproportionate difficulty 
for SMRs projects to meet regulatory expectations. However, by providing more flexibility within 
regulatory expectations and practices using performance-based approaches, the unique qualities of 
SMRs may be appropriately accommodated and regulated within Canada’s regulatory framework. 
 
3.3.2 Safety analysis policy of the CNSC 
 The CNSC has developed their deterministic safety assessment policy within REGDOC-
2.4.1, Deterministic Safety Analysis.218 REGDOC-2.4.1 outlines the scope, detail and content of 
the safety analysis, which aims to demonstrate the safety and adequacy of the design and 
performance of nuclear power plants. Though REGDOC-2.4.1 is developed to be technologically 
neutral, its application to SMRs leaves much to be desired. REGDOC-2.4.1 implements a 
bifurcated process for the assessment of nuclear power plants and small reactor facilities. As a 
result, SMRs may be divided based on their power level into two different safety analysis regimes; 
the first provides little flexibility for variation and the second employs the graded approach to 
determine the scope, detail and content of the safety analysis. It is suggested that SMRs should be 
regulated similarly to small reactor facilities, where the graded approach is implemented to 
determine the depth of scope, content and details necessary for their safety analysis so that they 
may be appropriately regulated. This approach transforms the prescriptive and conventional nature 
of REGDOC-2.4.1 to a more flexible approach. 
 The objective of a safety analysis is to evaluate event consequences concerning the siting, 
design, commissioning, operation or decommissioning of nuclear facilities to confirm and 
demonstrate its safety in all lifecycle phases.219 Deterministic safety assessment, probabilistic 
safety assessment and hazard analysis are assessment tools implemented within the safety analysis 
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to determine the likelihood and consequences of various events and to identify complementary 
design features that address those events.220 
 A safety analysis implements a systematic process to identify events, event sequences and 
event combinations (collectively referred to as “events”) that pose risks to the safe function of 
nuclear power plants.221 REGDOC-2.4.1 provides an inclusive list of factors to consider within the 
analysis;222 however, this list may not apply to SMRs because of the specificity  of the listed factors 
to CANDU reactors. For example, the factors list operating experience and events specific to 
nuclear power plants relevant to the regulation of CANDU reactors. However, as noted prior, these 
factors are inapplicable to the safety analysis of SMRs because SMRs typically lack operating data 
and are dissimilar to most other reactor types. Where these factors are assessed with insufficient 
data, the CNSC are compelled to act conservatively according to their experience and past 
practices. In this instance, it is suggested that performance-based factors and other approaches to 
risk management be implemented. This may include the use of expert-judgement and the use of 
the graded approach to determine scope and content, which are all discussed in more depth later 
in this chapter.  
 Consideration is given to expert judgement within the safety analysis when grouping and 
prioritizing events for analysis, however, the overall safety analysis relies heavily on objective risk 
assessment techniques. Engineering judgement is implemented within REGDOC-2.4.1 primarily 
to provide reference and support for grouping and prioritizing of risks.223 Overall, REGDOC-2.4.1 
provides expert judgement with a minor role in the safety analysis and relies heavily on 
deterministic safety assessment, probabilistic safety assessment and hazard analysis for 
performing safety analysis. 
 REGDOC-2.4.1 achieves high levels of confidence using three statistical methodologies. 
First, the conservative analysis method is used to achieve appropriate conservative limits relative 
to the specified acceptance criteria. Second, the estimate-plus-evaluation-of-uncertainties method 
is used to determine initial and boundary conditions with all uncertainties defined to a high level 
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of confidence. Finally, the best estimate method is employed to obtain realistic results.224 Notably, 
the methodologies listed implement conservatism to achieve high levels of confidence when faced 
with uncertainty. 
 Regulations employ conservatism in both the conservative analysis method and estimate-
plus-evaluation-of-uncertainties method.225 The conservatism within safety analysis is defined as 
the “[u]se of assumptions … about a phenomena or behaviour of a system being at or near the limit 
of expectation, which increases safety margins or makes predictions regarding consequences more 
severe than if best-estimate assumptions had been made.”226 This approach to conservatism 
assumes worst case scenarios, and without more is in danger of applying excess conservatism. 
REGDOC-2.4.1 provides no discussion as to how this conservatism may be applied commensurate 
to uncertainty. 
 REGDOC-2.4.1 is split into two parts which have differing approaches for determining the 
scope, detail and content of the safety analysis. Part I applies to nuclear power plants with a power 
level above 200 MWt and Part II applies to small reactors facilities that have a power level of 200 
MWt or less.227 Small reactor facilities include those “used for research, isotope production, steam 
generation, electricity production and other applications.”228 As a result, SMR projects may be 
assessed differently based on their power level.229 The most significant difference between Part I 
and Part II is the invocation of the graded approach for determining the scope, detail and content 
of the safety analysis of small reactor facilities within Part II.  
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 The distinction between Part I and Part II is important because the policy expressly 
acknowledges the need for the graded approach to define the scope, content and detail for safety 
assessments of small reactor facilities.230 The policy explains that the use of the graded approach 
in this way is needed for small reactor facilities because for some facilities “[d]ifferent accident 
scenarios may apply and some scenarios may need only limited safety analysis.”231 That is, the 
policy acknowledges that the graded approach is needed to anticipate the variability of nuclear 
activities encompassed within the definition of “small reactor facilities.” Conversely, the policy 
does not apply the graded approach for safety analysis of nuclear power plants assessed under Part 
I because of its conventional application to CANDU reactors.232  
 REGDOC-2.4.1 is presented as technologically neutral, but it’s failure to acknowledge the 
graded approach in Part I suggests it is not drafted with the anticipation of applying to power 
generation facilities other than CANDU reactors. Instead of defining the depth, content, and detail 
of the safety analysis using the graded approach, Part I sets out analysis criteria relevant to 
CANDU technologies. This criteria includes “the selection of events to be analyzed, acceptance 
criteria, deterministic safety analysis methods, and safety analysis documentation, review and 
update, and quality control.”233 It is clear that REGDOC-2.4.1 was drafted using CANDU reactors 
as a reference point as much of the technical criteria and requirements are exemplified using 
references to how they apply to CANDU reactors.234 Thus, the safety analysis developed within 
REGDOC-2.4.1 is not flexible to other reactor types and may not be effective for the regulation of 
SMRs. 
 The CNSC has already acknowledged the need for the graded approach for the regulation 
of SMRs.235 For example, the CNSC has integrated the graded approach into the draft licence 
application guide for SMRs to provide applicants with the opportunity to address SCAs using 
alternative approaches.236 In doing so, the CNSC recognizes that “many requirements were 
originally written to reflect experience from water-cooled reactor designs, [and] that a graded 
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approach may be applied, or alternative approaches used, to meet the intent of some requirements 
or to make a compelling case that the application of the requirements would not serve the 
underlying purpose or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose.”237 It is sensible to 
implement the graded approach to determine the scope, depth and content of risk assessments of 
SMRs so that their assessment does not consider irrelevant consideration and so that risks are 
appropriately considered. 
 DIS-16-04 posed the questions whether “the regulatory requirements and guidance clear 
for the kinds of alternatives that might be proposed for Deterministic/probabilistic safety analyses 
for SMR facilities? Do the existing requirements permit the establishment of a suitable level of 
probabilistic safety analysis for different novel designs?”238 In their response to DIS-16-04, 
industry consistently recommended that safety analyses include alternative techniques to 
probabilistic safety assessment239 and requested the consideration of key features of SMRs that 
render traditional events and scenarios insubstantial.240 Industry also explained that the extent of 
applicability of current deterministic and probabilistic policies are limited by the (1) focus of safety 
analysis policy on water-cooled reactors; (2) absence of sufficient procedure for dealing with 
passive systems and inherent safety; and (3) inability to identify potential accidents for designs 
with little or no operating experience.241 The nuclear industry has suggested that policies should 
reduce prescriptive elements and provide flexibility within the policy to combat these limitations. 
 Industry suggests that a system to define scope, content, detail and depth on a case-by-case 
basis for non-water cooled reactors within safety analyses would offset the limitations of the safety 
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analysis of SMRs.  Regarding the first limitation, industry suggests that vendors be able to review 
the CNSC’s safety analysis requirements before analysis and exclude or add requirements where 
applicable.242 This addition would require the vendor to address the safety intent of underlying 
requirements and ensure their satisfaction. Additionally, vendors will have to identify requirements 
for phenomena latent within their reactor designs but not addressed within Canada’s safety analysis 
policies. However, this approach is precarious as it leaves it to the vendor to develop potentially 
significant aspects of the safety analysis that may not be within the scope of the expertise of the 
CNSC. The principle of proportionality may be employed to help curtail this issue as vendors will 
be required to provide documentation and support commensurate with the risk and novelty of the 
alternatives implemented. 
 To address the second limitation, industry suggests providing vendors and proponents the 
opportunity to be credited for the inherent or passive safety features of their design. In this way 
designs with a high degree of passive or inherent safety can forego unneeded extensive analyses.243 
This approach eliminates the need for backup safety functions and the need to include reactor 
vessel failure within design basis events.244 For example, the inherent safety of molten salt reactors 
make it a popular and advantageous reactor design for nuclear power generation.245  Molten salt 
reactors have a strong negative temperature coefficient of reactivity, use a stable coolant, operate 
at low pressures, are easy to control, have passive decay heat cooling, and do not require expensive 
containment. Canada’s nuclear policies provide little flexibility for accepting these inherent safety 
features without requiring extensive assessment. By providing a crediting system, nuclear 
regulators can not only accommodate the passive features of SMRs but may serve to streamline 
aspects of the safety analysis. Crediting proponents for the safety of their reactors is expanded 
upon within chapter 4, where this thesis discusses the use of type certification to certify reactor 
designs for more streamlined regulation. 
 The third limitation applies to any new design as identifying events typically requires 
operating experience.246 Though there are techniques to derive a list of events, conventional 
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probabilistic safety assessments do not integrate well with passive systems.247 Industry suggests 
that vendors initiate the development necessary where needed, which the CNSC may accumulate 
for its use.248  
 Upon making these recommendations, industry notes the utility of the graded approach for 
providing flexibility and supporting the recommendations made above. They explain that, although 
no new regulatory requirements are needed, acknowledgement of the graded approach within the 
process would be useful for demonstrating safe deviation or alteration of the safety analysis 
requirements.249  
 The use of the graded approach for the safety analysis of SMRs is not without difficulty as 
the lack of operational history, uncertainty and insufficient expertise available may complicate 
determinations of scope, detail and content. That is not to say that the graded approach would 
provide a streamlined and simpler risk assessment procedure for SMRs. In fact, the graded 
approach may dictate more stringent and greater depth within assessments because of the level of 
complexity, risk and uncertainty associated with some SMR designs. Notwithstanding, the graded 
approach may provide a suitable and appropriate assessment of SMRs, and the extent of its scrutiny 
will decrease as uncertainty, expertise and operational history improve as the industry develops. 
Ultimately, the graded approach provides the necessary flexibility to the regulatory regime to 
assess SMRs. 
 Development of REGDOC-2.4.1 has occurred based on the CNSC’s experience with 
CANDU reactors and is not technologically neutral as purported by it’s policy guides. Grading 
should be implemented within the safety analysis so that all reactor designs may be evaluated fairly 
and appropriately, and not just those premised on light water reactor technology. Grading 
implements flexibility, allowing the regulator to accommodate the unconventional, novel and 
innovative approaches taken by SMRs. The application of the graded approach will invoke 
additional documentation, increased risk mitigation and other conservative approaches to curtail 
the novelty of SMRs, at least during the outset of their use within Canada. In addition to the graded 
approach, other regulatory methods may be used to offset the stringency of conservatism and 
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uncertainty within safety analysis. For example, statistical analysis of uncertainty and 
conservatism may provide insight into what amount of conservatism is sufficient. Additionally, 
expert opinion and judgement may be used to provide insight to reduce uncertainties. Risks may 
be more accurately represented by applying these approaches to safety analyses.  
 
3.3.3 Accommodating uncertainty for risk management  
Current nuclear regulatory policy utilizes uncertainty as an indication for the amount of 
conservatism needed. However, uncertainty has greater applications within risk management and 
may be used to inform whether decisions meet objectives, whether cost-benefit requirements goals 
are satisfied and is indispensable for prioritizing risks. Using uncertainty analysis in this way is 
useful for SMRs because it provides additional considerations when comparing the risks of novel 
technologies and may be used to inform decision-makers of the amount of conservatism that is 
appropriate. Current regulatory policies consider uncertainty analyses when applying conservative 
measures, but fail to utilize those analyses in other aspects of risk management. 
Canadian nuclear regulatory documents consider uncertainty distributions primarily to 
account for the amount of conservatism their decisions should embody. For example, REGDOC-
2.4.1 requires frequency of accident occurrences characterized by significant uncertainty to be 
classified into a higher frequency class where more stringent precautions will apply.250 Other 
precautionary measures such as safety margins or safety factors are to be taken by designers “to 
account for uncertainty in experimental data and relevant models” when establishing quantitative 
acceptance criteria for anticipated operational occurrences and design-basis accidents.251 Notably, 
REGDOC-2.4.1 prescribes a degree of conservatism be incorporated within the analysis “to 
demonstrate a level of confidence in conformance with the analysis objectives”252 and “is often 
necessary to cover the potential impact of uncertainties.”253 REGDOC-2.4.2 prescribes sensitivity 
and uncertainty analysis to be included within probabilistic safety assessments254 and describes an 
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uncertainty analysis as a “process of identifying and characterizing the sources of uncertainty in 
the safety analysis, evaluating their impact on the analysis results, and developing, to the extent 
practicable, a quantitative measure of this impact.”255 
The CNSC uses uncertainty to justify safety margins and precautionary measures within 
their policy and neglect its benefits for assessing conservatism. Uncertainty may be used to identify 
where conservative decisions are overconfident by identifying the flaws in risk estimates that result 
in a greater skew towards prudence than is intended.256 In the report “Science and Judgment in 
Risk Assessment” by the National Research Council, the Committee on Risk Assessment of 
Hazardous Air Pollutants (the “Committee”) recommended the use of uncertainty to determine 
whether a risk assessment generates a point that is too “conservative,” which exaggerates the 
magnitude of harm.257 This recommendation highlights the short comings of REGDOC-2.4.2’s use 
of uncertainty as justification for the application of conservatism “to demonstrate a level of 
confidence in conformance with the analysis objectives.”258 Conversely, this thesis recommends 
that uncertainty analysis be used to determine whether such applications of conservatism 
overestimate the magnitude of harm for SMRs.  
Uncertainty distributions may also be used to optimally weigh probabilities and 
consequences, compare alternatives, identify compatible control options, and develop mechanisms 
to reduce it.259 Uncertainty analysis used in these ways is beneficial for regulating SMRs as safety 
assessment would be able to compare designs, accurately identify alternative measures and 
calibrate conservative measures appropriately. Consider the assessment of whether structural 
barriers for containment are necessary for packed bed nuclear reactors using tristructural isotropic 
(TRISO) fuels. TRISO fuels are engineered to inhibit the release of harmful materials and prevent 
meltdowns because of its high-temperature resistance.260 Proponents of this technology claim that 
containment is not necessary and that containment may impede heat transfer, therefore, increasing 
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risks rather than decreasing them.261 On this issue, uncertainty may provide additional information 
for decision-makers for assessing alternatives to conventional practices and completing a full 
evaluation of these claims. At present, policy avoids novelty and variation and prefers conventional 
precautions. 
Unlike point estimates, the comparison of uncertainty distributions can account for 
overestimation and underestimation of risks and reduce non-uniform outputs caused by 
conservative probabilities.262 Point estimates are unable to account for the ambiguities inherent 
within risk probabilities and, hence, are silent on whether the differences between two value 
estimates exceed the uncertainties of the estimates together.263 That is, decision-makers cannot 
ensure that the lower risk is not being underestimated and the higher risk is not being overestimated 
by comparing point estimates alone.264 Conservatism exacerbates this issue because it may be 
hidden within estimates resulting in non-uniform outputs as some estimates may represent 
differing worst case scenarios.265 For example, an estimate that represents the worst case scenario 
and another that represents a realistic scenario are incomparable because they are based on varying 
levels of conservatism.266 However, comparing uncertainty analyses under the examination of 
statistical methods may account for overestimation and underestimation and promote uniform 
outputs despite differing levels of conservatism.  
Furthermore, comparing uncertainty distributions is beneficial because it provides insight 
into the variation of risk magnitude important for decision-making. For example, consider the risks 
of two hypothetical chemicals, chemical A and chemical B, at an upper confidence limit of 95 
percent and that have 86 and 119 deaths/year, respectively.267 However, at a 97 percent confidence 
level, the uncertainty of chemical A and B have a corresponding risk of 580 and 340 deaths/year.268 
This example illustrates how uncertainty can affect the magnitude of risks at different levels of 
confidence. With the appropriate statistical tools, uncertainties may be compared to determine 
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where risks may exceed one another and yield more information to form decisions.269 Ranking 
based on point estimates alone may lead to decisions that rank chemical A higher than chemical B 
despite chemical A having a non-trivial worse outcome than the other at a 97 percent confidence 
limit.270 To effectively rank risks using uncertainty, decision-maker must weigh the probabilities 
and the costs of error.271  
In addition to uncertainty distributions, bottom-line summaries of risks are critical for 
determining risks that are acceptable and within the safety objectives of the CNSC.272 Uncertainty 
distributions and bottom-line summaries provide decision-makers with the ability to assess the 
amount of “conservatism” inherent within the risks, determine whether benefits exceed costs and 
whether other objectives are met.273  
 Though REGDOC-2.4.2 prescribes the completion of uncertainty analyses within 
probabilistic safety assessments to identify and characterize the sources of uncertainty and evaluate 
their impact on the analysis results, REGDOC-2.4.1 does not develop a policy that implements 
uncertainty analysis to compare and rank alternatives or to investigate the magnitude of 
conservatism inherent within the risk distributions. Uncertainty distributions are an excellent tool 
for risk management and should be utilized by decision-makers to make decisions. The Committee 
found that uncertainty distributions and bottom-line summaries are effective for ensuring decisions 
meet objectives and are acceptable as it provides insight about the amount “conservatism” inherent 
within the risks, whether benefits exceed costs, and whether safety objectives are met. 
Additionally, the Committee recommended the completion of uncertainty analyses for all risk 
estimations including low-tier risk assessments as the inherent difficulties associated with 
uncertainty should be expressed, despite difficulties and costs.274 It was the Committee’s opinion 
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that “explicit treatment of uncertainty is critical to the credibility of risk assessments and their 
utility in risk management.”275  
 
3.3.4 Conclusion 
The CNSC must be proactive within their RIDM process to accommodate the uncertainty 
and novel risks associated with SMRs and their variability. Conventionally, the CNSC employ 
conservatism to address uncertainty and novel risks. Conservatism is a risk averse practice to 
mitigate risks, but where left unchecked and under a conventional mindset may unnecessarily 
increase costs and assessment delays for proponents. SMRs are particularly vulnerable to 
conservatism because of their complexity, and uncertain and novel risks. The bias of regulations 
for CANDU technology exacerbates the use of conservatism for regulating SMRs and provide 
little flexibility for novel technologies. Therefore, to effectively regulate SMRs, the CNSC must 
implement more flexibility and proactively manage uncertainty.  
The graded approach should be applied to SMRs of all sizes to determine the scope, content 
and detail for their deterministic risk assessments. Industry and the CNSC both agree that the 
graded approach is essential for accommodating the variability of SMR designs. Furthermore, the 
flexibility offsets assessment expectations developed based on the CNSC’s experience with 
CANDU technology. The use of grading in the risk assessment of SMRs improves regulatory 
flexibility and reduces reactionary tendencies to rely on conservatism to accommodate SMRs 
within a fixed regulatory framework. 
The literature on the management of risk uncertainty perpetuates conservatism as the 
primary risk management tool to accommodate uncertainty or risk gaps. This thesis recommends 
the use of risk uncertainty as a resource for decision-making rather than just the impetus for 
precaution. Risk uncertainty analyses may be used to determine whether regulatory objectives are 
met, whether benefits exceed costs and the amount of conservatism already within risks. The use 
of uncertainty analysis within risk management is encouraged by the Committee who assert that it 
is critical to the credibility of risk assessments and risk management.276 
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3.4 Supporting the elicitation of expert judgement for risk assessment 
 Inadequate scientific understanding and lack of data may be responsible for gaps within 
risk assessments, thereby hindering objective assessment;277 however, subjective quantification of 
expert opinion can be a suitable alternative.278 Experts may assign probability weights to scenarios 
or models according to their best judgement and available scientific judgement which may form a 
risk distribution where objective assessments are unavailable.279 Though there are advantages to 
objective risk assessment such as impartiality, there is no rule that objective estimates are always 
preferred to subjective estimates.280 
Canada implements expert opinion within its deterministic assessments to evaluate 
determined risk. Expert judgement is used in conjunction with sensitivity analyses “to help identify 
and rank the parameters by assessing their influence on analysis results for each acceptance 
criterion.”281 Regulatory documents indicate that the CNSC may weigh heavily expert opinion 
where faced with no standard282 and employ best-estimate analysis and assumptions in conducting 
deterministic assessments.283 Accordingly, Canadian nuclear regulations do not emphasize the use 
of expert judgement for eliciting probabilities for assessment but use it primarily for the evaluation 
of risks within deterministic risk assessment. 
 Elicitation of expert judgement can produce qualitative and quantitative risk assessments 
for new, rare, complex or poorly understood phenomena, and can include failure rates, incidence 
rates, or weighing factors for combining data sources.284 For proponents of SMRs, expert 
judgement can provide another resource to fill risk gaps or relieve uncertainty where objective 
probabilistic safety assessment cannot accurately do so. Defence Research and Development 
Canada [the “DRDC”] has consolidated much of this literature and have reviewed methods and 
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procedures for the preparation, training, aggregation, scoring and verification of expert judgement 
to elicit probabilities based on expert judgement successfully.285  
 Though the DRDC lays out the process and procedures for obtaining accurate elicitation 
of expert judgement, challenges remain regarding how it may be implemented within Canada’s 
current nuclear policies and how it may be relied upon within the RIDM structure. The reliance on 
elicited risks for determining proportional amounts of conservatism poses the greatest challenge 
as it will be explained that elicited risks are only as accurate as the procedures in which they are 
generated.  
 
3.4.1 Eliciting expert opinion for quantitative and qualitative risk assessment 
 The use of expert judgement to overcome risk uncertainty is not contemplated by Canadian 
policy but may benefit the regulation of SMRs. Expert elicitation may be used to produce risk 
distributions for new, rare, complex or poorly understood phenomena associated with SMRs. The 
DRDC has consolidated literature on how to effectively elicit expert judgement for risk 
assessment. Their article outlines the elicitation process, inherent biases, evaluation of expert 
elicitations, how to improve elicitations, and how to aggregate multiple elicitations to generate 
accurate risk assessments.  
The DRDC reviews the literature on  how to effectively generate probabilities based on 
expert judgement.286 The aim of the article is to “synthesise models and techniques for eliciting 
and aggregating expert judgements, together with methods to evaluate the accuracy of elicitation 
and the quality of the risk assessment, in order to assist [branches of the DRDC] and other public 
security partners with essential tools to conduct sound risk assessments.”287 The result is a set of 
procedures, consideration and approaches for decision-makers to implement within regulations to 
effectively elicit expert judgement. 
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Expert judgement for eliciting quantitative and qualitative risks is useful for determining 
risks of SMRs where there exist risk gaps or uncertainty in risks. The DRDC suggest the use of 
expert judgement where objective probabilities are sparse, and experimentation is impractical.288 
In particular, expert judgement may be used to provide estimates for new, rare, complex or poorly 
understood phenomena, and can include failure rates, incidence rates, or weighing factors for 
combining data sources.289 Additionally, the process can form both qualitative and quantitative 
judgements. Quantitative estimates “can be expressed in the numerical value of probabilities, 
ratings, odds, uncertainty estimates, weighting factors, physical quantities of interest.”290 On the 
other hand, qualitative estimates can be “textual descriptions of the expert’s assumptions in 
reaching an estimate, reasons for selecting or eliminating certain data or information from the 
analysis, and natural language statements of physical quantities of interest.”291 Expert judgement, 
therefore, can be employed to develop risk distributions for SMRs where objective probabilistic 
assessments are unavailable or uncertain. 
There are five roles within the elicitation process: (1) the decision maker; (2) the facilitator; 
(3) the normative expert; (4) the domain experts; and (5) the stakeholders.292 The decision-maker, 
or the CNSC, is embodied with the responsibility to set out objective outcomes and decision 
criteria.293 Though legislation, regulations, and regulatory documents set out broad objectives of 
safety analysis already, the CNSC may develop a regulatory document that sets out its expectations 
regarding elicitation of expert judgement and how to consider resulting probabilistic data within 
existing policies and the graded approach.  
The facilitator acts as the medium between the domain expert and the decision maker and 
is responsible for selecting domain experts and describing the case to them.294 The applicant, or an 
agent thereof, should fill the role as a facilitator because the applicant has the onus to demonstrate 
the safety of their application. Furthermore, the applicant would have the best insight into the 
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subject matter for which risks are being elicited and thus would be better capable of describing it 
to the domain expert. 
The normative expert is responsible for eliciting judgements from domain experts and 
instructing them how to perform inferential estimations, and therefore require expertise in the 
generation of risk distributions.295 Additionally, the normative expert also combines elicited 
domain expert judgements and forms conclusions from the results. To avoid industry bias and 
regulatory capture, it is suggested that the normative expert be independent from the applicant. 
Stakeholders are those affected by the decision and provide feedback to affirm the scope 
and completeness of the issues.296 The decision-maker identifies the stakeholders and is given the 
opportunity to affirm the quality of the results. The scheme considers the input of stakeholders 
crucial for the qualification of risk assessment and divides engagement amongst the decision-
maker, the facilitator and the normative expert.297 Conversely, Canadian regulations engage 
stakeholders through mandatory public hearings, notices and engagement programs carried out by 
proponents with the public and indigenous peoples. Though the current scheme may achieve the 
participation of stakeholders within the elicitation process through engagement requirements, it 
may be appropriate for the CNSC to outline their expectations of this engagement regarding the 
elicitation of expert opinions. This approach not only satisfies the suggestions made by the DRDC 
but clarifies expectations for proponents. 
Domain experts are those who are qualified to provide respected judgments. Elicitation 
involves the extraction of inferential opinions based on the expert’s knowledge and experience 
within a controlled process to minimize error. 298 To determine qualified expertise, consideration 
is given to the special knowledge and skill of the expert relevant to the particular domain, which 
may be determined through peer assessment, ability and length of experience.299 The obligation to 
select experts is on the applicant because they have the onus to demonstrate to the CNSC that their 
project is safe and within regulatory requirements. Independence of the experts is ensured through 
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a nomination system and the oversight of the CNSC. How the CNSC may ensure the independence 
of the experts is discussed further in the following section. 
Literature outlines five critical stages conducive to a favourable elicitation process with 
preparation being an underpinning factor.300 The first stage, “Background and Preparation,” 
requires the normative expert and facilitator to identify variables to be assessed by the domain 
experts and plan the elicitation process. Next, literature recommends a nomination system to 
appoint domain experts and suggests that nominations include public interest groups and 
professional organizations to balance perspectives, and recommends six criteria for selecting 
appropriate domain experts. 301  The third stage involves motivating and training experts.302 At this 
stage, domain experts undergo training on probability and overcoming biases, and practice 
elicitation.303 The final two stages, the “Structuring and Decomposition” stage and “The 
Elicitation” stage represent the actual elicitation of judgement. Structuring and Decomposition 
define what risks are to be quantified and on what evidence those quantities are to be drawn.304 
Elicitation solicits probability distributions through an iterative procedure which repeats until 
assessments are adequate.305 The process outlined by the DRDC is methodical and deliberate to 
build a foundation of accuracy and impartiality for elicitations.  
 Training domain experts to overcome biases is important because of the limitations of 
human memory, and information processing regularly produce probabilities that are poorly 
calibrated or inconsistent.306 Research suggests that human ability to assess probabilities or predict 
future quantities are limited, which introduces uncertainty into the assessment through 
psychological biases.307 Literature finds that bias is minimized where the expert has a high level 
of expertise, adequate preparation, adequate instruction on the process and face-to-face 
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interactions with the facilitator and normative expert.308 Additionally, alerting experts to what 
biases influence elicitation and how they are introduced is found to be the most effective approach 
to reducing inaccuracies.309 The use of behavioural and mathematical aggregation techniques of 
multiple domain experts are also recommended to bolster results and ensure accuracy.310 
 Following elicitation, calibration curves, scoring and feedback are used to evaluate the 
performance of domain experts based on whether their elicited risks accurately reflect both the 
their opinion and reality.311 Calibration curves graphically represent the accuracy of elicitation 
over a range of confidence levels,312 where poor calibration may result from the domain expert’s 
poor ability to accurately reduce their beliefs or the operation of the domain expert on inaccurate 
knowledge.313 Calibration curves can conclude if estimates are overconfident or underconfident 
and are used to calibrate the elicitation process to improve accuracy.314 Calibration curves are 
developed during the training stage of elicitation where testing, practice and feedback are used 
systematically to produce and improve calibration.315 Scoring uses a statistical approach to 
compare the expert’s performance against reality and is applicable to both discrete and continuous 
probability distributions.316 Additionally, scoring provides an incentive for experts to perform their 
elicitations well and help train them to quantify judgements accurately.317 Feedback of the domain 
experts is the most effective method of improving accuracy and calibrations.318 Feedback should 
be structured to avoid apathetic responses to feedback319 and anchoring effects320  of the domain 
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experts. The DRDC suggest the implementation of an iterative feedback procedure during training 
which counteracts apathetic responses and anchoring and encourages accurate elicitation.321  
 Random variation of estimates can be offset by aggregating multiple expert judgements 
into a single distribution using behavioural or mathematical aggregation techniques.322 
Statistically, aggregating judgements from multiple experts produce a better appraisal than 
individual distributions and provides practicality and feasibility when assessing risks as the single 
distribution represents a consensus.323 Both aggregative approaches provide effective conclusions, 
and debate over which approach is most effective is inconclusive. However, literature recommends 
using behavioural aggregation initially because of its simplicity and ability to coordinate the 
synthesis of knowledge and analysis through group interaction.324 Conversely, mathematical 
aggregation is used where behavioural aggregation fails to yield a consensus as it can be complex 
and time-consuming.325  
 Behavioural aggregation facilitates collaboration between multiple experts to generate a 
single probability distribution through various methods of interaction that promotes the exchange 
of knowledge, information, and interpretations.326 There are many behavioural aggregation 
methods to consider, such as the Delphi Method,327 Nominal Group Technique,328 and Kaplan’s 
Approach,329 but their application will depend on the circumstances of the process.330 The type of 
interaction, the nature of the interaction, individual reassessment post interaction, and the role of 
the facilitator in the process are some, but not all, of the elements to consider when choosing a 
behavioural aggregation method.331  
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 Where domain experts fail to reach a consensus within behavioural aggregation attempts, 
mathematical aggregation may be used to combine elicitations into a single distribution through 
mathematical methods.332 However, mathematical aggregation tends to be complex, time-
consuming and difficult to implement and thus should be applied as an adjunct to behavioural 
aggregation. For example, Bayesian methods333 require sophisticated elicitation practices by the 
decision-maker and create complexity and difficulties of implementation.334 Additionally, Cooke’s 
method,335 though significantly accurate, is substantially more complex than other methods and 
requires a well-structured and thorough elicitation process.336 Linear and logarithmic pooling,337 
though simpler and widely used in practice, also relies on a thorough elicitation process.338 
Additional complications arise as the choice of what method to use is dependent on a myriad of 
considerations which are not always obvious.339 In the interest of simplicity and time, 
mathematical aggregation approaches should be considered supplementary upon the failure of 
behavioural aggregation attempts because of their associated complexity and comparable results. 
 The article recommends that a risk assessment framework be developed within the RIDM 
processes to verify the quality of the elicitations and to promote the regulatory qualities of 
completeness, credibility, transparency and fairness.340 A framework developed by Rosqvist built 
upon peer review, accountability and quality characteristics implement “yes” or “no” criteria to 
satisfy the four regulatory qualities, albeit upon the judgement of the decision-maker.341 The 
effectiveness of Rosqvist’s framework depends on the experience of the individual performing the 
verification, which in the Canadian context would be the CNSC.342 Rosqvist’s step by step 
procedure is as follows: (1) “scope definition,” which ensures that stakeholders are informed of 
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decision rules and criteria; (2) “hazard identification,” which ensures hazard identification process 
is adequately surveyed and verified by stakeholders and domain experts; (3) “risk estimation,” 
verifies that parameter uncertainty, model uncertainty and bias are sufficiently addressed; (4) “risk 
evaluation,” which verifies that resolutions are consistent; (5) “analysis of options,” which ensures 
that control options are adequately surveyed from stakeholders and domain experts; (6) 
“recommendation for the decision-maker,” which requires that a peer review be completed.343 
Upon the completion of the verification, the decision-maker may make decisions based on the risk 
assessment and verification results, or request modifications or other adjustments.344 
  The DRDC outline effective procedures to elicit expert judgment and evaluate the 
accuracy and quality of the resulting elicitations. Canada’s nuclear regulations do not contemplate 
the use of expert judgement as a method to assess risk and produce risk probabilities. However, its 
use for SMRs may be an alternative method to provide estimates for new, rare, complex or poorly 
understood phenomena. Though the DRDC outline procedures and steps for obtaining accurate 
elicitations, regulators must investigate how elicited expert opinion may be implemented 
successfully within current policies. Points of consideration for this task include how the graded 
approach should apply to elicitations, whether regulatory expectations should outline procedures 
for choosing domain experts, what aggregations methods are best for nuclear power generation 
risk assessments, whether there are conflicts with existing policies, and complications arising out 
of the relationship between proponents and the decision-maker. 
 
3.4.2 Implementing expert judgement into Canada’s regulations 
This thesis suggests that the CNSC produce an adjunct regulatory document that outlines 
its expectations of how elicitations are to be performed and how elicited risks are to be relied upon 
amidst established policies and regulatory principles. The article by the DRDC sets out a well-
informed elicitation process, a summary of appropriate aggregative methodologies, and procedures 
for the evaluation and verification of elicited risk distributions that may be drawn upon by the 
CNSC for this task. However, when implementing these procedures, the CNSC must consider the 
compatibilities with their policies and their international commitments. Important considerations 
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include potential modifications to the CNSC’s public engagement policies, and the adherence to 
safety standard policies of the IAEA that prescribe conditions for elicitations. 
 The CNSC will need to develop policy that expresses their expectations for the elicitations 
of risks and how it may be relied upon within their risk assessment. The CNSC’s REGDOC-2.4.1 
and REGDOC-2.4.2 follow the standards for deterministic and probabilistic risk assessments 
outlined by the IAEA. However, the IAEA does not outline a specific regime for the elicitation of 
expert judgment or how it may be relied upon. Accordingly, the CNSC must develop their own 
elicitation policy.  
Such a regulatory document would specify, among other things, procedural expectations 
of the elicitation process, acceptable behavioural and mathematical aggregative methods, 
calibration and scoring requirements, stakeholder engagement expectations and require extensive 
documentation throughout the process. The elicitation process proposed by the DRDC is 
sufficiently thorough to act as the bare bones standard for elicitations, whereas the CNSC may 
expound on areas they see fit within regulations. Additionally, the CNSC may provide proponents 
opportunities to refine further elicitation procedures where such variation or addition may improve 
elicited judgement accuracy while maintaining the independence of the experts and where 
documented heavily. The expectations of the elicited process may also be a point of discussion 
during the optional pre-licensing stage of vendor diagram review.  
 The regulatory document developed for elicitation of expert judgement will be an adjunct 
to REGDOC-2.4.1 and REGDOC-2.4.2. Thus, elicitations are to be carried out in accordance with 
existing regulatory expectations including the IAEA’s Safety Standards documents, Level 1 and 
Level 2 PSA.345  
 The IAEA Safety Standards contemplate the use of expert elicitation, which requires expert 
judgement to be accompanied by an appropriate justification, extensive documentation346 and strict 
                                                 
345 Canada, REGDOC-2.4.2, supra note 254 (the following safety standard documents provide general guidance 
for conducting high-quality PSAs: IAEA Safety Standard SSG-3, Development and Application of Level 1 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Nuclear Power Plants; and IAEA Safety Standard SSG-4, Development and 
Application of Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Nuclear Power Plants at 1). See also International 
Atomic Energy Agency, Development and Application of Level 1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Nuclear 
Power Plants, (Vienna: IAEA, April 2010) [IAEA, Level 1 PSA] at 3.   
346 Ibid at 42, 83, 99. See also at International Atomic Energy Agency, Development and Application of Level 2 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Nuclear Power Plants, (Vienna: IAEA, May 2010) [IAEA, Level 2 PSA] at 11, 
36. 
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conditions. The IAEA Safety Standard document Level 1 PSA requires that the elicitation of expert 
judgement embody “a formal, highly structured and documented process” with the following 
conditions: 
(a) Qualified experts capable of evaluating the relative credibility of multiple 
alternative hypotheses in order to explain the available information are selected.  
(b) Independence of the experts’ opinions is maintained.  
(c) The uses, rationale and background information for expert judgement are 
documented in a way that is traceable and reproducible.  
(d) Uncertainties and variabilities in expert judgement are stated. The impacts or 
effects of these uncertainties and variabilities are assessed.  
(e) The conclusions that are based on the results of the process have a sound basis347 
 
Though REGDOC-2.4.2 cites the IAEA Safety Standard documents as “guidance,”348 it is 
recommended that these considerations be included in the Canadian regulatory documents 
developed for elicitation of expert judgement.  
 The five-stage elicitation process recommended by the DRDC is compatible with the 
conditions of elicitation set out by the IAEA’s safety standards, though some aspects may require 
reinforcement and support within the policies developed by the CNSC. Condition (a) is met within 
Stage 2: Identification and Recruitment of Experts of the DRDC’s suggested process. Stage 2 
implements a nomination system set out by Hora and von Winterfeldt, which was developed for 
the elicitation of risks for nuclear waste repositories, to ensure the quality and capability of 
experts.349 In the nomination system, proponents, and any other interested parties, pool experts 
identified through literary searches, registries of professional organizations, contacts with 
consulting firms, research laboratories, governmental organizations and universities.350 For 
matters that are controversial or have alternative viewpoints, such as nuclear regulation, Hora and 
von Winterfeldt recommend that public interest groups and professional organizations both be 
invited to submit nominations to avoid criticisms of bias.351 From this pool, domain experts are 
selected according to six criteria: (1) tangible evidence of expertise; (2) reputation; (3) availability 
                                                 
347 IAEA, Level 2 PSA, ibid at 99. 
348 Canada, REGDOC-2.4.2, supra note 254 at 1. 
349 DRDC, supra note 285 at 5. See also Stephen C Hora & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Nuclear Waste and Future 
Societies: A Look into the Deep Future, (1997) 56:2 Technological Forecasting and Social Change 155 at 158. 
350 Hora, ibid (in the authors study, they pooled nominated experts as a neutral party but also invite many 
professional organisations and public interest groups to also nominate experts to create a well-balanced pool of 
experts at 158). 
351 Ibid. 
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and willingness to participate; (4) understanding of the general problem area; (4) impartiality; and 
(6) lack of an economic or personal stake in the potential findings.352 In their case study, Hora and 
von Winterfeldt implemented a committee to select experts made up of professionals and members 
of a university. For SMRs, this thesis suggests the selection of experts should be made by a 
committee of neutral members to avoid partiality when selecting experts, with at least one member 
being from the CNSC. This selection process ensures the selection of qualified and capable experts 
for elicitations. 
 Condition (b), which advocates that experts provide an independent opinion, is a significant 
concern because of the potential partiality introduced by the proponent carrying out the elicitation 
process. However, measures may be introduced to mitigate partiality and encourage independence, 
such as implementing the nomination process recommended by Hora and von Winterfeldt, 
requiring extensive documentation for all stages of elicitation, and designing procedures that 
encourage independence. Nominating domain experts using the recommendations of Hora and von 
Winterfeldt encourages a balanced pool of experts, deters conflict of interest and rejects experts 
who have an economic or personal stake in the potential findings. Additionally, extensive 
documentation of the elicitation process, which is required by IAEA Safety Standards and 
condition (c), (d) and (e),353 provides content reviewable by the CNSC to ensure the independence 
of the experts. This documentation should include the scientific evidence being relied upon by the 
experts for their determinations. Where documentation is found unsatisfactory, the CNSC may 
reject the findings or request refinements or adjustments to elicitations. Finally, requiring multiple 
experts to arrive at a consensus using behavioural aggregation limits the influence of rogue experts 
within the process. Where experts fail to arrive at a consensus and mathematical aggregation 
techniques are used, the CNSC may review documentation, the basis for the elicited expert’s 
opinions and the qualification of the domain experts to rule out impartiality and ensure 
independence. 
 Conditions (c) through (e) are substantive requirements to be met within the completion of 
elicitations and the probabilistic safety assessment. The verification of these, and preceding 
conditions, is carried out by the CNSC within their safety assessment regulations, which are 
                                                 
352 Ibid. 
353 IAEA, Level 1 PSA, supra note 345 at 42, 83, 99. See also IAEA, Level 2 PSA, supra note 346 at 11, 36. 
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informed by the IAEA’s “A Framework for a Quality Assurance Programme for PSA.”354 The 
IAEA’s Quality Assurance Programme describes elements and principles necessary to develop 
adequate quality assurance programmes for probabilistic safety assessments of nuclear facilities.355 
This framework is delineated within two methodological aspects: (1) probabilistic safety 
assessment quality characteristics;356 and (2) quality verification tasks.357  Rosqvist argues that the 
Quality Assurance Programme provides little detail for how quality assurance tasks should be 
linked to quality characteristics.358 Furthermore, in his analysis of other probabilistic safety 
assessment quality assurance literature, Rosqvist determines that, overall, quality assurance for 
risk assessments is still “in the stage of conceptual development” and that for elicitation purposes 
a “mature conceptual framework relating to quality characteristics, peer review organization and 
its tasks, and accountability” is necessary to serve its aim in the RIDM process. 
 Rosqvist develops a framework built upon “an independent peer review process for 
consolidating the decision-maker’s confidence in the results and recommendations of risk 
assessment.”359 This framework implements the quality characteristics of completeness, 
credibility, transparency, fairness, which encapsulates the same quality characteristics promoted 
within the IAEA’s Quality Assurance Programme.360 Rosqvist links quality characteristics to a 
six-step risk assessment framework: (1) Scope Definition;361 (2) Hazard Identification;362 (3) Risk 
                                                 
354 International Atomic Energy Agency, “A Framework for a Quality Assurance Programme for PSA” (1999) 
1101 Tecdoc Series 1. 
355 Ibid at 1. 
356 Rosqvist, supra note 297 (the quality characteristics embodied by the IAEA’s Quality Assurance Programme 
are completeness, consistency and accuracy at 35). 
357 Ibid at 35. 
358 Ibid. 
359 Ibid. 
360 Ibid  (“[t]he following quality characteristics are presented [in the IAEA’s Quality Assurance Programme]: 
Completeness, Consistency and Accuracy” at 35). 
361 Ibid (Scope Definition “verifies that the stakeholders have been informed about adopted decision rules and 
criteria” and embodies the quality of transparency at 38). 
362 Ibid (Hazard Identification “verifies that the stakeholders’ and the domain experts’ feedback on the 
completeness of hazard identification process is adequately surveyed” and represents the quality of completeness at 
38). 
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Estimation;363 (4) Risk Tolerability;364 (5) Analysis of Options;365 and (6) Recommendations for 
the decision-maker.366 Though the IAEA may provide an adequate standard for quality assurance 
of elicitations, Rosqvist’s framework not only links tasks to quality characteristics but represents 
a framework that represents the culmination of literature on the subject.  
 REGDOC-2.4.1 and REGDOC-2.4.2 embody the quality assurance framework of the 
IAEA; however, the question is whether they should adopt the more rigorous model of Rosqvist 
and how that will affect the reliability of expert elicitation. The differences between the verification 
processes of REGDOC-2.4.1 and REGDOC-2.4.2 and Rosqvist’s framework are minimal. 
Rosqvist’s verification steps of Hazard Identification, Risk Estimation and Risk Tolerability are 
already, in one way or another, represented within REGDOC-2.4.1. The most significant difference 
is the inclusion of stakeholders’ feedback throughout the elicitation process and the verification of 
that participation.367 The verification process ensures that stakeholders provide feedback on the 
completeness of hazard identification, provide feedback on the completeness of risk control 
options and are informed about decision rules and criteria during the verification steps of Hazard 
Identification, Analysis of options, and Scope Definition respectively.368 The inclusion of 
stakeholders in this way is a result of the culmination of literature on the subject.  
The elicitation process recommended by the DRDC provides for extensive stakeholder 
feedback and interaction with normative experts and facilitators 369 and engages the proponent’s 
obligations to consult with the public and indigenous peoples under regulatory policies. Literature 
                                                 
363 Ibid (Risk Estimation “verifies that sensitivity studies, based on parameter uncertainty, are adequate; … 
verifies that model uncertainty and direction of bias of risk model is adequately addressed” and represents the 
quality of credibility at 38). 
364 Ibid (Risk Tolerability “verifies that the conclusions drawn as based on the decision rules are consistent” and 
represents the quality of credibility at 38). 
365 Ibid (Analysis of options “verifies that the stakeholders’ and the domain experts’ feedback on the 
completeness of risk control options is adequately surveyed” and represents the quality of completeness at 38) 
366 Ibid (“[Recommendations for the decision maker] verifies that the stakeholders’ and the domain experts’ 
feedback on the completeness of risk control options is adequately surveyed” at 38). 
367 Ibid (Rosqvist lists the roles of parties involved in the elicitation process and their responsibilities to engage 
with stakeholders, i.e. the Facilitator is required to question stakeholders on the quality of results and whether any 
issues have been neglected; Normative experts are responsible for eliciting “preferences and the development of 
utility functions” of stakeholders; and Stakeholders give feedback during the risk assessment process at 14).  
368 Ibid at 38. 
369 Ibid (Rosqvist lists the roles of parties involved in the elicitation process and their responsibilities to engage 
with stakeholders, i.e. the Facilitator is required to question stakeholders on the quality of results and whether any 
issues have been neglected; Normative experts are responsible for eliciting “preferences and the development of 
utility functions” of stakeholders; and Stakeholders give feedback during the risk assessment process at 14). 
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explains that the input of stakeholders is crucial for the qualification of risk assessment and that 
the public should be involved within the nomination process of domain experts. Implementation 
of this engagement should not only be addressed within safety assessment but should also be 
outlined within public engagement policies of the CNSC so that proponents understand the full 
scope and content of their obligations.   
REGDOC-3.2.1 and REGDOC-3.2.2 require proponents to develop a public information 
and disclosure program and engage with the public and indigenous peoples early and throughout 
project development. It is suggested that these regulatory documents include the CNSC’s 
expectations for how the proponent should involve the public in eliciting risks. These expectations 
would include the goals and objectives of that engagement and require the proponents to develop 
a program outlining how they aim to achieve those goals and objectives. Proponents will be 
required to identify points where stakeholder engagement is necessary to provide feedback, and 
how and when the public is to interact with the facilitator and normative experts. When 
determining whether the objectives and goals of public engagement are met, it is suggested that 
the CNSC also consult the verification process framework by Rosqvist as the first questionnaire 
asks whether stakeholders are informed of decision rules and criteria. 
The integration of the elicitation process recommended by the DRDC produces minimal 
conflicts with Canadian policies and conforms with the standards of the IAEA`s Quality Assurance 
Programme. Dovetailing the elicitation process within the current safety assessment policy is 
possible, but additional regulatory documents should be established to outline expectations. 
Though the mechanisms of this elicitation process can easily be integrated, regulators must 
consider the impact this will have on regulatory policies such as the graded approach and 
conservative decision-making. 
 
3.4.3 The application of the graded approach 
 The decision-makers must consider how the graded approach will apply to elicited risks, 
not only for their assessment but also so that proponents may be informed of their expectations. 
Traditionally, decision-makers have dealt with subjective risks using conservatism as exemplified 
by the heavy use of margins of safety during the advent of the nuclear industry which heavily 
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relied on expert judgement.370 However, elicitations have the potential to be well-informed and 
statistically interpreted to yield accurate and informative risk distributions because of 
advancements in elicitation methodologies.371 This section recommends a two-step process to 
appropriately characterize elicited risks for the purpose of applying the graded approach. 
 In the advent of nuclear power generation, expert judgement was relied upon to develop 
regulatory requirements for safety features, operations and quality assurance; however, this 
resulted in a strong dependence on conservative decision-making philosophies resulting in 
substantial safety margins.372 The fear of subjective risk analysis has remained and is exacerbated 
by the public fear of nuclear technology. This analogy serves as a cautionary tale for considering 
expert elicitations. However, since then elicitation processes have developed robust methodologies 
to account for bias and error, understanding of nuclear technology and safety has progressed, and 
technology has advanced. Regulators must consider elicited risks objectively and avoid 
disproportionate conservatism. 
  The graded approach is a significant consideration in the RIDM process and embodies 
regulatory principles such as proportionality and conservatism to make decisions. This thesis 
recommends the implementation of a two-step process to account for the accuracy of elicitations 
for RIDM. First, elicitations are assessed for their accuracy by assessing the process used by the 
proponent to elicit the risk distributions and whether they conform to the expectations promulgated 
within the CNSC’s to be developed regulatory documents. From this assessment, the CNSC will 
score the performance of elicitations proportional to the performance of the elicitation process. 
The performance score should also consider the effectiveness of the elicitation process, what 
methodologies are applied, the accuracy of elicitations as characterized by calibration curves and 
probability scoring, the probabilistic coherence of elicitations and whether elicitations are 
successfully verified. Second, the graded approach is applied normally but applies conservatism 
proportionally to the uncertainty of the risk distribution and the performance score. By framing 
                                                 
370 Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Regulatory Decision-making, supra 61 (in the infancy of nuclear 
regulation, expert judgement was relied upon to develop requirements for safety features, operations and quality 
assurance which was supplemented by conservative decision-making philosophies and resulted in substantial safety 
margins at 27).  
371 See generally W P Aspinall et al, “Evaluation of a Performance-Based Expert Elicitation: WHO Global 
Attribution of Foodborne Diseases” (2016) 11:3 PLOS ONE 1 at 1. 
372 Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Regulatory Decision-making, supra 61 at 27. 
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the process in this way, elicited risks may be treated alongside other risks in the overall evaluation 
of the design. 
 It is important to note that step one determines a performance score which reflects the 
performance of the elicitation process and does not account for the subject matter of the risk or the 
value of the risk. A performance score is determined by setting goals, expectations and objectives 
within regulatory documents and evaluating applicants based on how effectively they meet those 
targets. Step two assesses risks and afford elicited risk distributions weight proportional to the 
performance score assigned by the decision maker. Poor performance scores are an indication of 
the reliability of elicited risk distributions and can also be used to indicate the amount of 
conservatism that should be applied. For example, elicitation of the frequency of occurrences 
attributed with notable uncertainty and a poor performance score may be classified into a higher 
frequency class then the reported estimation of frequency alone may suggest. This approach is 
similar to the practice implemented by REGDOC-2.4.1, which requires frequencies of occurrences 
characterized by significant uncertainty to be classified into a higher frequency class.373  How 
performance scores affect decision making will depend on the score given and the decision-maker 
The DRDC’s report presents three methods to evaluate the uncertainty of elicitations to be 
considered in step-one – calibration curves, probability scoring and coherence. The degree of 
agreement between the expert’s judgement and reality is quantified using calibration curves.374 
Calibration curves quantify the “quality of subjective judgements elicited from experts … over a 
range of confidences.”375 The calibration curve does not demonstrate the actual accuracies of 
elicited judgement as there is no way to compare elicitations to observed frequencies but identifies 
whether experts are overconfident or under-confident due to bias or poor understanding of the 
statistics. Scoring quantifies how well the expert’s elicitations match their true beliefs.376 Strong 
scores represent a positive correlation between reality and the elicitations.377 Additionally, 
coherence is checked to affirm the maintenance of the laws of probability.378 Good calibration, 
probability scores and coherence indicate unbiased results that obey the laws of probability and 
                                                 
373 Canada, REGDOC-2.4.1, supra note 211 at 13. 
374 DRDC, supra note 285 at 27. 
375 Ibid at 12. 
376 Ibid at 14. 
377 Ibid.  
378 Ibid at 27. 
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are a good representation of the expert’s beliefs based on substantive evidence, and vice versa. 
Within regulatory documents calibration curves, probability scores and coherence can be used as 
quantitative targets for proponents completing elicitations and can be used to determine 
uncertainty and margins of safety. 
The verification proposed by Rosqvist ensures credibility, completeness and transparency 
using a “yes” or “no” response rubric. A “no” on any of the questionnaire indicates an inadequate 
risk assessment and the need for more detail.379 A decision-maker who awards a “no” during the 
verification process should reject the elicitation or award it a significantly poor performance score.  
The accuracy of elicitations increases with the number of experts elicited and should form 
a consideration of step one. Studies have found that the accuracy of elicitations increases with the 
number of experts and that there is little improvement beyond five or six.380 The performance score 
should represent the number of experts elicited, especially where the number of experts involved 
is less than five. However, elicitations with greater than six experts should not call for increased 
deference due to the accompanied plateau of accuracy. The performance score should consider the 
number of experts to ensure that perspectives, knowledge, and interests are balanced, and that 
impartiality and independence is maintained. These aspects are important for emulating objectivity 
within elicitations. 
Behavioural and mathematical aggregative techniques are equally effective for arriving at 
a single elicited probability distribution. However, documentation should be reviewed to ensure 
that the correct methods employed under the circumstances and that training and preparation of 
experts are satisfactory. Behavioural aggregation methods rely heavily on the facilitator to carry 
out the process. The appropriateness of the behavioural aggregation methods employed will 
depend on whether interactions occur face-to-face, and the nature of the interaction (e.g. sharing 
information).381 The appropriateness of mathematical aggregative methods will also differ based 
on the circumstances, with different methods having varying accuracies. Cooke’s Method is the 
most complex mathematical aggregation technique but also provides the best results and provides 
the most information to form conclusions.382 Targets and expectation for aggregation should 
                                                 
379 Rosqvist, supra note 297 at 37. 
380 DRDC, supra note 285 at 14. 
381 Ibid at 20. 
382 Ibid at 22. 
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consider the appropriateness of the methods chosen, the effectiveness of the aggregation technique 
used, any additional information that may result from aggregation and the actions of the facilitator 
and the normative expert to improve the accuracy during behavioural aggregation methods – i.e. 
the use of feedback and training.  
Upon the completion of step one, the overall assessment of the nuclear activity continues 
as normal, whereas performance scores are considered within the application of the graded 
approach to elicited risks. Elicited risks are treated the same as objectively determined risks, and 
conservatism is introduced to mitigate events in response to the evaluated risk probability, 
uncertainty and performance score determined in step one.  However, when applying the graded 
approach there are additional considerations that are pertinent to elicited risks. Decision-makers 
must consider additional conservatism where: 
• a significant number of risks are elicited or otherwise subjectively determined; 
• there is conflict or incongruity between elicited risks and other risks; 
• stakeholders strongly oppose use of elicited risks; 
 
 The two-step process is advantageous because it contemplates elicited risk as any other 
risk. Step one operates on the assumption that an elicitation formed with perfect execution with 
sufficient evidence is comparable to risks formed objectively using accurate models and 
parameters. However, the uncertainty of the elicited distribution and the performance score temper 
this assumption so that it can be appropriately considered within the RIDM process. Scoring, 
calibration curves and analysis of probabilistic coherence indicate the amount of uncertainty in the 
elicitation. On the other hand, the performance score accounts for circumstances within the 
performance of the elicitation that may result in ineffective results. In practice, the addition of the 
performance score may overestimate the necessary amount of conservatism due to the subjective 
determination of the performance score and the evaluations of elements that may or may not have 
a bearing on the accuracy of the results. However, by evaluating the elicitations on their ability to 
meet established goals and objectives, decision-makers can break down the evaluation into 
manageable quantifiable chunks thereby minimizing superfluous conservatism.  
 
92 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
Regulatory flexibility is needed to effectively regulate SMRs within Canada’s current 
regulatory framework so that their variability, novel technology and novel applications are 
addressed appropriately without prejudice. Performance-based regulation is advantageous for this 
purpose as it provides aspirational goals for which SMRs must adhere, instead of immovable 
prescriptive requirements. Though performance-based regulations improve regulatory flexibility, 
Canada’s experiences with CANDU reactors inevitably constrain the assessments of SMRs. 
However, the use of the graded approach to define the scope, content and detail of risk assessment 
will help negate any preferences for CANDU technology. The graded approach will ensure that 
regulatory expectations are adjusted based on the design of the reactor on a case-by-case basis.  
Canada’s regulatory response to risk uncertainty is to mitigate its effects using 
conservatism. However, uncertainty may be used in risk management practices to provide insight 
into the amount of precaution needed to meet safety objectives and can be used to ensure that 
appropriate conservatism is applied. Additionally, uncertainty can be used to prioritize risks, 
ensure safety objectives are met, and provide credibility to the decisions being made. In this way, 
the risk uncertainty of SMRs may play a beneficial role within risk assessment and may help reduce 
conservative responses. 
Expert judgement may also be used to help fill risk gaps to provide accurate risk 
distributions on which the CNSC may confidently rely to form decisions. The CNSC may score 
the performance of the elicitation to be used as a weighting factor when considering elicited risk 
distributions within risk assessments. The weighting factor operates on the fact that there is a strong 
link between the accuracy of elicitations and the methods used to procure those elicited risks. 
Elicited risks are a powerful tool to produce risk distributions that will become increasingly 
necessary as technology becomes progressively complex.  
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Chapter 4: The type certification of SMRs  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 Type certification or type approval is the process of certifying a design and approving its 
manufacturing process such that productions of that design are assured to meet regulatory 
requirements without further proof. Industries that regulate products produced in mass use type 
certification to ensure their safety without having to certify each individual product. Accordingly, 
the nuclear industry has raised reproducibility and, by association, type certification to take 
advantage of the modularity and mass production benefits of SMRs. However, Canada regulates 
nuclear activities on a case-by-case basis and does not currently have a type certification 
framework in place 
 The CNSC raised the issue of how to effectively regulate SMRs deployed in fleets, either 
on the same site or across Canada, in DIS-16-04.383 On this issue, the nuclear industry suggested 
that the CNSC employ reproducibility similar to the maritime and aviation industries.384 
Reproducibility refers to the assurance that the vendor is capable of producing products that are 
consistent to a high degree with the original design. Reproducibility is an essential element of type 
certification and is thus an important consideration in this chapter.  
 This chapter examines how type certification is employed by the U.S. Federal Aviation 
Administration (the “FAA”) and by classification societies within the maritime industry. These 
two industries provide pedagogical value for the CNSC because both industries regulate complex 
products that can have catastrophic consequences upon the realization of a risk event. Examination 
of these industries provides insight into type certification practices and its application to complex 
products. Notably, the complexity of the products has compelled both industries to rely on third 
parties for assessment and, in the case of the FAA, key regulatory functions.  
The FAA’s approach to type certification is afflicted with conflict of interest and possible 
regulatory capture as members of the industry are depended on to perform regulatory functions. 
Conversely, the maritime industry is able to maintain impartiality in the administration of risk 
                                                 
383 See Canada, DIS-16-04, supra note 120 at 9. 
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assessments because it relies upon third-party classification societies who have an insignificant 
stake in the maritime transport market. 
 The FAA and the maritime industry provide surprising insight into the type certification of 
complex products. Both industries found it necessary to depend on private enterprise to perform 
important regulatory responsibilities because of insufficient resources to effectively regulate 
complex products. The reliance of the aviation and maritime industry in this way exemplifies the 
difficulties of regulating increasingly complex technologies and serves as a cautionary narrative 
for the regulation of SMRs as their complexity and popularity increase. This chapter serves not 
only to indicate how Canada’s nuclear regulation can implement type certification but also to 
provide caution as Canada embarks on the regulation of increasing complex nuclear reactors.   
  
4.2 The use of type certification by the Federal Aviation Administration of the United 
States 
 The Federal Aviation Administration of the United States is responsible for the regulation 
of aviation safety and for granting type certificates, referred to as production certificates, to aircraft 
designs that have been demonstrated to meet applicable rules and regulations.385 The production 
certificate is advantageous because aircraft produced thereunder are axiomatically determined 
airworthy, thus avoiding further assessment for individual products. However, due to the 
complexity of aircraft design, the FAA rely heavily on designated representatives of the 
manufacturer to review the multitude of supporting documentation. Many have criticized this 
reliance for introducing regulatory capture into the industry and serves as a cautionary tale for the 
CNSC. 
 Production certificates certify that produced aircrafts meet regulatory requirements and are 
produced consistently and accurately to design schematics. The FAA award production certificates 
to manufacturers after the completion of two steps. First, the aircraft design undergoes an 
assessment to ensure that it meets regulatory requirements and standards. The assessment ensures 
                                                 
385 National Research Council, Committee on Airliner Cabin Air Quality, Airliner Cabin Environment: Air 
Quality and Safety, (Washington (DC): National Academies Press, 1986) at 65 [National Research Council, 
“Airliner Cabin Environment”].  
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that the aircraft design is airworthy. Second, the manufacturer is audited to ensure that the aircraft 
design can be produced accurately and consistently to specifications.  
The audit ensures that the manufacturer’s organization, production facility, quality system 
and design data follow regulatory requirements and expectations.386 Where corrective actions are 
needed, the manufacturer is notified in writing. The correction may include additional audits or 
meetings with the manufacturer.387 The production certificate is effective “until surrendered, 
suspended, revoked, or the FAA otherwise establishes a termination date”388 and cannot be 
transferred.389 Additionally, notification must be given to the FAA where the manufacturer makes 
any changes to the facilities that affect quality systems, inspection, conformity or airworthiness of 
the product, which are subject to review by the regulator.390   
 The auditing process requires extensive documentation from the applicant. Materials 
include a description of how the organization will ensure compliance, the responsibilities of 
management overseeing the quality of production, and the identification of a manager with 
authority over production operations.391 The manager acts as a liaison to confirm that the 
procedures in place comply with regulations. Most importantly, the manufacturer must provide a 
written description of their facility’s quality system to demonstrate the conformity of the 
production to the approved design. Federal regulations list fourteen quality systems that must be 
maintained to demonstrate the adequacy of the manufacturer’s quality systems.392 The 
documentation provided by the manufacturer and the compliance of their quality system to 
regulations are used to demonstrate the reproducibility of the product. 
 Aviation safety relies on the cooperation and mutual exchange between the FAA and 
manufacturers.393 There is a strong incentive for the manufacturer to continue to produce according 
to the certified design because modifications that affect the quality, organization or airworthiness 
                                                 
386 United States of America, Federal Aviation Administration, “Production Certificate Application and 
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of the aircraft require resubmission for certification.394 This pattern of interaction emphasizes 
inspection and enforcement rather than the review of design specifications and production.395 This 
characterization becomes increasingly evident when considering the FAA’s reliance on 
representatives from the manufacturer to assess their designs. 
 The FAA relies heavily on Designated Engineering Representatives (the “DERs”) to assess 
aircraft. DERs are typically employees of the manufacturer who have been selected by the FAA 
to perform assessments of their design because of the growing complexity of aviation technology, 
the significant amount of documentation that needs to be considered within the assessment, and 
the familiarity of the employees with their design.396 Though DERs are not supposed to perform 
key regulatory tasks of the FAA, government audits of the regulator indicate that DERs are relied 
upon for the bulk of the FAA’s regulatory work, including work that is meant to be completed by 
FAA staff. As a result, many have analogized the FAA as a human resource manager, as they 
ensure the impartiality and competency of DERs rather than directly perform safety 
assessments.397 
 The type certification of aircraft by the FAA provide insight for the nuclear industry as 
both industries are tasked with regulating complex products with the potential for catastrophic 
failures. It is recommended that the CNSC type certify designs upon the satisfaction that the design 
of the SMR meets regulatory expectation and its manufacturing process ensures reproducibility 
just as the FAA does. However, not all aspects of the approach of the FAA are comparable. It is 
recommended that the CNSC avoid relying upon representatives for regulatory tasks, as it removes 
their direct involvement of ensuring the safety of the designs. The challenges associated with the 
FAA’s approach to type certification is discussed in the following section. 
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4.2.1 Criticisms of the FAA: Conflict of interest and Regulatory capture 
The FAA relies on DERs for most of their assessment responsibilities due to the complexity 
of the aircraft designs and their familiarity with the technology. As a result, the tacit knowledge of 
DERs has become indispensable for aviation regulation. Many have criticized the relationship 
between the FAA and DERs for introducing a conflict of interest between manufacturers and the 
regulator and the potential for regulatory capture. Conflict of interest arises from the DERs service 
to two masters: their employer (the manufacturer) and the FAA. The FAA is exemplary for its 
assurance of reproducibility, but its reliance on DERs is a cautionary tale that should be carefully 
examined if the CNSC chooses to implement their own type certification framework. 
 DERs are employees of the manufacturers, usually senior employees, who are deputized 
by the FAA to act as surrogates for the oversight of the design, test calculations and compliance 
with aviation regulations.398 The FAA choose DERs to perform assessments because of their tacit 
in-depth knowledge of the design.399 As a result, DERs perform the bulk of regulatory obligations 
of the FAA, including key regulatory responsibilities of FAA staff. Thus, DERs serve two masters: 
the FAA and the manufacturer. To effectively administer this regime, the FAA reportedly go to 
great lengths to train DERs with sufficient expertise and impartiality.400  
 The FAA’s approach to regulation is characterized as “second-order” regulation because it 
functions as a resource manager of DERs.401 In this role, the FAA assesses the integrity and 
expertise of its DER workforce to ensure that technical assessments of aircraft are performed 
honestly by qualified and credible people.402 That is, the FAA cannot assess the technological 
claims directly, but assess the creditworthiness of the people who make them.403 This approach is 
characterized as “second-order” regulation because the FAA is intimately involved in the oversight 
of “representatives who conduct, interpret and frame the tests,” and not the direct assessment of 
the design.  
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 Critics chastise the FAA’s reliance on DERs because it places the primary responsibility 
of ensuring the safe design, maintenance and operation, and ultimately the guarantee of aviation 
safety, with the manufacturer.404 In principle, DERs are to conduct routine functions while the 
FAA staff administers key elements of certification.405 In practice, however, DERs have 
increasingly been delegated key aspects of the certification and assessment process because of the 
growing complexity of aircraft designs.406 In 1993, the US Government Accountability Office 
found that DERs are delegated 90-95 percent of the FAA’s regulatory activities.407 A delegation 
of significant regulatory tasks to DERs has been noted since 1989, where the FAA delegate nearly 
all certification processes to Boeing for assessment of their advanced flight management system 
because of the unfamiliarity of the system.408 As a result, conflict of interest and regulatory capture 
are significant concerns. 
 DERs are in a clear conflict of interest as they serve two masters: the manufacturer and the 
FAA.409 The conflict arises as the manufacturer’s interest lies in corporate gain and the FAA’s 
interest lies in ensuring the safety of civil aviation. These interests are incompatible as regulation 
by definition is the control or maintenance of industry, irrespective of private interest, for some 
objective that might not otherwise occur.410 Supporters of the FAA argue that the concerns of 
conflict of interest are unjustified because the FAA and aircraft manufacturers share the same 
interest to design safe, reliable aircraft.411 However, this interest fails on two points. First, it 
neglects the parallel economic interest of the manufacturer that is influenced by market 
pressures.412 For example, certification failures can be extremely expensive with some 
manufacturers literally “betting the company” on its success.413 Under these stresses, the refined 
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impartiality of the DER in their assessment is dubious as they strive to rise through the corporate 
ranks and maintain their employment through the success of their employer.414 Second, this fails 
to consider non-nominal legal obligations such as the fiduciary accountability of the DERs to the 
manufacturer and the FAA that may arise. Academics have raised the question as to why regulation 
is needed at all if the interests of the FAA and the manufacturers align.415 
 Critics of the relationship between manufacturers and the FAA are also concerned with the 
potential for regulatory capture. Regulatory capture occurs where, “over time, powerful industries 
come to dominate the agencies that regulate them.”416 The arrangements between manufacturers 
and the FAA are exemplary of regulatory capture pathology as the FAA’s dependence on 
manufacturers provides a power imbalance which the manufacturers may abuse to achieve their 
interests.417 Many academics have named the FAA as particularly vulnerable to regulatory 
capture,418 and some agency veterans have confirmed that manufacturers have significant 
influence within aviation regulation.419 Regulatory capture threatens good regulation because it is 
“a method of subsidizing private interests at the expense of the public good.420 
  The type certification regime of the FAA serves as a caution for the regulation of complex 
technology that requires extensive assessment. Moving forward with the regulation of SMRs, the 
CNSC must ensure they have sufficient resources to accommodate nuclear activities. Reliance on 
representatives to assess designs and audit the quality system of the manufacturer poses significant 
risks of conflict of interest and regulatory capture. Proponents of the FAA have suggested that the 
criticisms are moot because of the lack of alternative approaches available and that the 
imperfection of the process is embraced.421 However, the CNSC may avoid this through 
preparation and fortification of their expertise and resources. 
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4.2.2 The Canadian perspective 
The reliance on third party representatives not only introduces regulatory capture and 
conflict of interest into regulation, but it also contradicts the ideology that RIDM embodies. The 
power imbalance resulting from the reliance on DERs for the performance of risk assessments 
contradicts the heart of RIDM. Furthermore, the conflict of interest arising from the reliance on 
DERs is potentially a breach of the DERs fiduciary obligation to their employer under Canadian 
jurisprudence. Fortunately, with informed and careful policy the CNSC may be able to avoid the 
challenges faced by the FAA if a similar licensing structure is put in place. 
 There is no doubt that the CNSC should avoid the type certification process imposed by 
the FAA, not only because of the fear of regulatory capture but also because it is inoperable within 
the RIDM policies of the CNSC. The latent power imbalance of the FAA’s regulatory approach 
places significant responsibility on industry to make regulatory decisions, sharing the 
responsibility with the CNSC, and potentially obscuring informed decision-making. Additionally, 
it is difficult for organizations, other than the CNSC, to have sufficient experience to administer 
performance-based criteria based upon aspirational objectives. Decisions formed under a conflict 
of interest by definition signals that the values of RIDM are not maintained.  
 Not only is there a conflict of interest between DERs and the FAA but, in the context of 
Canadian jurisprudence, there is also the potential for a breach of fiduciary obligations owed by 
the DER to its employer. In Can. Aero v O'Malley, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized senior 
management officers as status fiduciaries owing a strict duty of loyalty to their employer requiring 
them to put the interest of the corporation ahead of their own.422 It is also noteworthy that the court 
left open the opportunity for junior employees to be found as a fact-based fiduciary where their 
duties have a confidential nature.423 As a regulator, expertise is a commodity when choosing 
designated representatives and, therefore, there is a preference for employees who have tacit 
knowledge and years of experience.424 Though their position will determine whether they are a 
fact-based or a status-based fiduciary, it is probable that designated representatives owe a fiduciary 
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duty to their employers because of the confidential and senior nature of their employment. Notably, 
some academics have argued that all employees are accountable as fiduciaries.425  
 It may be also possible for the DER to be a fiduciary of the regulator in addition to the 
manufacturer. Such a characterisation will depend on the nature of the relationship of the DER 
with the regulator. The characterization of the DER as an employee of the regulator is unlikely 
because of the regulator's lack of sufficient control over the DER426 and thus cannot create a 
fiduciary relationship.  However, the finding of a fact-based fiduciary relationship remains 
possible. Thus, the failure to find the DER as an employee of the regulator does not preclude the 
fiduciary accountability of the DER to the regulator.427  
  Fiduciary accountability is strict and is breached where the fiduciary uses their limited 
access to the employer’s assets opportunistically.428 As discussed previously, some argue that there 
is no conflict of interest between the regulator and the manufacturer because they share the 
common interest to produce a safe and reliable product. However, this is an economic justification 
and should not be conflated as a justification for the legal duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty is 
strictly applied and acting in the “best interest” of the beneficiary is not a defence. Expressed 
consent is the only defence to a breach of a fiduciary obligation. Thus, despite being ostensibly a 
justification economically or politically, the justification is not defensible legally. 
 Issues arising out of fiduciary accountability of the employee are complex, and the 
complete discussion of those challenges is beyond the scope of this paper. Not only are there issues 
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of the breach of an employee’s fiduciary obligations to the employer, but the CNSC can be held 
accountable where those breaches are committed as a result of their relationship with the employee. 
Dishonest assistance, or knowing assistance, is a third-party liability in trust law for knowingly 
assisting the breach of a fiduciary duty.429 Accordingly, this thesis highly recommends that reliance 
on designated employees be avoided, not only because of the threat of regulatory capture and the 
conflict of interest but also because of the issues arising out of the fiduciary accountability of the 
employees to their employer. 
 The dependence on DERs by the FAA is not the result of some irreconcilable elements of 
type certification but is a consequence of the complexity of the technology and the FAA having 
insufficient resources to accommodate it. In addition to regulatory capture and conflict of interest, 
a similar approach implemented within Canada would potentially breach the employees’ fiduciary 
duty to their employer. Despite these issues, the FAA provide an example for how to ensure 
reproducibility of the manufacturer. Auditing the manufacturer facilities, ensuring the quality 
systems and having a manager as a liaison may simply be implemented within the current 
regulatory regime of the CNSC.  
   
4.3 The use of type certification by the Maritime transport industry 
 The maritime transport industry is regulated according to international standards, with 
deference to state requirements where appropriate. Independent organizations, or classification 
societies, heavily influence maritime transport and oversee the construction and manufacturing of 
vessels and accompanying components. The US relies on the American Bureau of Shipping (the 
“ABS”)430 for the certification, including type-approval, of maritime transportation. Although they 
are a third-party certification process made up of members of industry, they avoid regulatory 
capture and conflict of interest through their organizational structure. The certification processes 
                                                 
429 See Gold v Rosenberg, [1997] 3 SCR 767, 35 OR (3d) 736. 
430 American Bureaus of Shipping, Type Approval Program: Practical and Effective Approval Solutions, 
(Houston: ABS, 2015) (ABS is instrumental within the certification of ships for national and international shipping 
within the U.S provide, and provide review on behalf of the U.S. Coast Guard, perform conformity assessment for 
equipment for certification of the European Union Marine Equipment Directive and European Union Mutual 
Recognition at 4). 
103 
 
practiced by the maritime industry relay conducive regulatory approaches useful for the type 
certification of SMRs.  
 The maritime transport industry is regulated according to international standards and state 
requirements.431 The International Maritime Organisation (the “IMO”) is a specialized agency 
established by the United Nations tasked with regulating shipping. The IMO has produced 22 
conventions or treaties, 17 codes and resolutions containing guidelines and recommendations for 
maintaining comprehensive shipping regulations.432 International requirements are imposed by the 
vessels originating jurisdiction, or “flag state,” that has ratified the international agreements.433 A 
vessel is awarded a certificate for every convention for which it complies. A certificate is valid for 
five years, provided that the vessel is inspected annually.434 After five years, the ship undergoes a 
major inspection whereby certification is renewed pending any necessary maintenance or 
renovation to meet standards.435 Though traditionally inspection of vessels has been conducted by 
government agencies, such as the coast guard in both Canada and the U.S., there is increasing 
reliance on classification societies who are contracted by flag states to perform inspections and 
enforce regulations. 
 Classification societies are independent organizations relied upon by the maritime industry 
for their assurance of vessel safety. Classification societies establish basic minimum standards for 
the design, construction and maintenance of the hull and components of vessels.436 Classification 
societies issue certifications of the class which are relied upon throughout the maritime industry 
as an affirmation that the vessels are fit for its intended use.437 Prominent classification societies 
such as ABS are members of the International Association of Classification Societies (the 
“IACS”), which prescribe minimum requirements for classification.438 The IACS standardizes 
classification practices to deter, to the greatest extent possible, classification society shopping by 
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ship-owners and promote public confidence by discouraging economic gains regarding 
seaworthiness requirements.439  
 Like the FAA, the maritime industry relies on classification societies because of the  
complexity of the vessels being regulated. The complexity and continual advancement of the 
technology is an ever-moving target too ambitious for governments to maintain with specificity.440 
The rules of classification societies are continuously reviewed and developed to meet advancing 
technology. However, unlike the FAA, classification societies, mostly remain impartial in their 
assessments.  
 Though classification societies are independent third-parties, the system avoids regulatory 
capture and partiality through the competition between societies, enforcement of standards and 
oversight by the IACS, insulation from the market pressures of the shipping industry and the 
practice of publishing the findings of their assessments. Classification societies compete amongst 
each other to deliver the best services to their clients who include shipping companies and 
governments.441 In the U.S.,442 Canada443 and other countries, governments have legislated the use 
of classification societies for the regulation of their vessels and shipping industry, where 
impartiality and transparency are integral.444 Impartiality is also encouraged by the IACS, who 
instil public confidence through safety standards and inhibit gains awarded to classification 
societies for bias dealings with ship-owners.445 Furthermore, classification societies do not share 
the same interests as ship-owners because they have a distinctively different role within the 
                                                 
439 See Ibid. 
440 See Laihui Sun, A study of the roles of classification societies under the new maritime atmosphere, (MSc 
Thesis, World Maritime University Faculty of Maritime Safety and Environment Protection, 1999) [unpublished] at 
7. 
441 See Hartmut Hormann, “Classification Societies – What is Their Role, What is Their Future” (2006) 5:6 
WMU J Maritime Affairs 5 at 6. 
442 See example 46 CFR § 3316(a) (1983) (“[e]ach department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States 
Government shall recognize the American Bureau of Shipping as its agent in classifying vessels owned by the 
Government and in matters related to classification”). See also National Research Council, Tanker Spills, supra note 
431 (The U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for the “safety of life and property at sea and protection of the marine 
environment,” however incorporate the rules of the ABS and rely on the ABS to perform inspections and design 
reviews and delegates a significant amount of its regulatory responsibility to the ABS at 47). 
443 See e.g. Canada, Transport Canada, Guidelines for the Construction, Inspection, Certification, and 
Operation of Tugs < 24 Metres in Length, 1st ed, TP 15180E (Ottawa: Transport Canada, 2013) (“Transport Canada 
has entered into formal agreements with certain Classification Societies, under the authority of the Act. These 
agreements cover the delegation of statutory inspection and certification functions and product approvals” at 15). 
444 See Sun, supra note 440 at 39. 
445 Miller, supra note 436 at 77. 
105 
 
industry. Therefore, classification societies are unmoved by the market pressures experienced by 
ship-owners and have minimal to no incentive for regulatory capture.446 Furthermore, unlike 
DERs, classification societies rely on surveyors447 who do not have an economic stake in the 
performance or maintenance of the vessel.448 The IACS requires that surveyors be impartial and 
require member societies to ensure the independence of their personnel performing class surveys 
and audit activities.449 Finally, classification societies attempt to remain transparent and 
accountable by publishing their findings so that ship-owners, authorities, insurers and other 
interested parties may consult it.450  
 Using the ABS as an example, type approval certification for vessels is awarded upon the 
successful evaluation of the vessel design and the quality standards of the manufacturer. The “Type 
Approval Certificate” is granted upon the completion of the “Product Design Assessment 
Certificate” (the “PDA”) and the “Manufacturer Assessment” (the “MA”). To begin the process, 
a PDA is first applied for and completed. The ABS issue a PDA upon the verification of the 
product's compliance with the manufacturers’ specifications, ABS rules, national standards and 
international standards.451 Next, the ABS conducts an MA which requires the inspection of the 
product during manufacturing to assess the quality control system and the manufacturing processes 
of the plant.452 The quality system check is similar to that of the FAA, where the ABS conducts an 
audit of the quality control systems and the facility. The IACS provides quality assurance standards 
and guidance depending on the product.453 A “Type Approval Certificate” is axiomatic upon PDA 
certification and a successful MA. 
 The maritime industry and the FAA both employ third parties to aid in the regulation of 
complex technology. However, the maritime industry manages to maintain impartiality using 
                                                 
446 Ibid at 85. 
447 Hormann, supra note 441 (Though surveyors are required to be employees of a technical organisation, they 
may still act as independent experts for projects not pertaining to their employment at 11). 
448 Ibid. 
449 See Laihui Sun, supra note 440 at 35. 
450 See ibid at 7. 
451 American Bureau of Shipping, “Type Approval Procedure” (last visited 23 October 2018) online: ABS 
website <https://ww2.eagle.org/en/Products-and-Services/type-approval/type-approval-procedure.html> 
[https://perma.cc/8W3S-N2SG].  
452 Ibid. 
453 See e.g. International Association of Classification Societies, No. 17 Guidelines for the Acceptance of 
Manufacturer's Quality Assurance Systems for Welding Consumables, (London: IACS, 1987). See e.g. International 
Association of Classification Societies, No.47 Shipbuilding and Repair Quality Standard, (London: IACS, 1996). 
106 
 
classification societies. Over the last few centuries, this system has developed a market consisting 
of many societies that promote impartiality through competition, regulatory oversight and 
independence from the market pressures of the shipping industry. This approach drastically 
reduces conflict of interest and potential for regulatory capture. Another similarity between the 
FAA and the maritime industry is how they ensure reproducibility through audits and inspections 
of the manufacturing facilities, organization and quality systems. The maritime industry provides 
an example of an international inspection system that may be employed to streamline the licensing 
of SMRs being mass-produced. However, this system has its own flaws that should be considered 
and addressed before it is implemented for the regulation of SMRs.  
 
4.3.1 Criticisms of the Classification Societies: Market pressures and quality discrepancies 
The literature on classification societies criticizes their internal decision-making methods, 
but focus little discussion on their regulatory structure and approach. A pouring of criticism came 
during the mid to late 1990s after a string of accidents resulted in the loss of life and extensive 
pollution.454 Academics point out poor risk assessment methodologies, standards, and failures to 
address human factors in safety as the cause for the surge in maritime accidents.455 Though critics 
are silent on the reproducibility and type approval approaches of the maritime industry, their 
discussion of market pressures and competition amongst societies provide insight into additional 
difficulties of developing a third party assessment regime. 
The competitive nature of the classification society market has been called the Achilles 
heel of the industry.456 Delegating certification and assessment tasks to third-party organizations 
promotes competition. Competition for market share incentivizes societies to cut costs of services 
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to remain competitive 457 and decreasing the quality of service.458 Though 12 prominent 
classification societies are members of the IACS, there are countless others who operate out of the 
association. As a result, many societies are reporting annual losses, with some contemplating 
merging with other entities to remain profitable.459  
Market pressures are generally corrosive to good regulation – the aviation industry is a 
good example of that. Though classifications societies are not regulators per se, they do play an 
extensive role within the regulation of the shipping industry and are subject to their own market 
pressures. The IACS and IMO are important organizing institutions that ensure the standards of 
classification societies are satisfactory and instil confidence within the system. Despite the 
countermeasures placed by the IACS and IMO, however, classification societies’ capitulation to 
market pressures is inevitable, which typically incentivizes classification societies to reduce their 
costs and thus diminish their quality of assessment.    
 
4.3.2  The Canadian perspective 
As SMRs increase in popularity and begin deployment, regulators such as the CNSC may 
find themselves struggling to perform regulatory tasks competently and economically without 
reliance on outside resources. The maritime industry suggests that regulators may rely on 
independent third parties for the assessment of complex designs which are capable of maintaining 
their impartiality unlike the DERs relied upon by the FAA. It is suggested that this approach may 
be effective for the CNSC. However, the such a regime will require a sizeable SMR industry in 
order to eb effective.   
 Classification societies such as those in the maritime industry are impartial because of their 
unique placement within the maritime industry. Market independence, oversight by an 
international body, competition amongst classification societies, and publication of their findings 
are key aspects that hinder regulatory capture within the maritime industry. Unlike the FAA who 
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obscures the significance of their reliance on DERs,460 classification societies practice 
transparency and accountability to obstruct regulatory capture. Transparency aids in mitigating 
regulatory capture, encouraging complete and accurate information, and ensuring that decision-
makers are accountable for their decisions.461 Accountability has a significant impact on the 
promotion of effective decision-making in two ways. First, it holds the decision-maker accountable 
for their actions.462 Second, it holds regulators accountable for their inactions and elicits improved 
regulations where such regulations are inadequate.463  
 Were the CNSC to depend on third parties for regulatory assessments, classification 
societies would be exemplary for how to maintain impartiality and reduce the potential for 
regulatory capture. However, Classification societies are also exemplary of how regulation may 
develop to accommodate the proliferation of SMRs internationally. International oversight over 
nuclear activities already exists as the IAEA and the UN provide standards and guidelines for 
member countries. Thus, the IAEA, or if they so choose third-party organizations organized within 
the IAEA (like the IACS), may become a standard source for assessing reproducibility and 
certification of SMR designs. International oversight would be in line with already mobilized 
efforts to standardize nuclear regulations internationally. 
An international certification and reproducibility process may operate similarly to the 
maritime industry, where the assessment of SMR designs and quality assurance of the vendor occur 
in accordance with the regulatory guidelines of the IAEA. Under such a regime, states would defer 
to the assessments of the IAEA but would still need to assess SMRs according to their regulatory 
laws. For example, assessment for licenses to prepare a site, construct, operate, etc. would still 
have to be satisfied by the CNSC. This regime would reduce costs for regulators who otherwise 
must conduct the assessment of the manufacturer, while also reducing costs and licensing durations 
for the vendor.  
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The maritime industry and aviation industry are examples of how regulators have 
integrated expert and third parties to regulate complex systems. As the Canadian nuclear industry 
begins to expand their regulation to accommodate SMRs, a significant amount of consideration 
must be given to their resources and whether they have the capacity to accommodate the 
technology. Though the reliance on third parties to perform regulatory functions has resulted in a 
conflict of interest and potential regulatory capture for the FAA, the maritime industry illustrates 
that, under the correct structure, regulators may rely on third parties for the assessment of products 
for the purposes of type certification. However, before such a regime can be introduced, the SMR 
industry will have to grow substantially, which may occur as SMRs gain in popularity because of 
their safe operation, economics, range of applications, and as countries take measures to offset 
their emission.  
 
4.4 Type certification of SMRs and accommodating complexity in Canada 
 Though the substance of the regulation of SMRs will differ greatly from the aviation and 
maritime regulation, the two industries provide insight into how regulators can implement type 
certification and maintain reproducibility. This thesis recommends that the CNSC exercise type 
certification of SMRs in a two-step process similar in structure to type certification by the FAA 
and classification societies. The first step is the assessment of the design. This step administers 
design relevant expectations for assessing the design of the SMR. Following a successful 
assessment, step two ensures the reproducibility capabilities of the vendor. If vendors are 
successful in step two, their designs will receive type certification. In theory, this approach would 
mirror the approach taken by classification societies and the FAA. However, the implementation 
of type certification may be challenging due to the entangled and lengthy licensing process. 
 This thesis argues that the assessments conducted for type certification should embody 
relevant regulatory expectations conducive to the overall licensing process. In this way, type 
certification may occur during or before the licensing process without unnecessarily using 
regulatory resources. Another advantage of this approach is that it avoids implementing an ad hoc 
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regulatory scheme for SMRs464 and acknowledges the industry’s desire to regulate SMRs within 
the existing framework.465  
 The scope of assessment for type certification will be limited to that of the reactor and 
components of the facility that are standard to the respective SMR design. This assessment will 
include deterministic and probabilistic safety assessment, defence-in-depth considerations, 
personnel needed and other considerations specific to the safety of the facility and reactor. 
Additionally, the scope, content and details of the assessment should be tailored to each design 
using the graded as suggested in the previous chapter. This approach will also require the CNSC 
to extricate criteria and requirements entangled within the broad licensing phases of nuclear power 
plants and synthesise those requirements into a single assessment phase. 
 The CNSC requires licences for the five phases of the nuclear power plants lifecycle, three 
of which are pertinent to the deployment of the reactor: (1) license to prepare a site; (2) license to 
construct; and (3) licence to operate. These licensing phases consider aspects beyond just the 
design of the reactor such as consultation with the public, environmental assessment, personnel 
requirements and more. Though applicants may obtain these three licences in parallel, the total 
duration from applying for a licence to prepare a site to the grant of a licence to operate is 9 years.466 
The licensing duration may be increased by the limitations of the CNSC’s resources, and the 
complexity and unfamiliarity of SMRs.467  
 The pre-licensing vendor design review already synthesizes an assessment procedure 
useful for type certification. The pre-licensing step can “verify, at a high level, the acceptability of 
a nuclear power plant design with respect to Canadian nuclear regulatory requirements and 
expectations, as well as Canadian codes and standards.”468 Though the conclusion of the review is 
                                                 
464 See Tristano Sainati, Giorgio Locatelli & Naomi Brookes, “Small Modular Reactors: Licensing constraints 
and the way forward” (2015) 82 Energy 1092 (the authors discourage the creation of an ad hoc regulatory 
framework to regulate SMRs because of three primary challenges: (1) “[i]t requires a significant review of the legal 
and regulatory framework”; (2) “[i]t implies a complete re-think of the [licensing process] that implies a redefinition 
the institutional framework; (3) “[i]t implies a reduction of the licensing guarantees in intuitional and democratic 
terms (e.g. exemption of circumstances for the public inquiry)” at 1094). 
465 See Canada, “What We Heard Report”, supra 122.  
466 Canada, Design of New Nuclear Power Plants, supra note 74 at 14. 
467 Ibid. 
468 Canada, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Pre-licensing Review Vendor Design Review, GD-385 
online: CNSC website <https://www.nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/reactors/power-plants/pre-licensing-vendor-design-
review/>  [https://perma.cc/9VVY-8Z83]. 
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intended not to be binding, it demonstrates that designs may be assessed outside of normal 
licensing procedures to a high degree.  
 The second stage of the type certification assesses the reproducibility of the design by the 
manufacturer. This step assures that the manufacturer will produce its design consistently and 
accurately to its design specifications. Using the FAA as an example, the assessment of the 
manufacturing process is broken into two phases. First, the FAA requires that the manufacturer 
describe how its organization will ensure its compliance with productions standards and describe 
the quality management strategies implemented therein.469 Second, the FAA ensures that the 
quality system of the plant is sufficient to ensure that “each product and article conforms to its 
approves design.”470 The FAA’s regulations identify fourteen control measures to be included 
within the quality system which provide an excellent reference for the CNSC when implementing 
a similar approach.471  
 Quality assurance also requires that the regulator inspect the manufacturing premises that 
build the product. Before the FAA grants a production certificate, they inspect the manufacturing 
process on site. Classification societies do the same for vessels and other components. This 
inspection is necessary if the CNSC wishes to ensure the reproducibility of the manufacturer. 
Additionally, an on-site inspection may alleviate difficulties associated with the inspection of 
modular reactors during installation on site as inspectors may assess the inside of the vessel during 
its manufacturing. Upon type certification, the inspection of a single certified unit may be 
sufficient for all units designed to that specification. 
 The CNSC may grant type certifications with conditions at their discretion. Common 
conditions by the FAA and maritime industry include the voiding of certification or license upon 
any unauthorized changes to the design or the manufacturing facilities. The FAA requires approval 
for any minor472 and major changes to aircraft designs.473 Additionally, the manufacturer must 
notify the FAA of any changes to the manufacturing process that affects inspection or conformity 
                                                 
469 14 CFR § 21.135 (2009). 
470 14 CFR § 21.137 (2009). 
471 Ibid. 
472 14 CFR § 21.93 (2009) (a minor change being one that does not affect “the weight, balance, structural 
strength, reliability, operational characteristics, or other characteristics affecting the airworthiness of the product”). 
473 14 CFR § 21.97 (1964) (major changes are approved upon the receipt of substantiating and descriptive data 
and demonstration that the changes comply with regulations). 
112 
 
of the product.474 The maritime industry requires that certified vessels be re-examined every five 
years to ensure that designs are up to standards.475 Additionally, conditions may be appended to 
type certification as the CNSC sees fit similar to how they provide conditions to the license they 
grant. 
 It is possible to integrate type certification into the Canadian nuclear industry without 
adverse effects or challenges to RIDM and associated regulatory principles such as the graded 
approach. In the first step of type certification, designs will be scrutinized as if being assessed 
within the normal licensing procedures. The second step of type certification, the audit of the 
manufacturer and its quality assurance systems, is heavily prescriptive-based and, thus, 
insignificantly engages with performance-based principles such as the graded approach. The 
graded approach may apply, however, during the assessment of documentation provided by the 
manufacturer concerning their quality assurance program. The extent of documentation must 
satisfy the quality assurance claims of the vendor proportional to the complexity and novelty of 
the process (not the design of the reactor). This is in line with other regulatory requirements of the 
CNSC which requires that the amount and content of documentation be proportional to the 
complexity and novelty of the activity. 
 The CNSC can avoid regulatory capture through transparency, accountability and clarity 
which should be maintained in the practice of type certification. Examples of the practice of 
transparency by the CNSC include the publishing of discussion papers and workshops completed 
with stakeholders, and the involvement of the public and Indigenous peoples within the process. 
Accountability is a value embedded within the CNSC code of ethics, which states that the CNSC 
is committed to exercising their authority in a responsible manner that maintains public trust and 
confidence and being accountable for their “decisions, actions and advice.”476 Clarity is promoted 
through the CNSC’s dealings with industry and its robust library of regulatory documents outlining 
their expectations. It is suggested that licenses granted on the basis of type certification be subject 
to these values and practices to avoid regulatory capture. The involvement of stakeholders and the 
                                                 
474 14 CFR § 21.139 (2009). 
475 National Research Council, Tanker Spills, supra note 431 at 43 
476 Canada, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, supra note 177 at 4. 
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transparency of that involvement will be important as the Canadian nuclear industry is diverse and 
contains many different stakeholders who are influential within the process.  
  The exact scope and content of the type certification are beyond this thesis. It involves 
intimate regulatory considerations developed through years of practice and expertise familiar only 
to the CNSC. However, the above discussion does its best to highlight a structure for type 
certification that may be expanded upon by the CNSC to be used within it’s regulations. When 
implementing the system, the CNSC must be sure that the structure remains economical for 
vendors to take advantage of, while remaining sufficiently robust for the CNSC to rely upon. The 
pre-licensing vendor design review already does a similar assessment that verifies at a high level 
the acceptability of the SMRs design and can act as a reference for the development of a type 
certification assessment phase.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 Industry suggests the implementation of type certification for SMRs to take advantage of 
its modularity and to streamline the deployment of SMRs in fleets or otherwise across Canada. 
The FAA and the maritime industry provide a comparable approach to type certification and 
reproducibility. Additionally, both industries rely on non-governmental organizations for 
conducting key regulatory responsibilities, which have contrasting results pertinent to Canada’s 
potential advancement into the type certification of complex and unfamiliar reactor designs. 
 As Canada begins regulating SMRs, industry and regulators alike raise their complexity 
and uncertainty as a significant challenge to their effective regulation. The FAA and maritime 
industry foreshadow the difficulties of administering the type certification of complex products 
and illustrates the need for resources and expertise to ensure their effective regulation. The CNSC 
have implied that they the sufficient capacity to regulate SMRs. However, the maritime industry 
and the FAA show that regulating mass produced complex technologies is an overwhelming task 
and casts doubt on whether the CNSC could ever be ready for such a task. 
 There are no significant challenges or impediments to the implementation of type 
certification within Canada’s nuclear regulations. Assessment criteria of the reactor may be 
extricated from regulations, as done by the pre-licensing vendor design review. Reproducibility is 
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an important phase of the type certification process and regulators must assess the quality 
assurance, organization and the facilities of the manufacturer to ensure that products conform to 
standards. Reproducibility is a significant concern for type certification of SMRs because of the 
high consequence events that can result. Thus, the quality assurance programs of vendors must be 
held to a high standard, and the documentation of quality assurance and other reproducibility 
claims should be proportional to the complexity of the manufacturing process.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
  
 SMRs are characterized by their small size and modularity, which provide them with 
applications unavailable to conventional large nuclear power plants. SMRs provide advantages for 
Canada’s natural resource sector, remote communities and utilities. SMRs have gained 
international popularity because of these advantages, and the CNSC has begun activities to ready 
themselves for their regulation. However, SMRs pose unique challenges for their regulation in 
Canada arising from the risks they pose and the familiarity of the CNSC with CANDU reactors.  
 The CNSC and the nuclear industry aim to regulate SMRs within Canada’s existing 
regulatory framework. To address the variability and novel designs of SMRs, the nuclear industry 
and the CNSC agree that Canada’s regulations require additional flexibility. Flexibility can be 
improved by structuring regulations to be performance-based. Performance-based regulations are 
predicated on regulatory requirements in the form of aspirational objectives, where the onus is 
placed on the proponent to demonstrate their satisfaction. Additional flexibility can be provided to 
Canada’s regulation by the graded approach.  
 The graded approach encourages flexibility while ensuring the satisfaction of regulatory 
objectives. Regulators use grading to determine the amount of conservatism proportional to the 
uncertainty, complexity and novelty of the assessed activity. Grading will be indispensable for 
SMRs. However, most SMR designs lack operational history for which to judge the safety of the 
design. The challenges posed by the lack of operating history are exacerbated by the CNSC’s lack 
of expertise with the advanced technologies common within SMR designs. The lack of expertise 
forces the CNSC to rely on conservatism to ensure the safety of SMRs. There is no clear solution 
to this issue. Though increasing the knowledge and familiarity of the CNSC with SMR 
technologies would be beneficial, the variability of SMR designs and innovation employed can be 
significant.  
 The uncertain risks posed by SMRs also pose significant regulatory challenges. The graded 
approach indicates that the greater the uncertainty, the greater amount of conservatism needed. 
Care must be given to ensure that conservatism is applied proprotionally. The use of risk 
uncertainty analysis, though already a staple in risk assessment, can be used in novel ways to 
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ensure that the amount of conservatism being applied is proportional and ensures the confidence 
of the regulator's decisions.  
 The CNSC employs risk uncertainty analyses only as a means to indicate conservatism and 
fail to employ it to its full potential within risk management practices.  Uncertainty analysis can 
assure that the amount conservatism is proportional to the risk by considering the conservatism 
inherent in the risk distribution itself. Additionally, uncertainty analyses can ensure that regulatory 
objectives are met and provide regulators confidence in their decisions. The Committee on Risk 
Assessment of Hazardous Air Pollutants of the National Research Council has recommended the 
completion of uncertainty analyses for all risk estimations including low-tier risk assessments, 
despite difficulties and costs. 
 The use of uncertainty analysis for determining whether risk assessments generate points 
that are too conservative, thereby exaggerating the risk of harm, is beneficial to the application of 
the graded approach to SMRs. The complexity, uncertainty and novelty of SMR designs will 
invoke high levels of conservatism, and the use of uncertainty analyses can ensure that it is not 
applied with overconfidence. This is economically beneficial to proponents who will already have 
a high cost of deployment, especially where the SMR being deployed is a first of a kind technology. 
 Risk uncertainty can arise from inaccurate parameters and models used to generate risks, 
or from gaps within risk estimates. Risk uncertainties are a significant challenge for risk-informed 
decision-making. However, the elicitation of expert judgement to produce risk distributions and 
uncertainty distribution can be used to fill risk gaps or relieve uncertainty where objective 
probabilistic safety assessment cannot. Elicitation of expert judgement can produce qualitative and 
quantitative risk assessments for new, rare, complex or poorly understood phenomena, and can 
include failure rates, incidence rates, or weighing factors for combining data sources. The DRDC 
has consolidated and reviewed methods and procedures for the preparation, training, aggregation, 
scoring of expert’s conduct and verification of expert judgement to produce accurate risk 
distributions. 
 This thesis reccomends the use of performance scores are used to represent the accuracy of 
elicited risks within the RIDM process. Performance scores are determined based on how well the 
performance of the elicitations meets regulatory expectations and considers the methods and 
procedures illustrated by the DRDC. Performance scores operate on the finding that there is a 
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strong link between the performance of elicitations and the accuracy of the results. A strong 
performance score indicates greater accuracy and reliability of the elicitation. Within assessments, 
grading may consider the score as an indication of whether the risk is reasonable or whether 
precautionary steps are needed. 
 The IAEA Safety Standard document Level 1 PSA provides standards for expert elicitations 
that must be included within the CNSC’s regulatory expectations. REGDOC-2.4.2 requires that 
proponents comply with IAEA Safety Standard document Level 1 PSA. IAEA Safety Standard 
document Level 1 PSA requires that the elicitation of expert judgement embody “a formal, highly 
structured and documented process” and provides conditions for expert elicitations. The DRDC’s 
suggested procedures and outline fulfill to a high degree the conditions of IAEA Safety Standard 
document Level 1 PSA; however, the CNSC may wish to develop policy to ensure their compliance 
further. 
 The accuracy of expert elicitation is informed by multiple evaluative tools, such as the 
scoring of expert’s conduct, calibration, verification, coherence, the number of experts elicited, the 
amount of preparation, feedback and more. Performance scores simplify the entire performance of 
the elicitation into a single estimate for which the CNSC can rely on for its deterministic risk 
assessment and RIDM. The CNSC will need to develop a regulatory document informing 
proponents of their expectation regarding expert elicitation. This document must illustrate in detail 
how performance scores are determined, the weighting each factor considered in determining the 
performance score is given, and how performance scores are used in the CNSC’s risk assessment.  
 The amalgamation of the performance of an elicitation into a single score may ostensibly 
seem discriminatory as one poor evaluation can have a significant impact on the value of the score. 
However, the amalgamation will encourage proponents to ensure the quality of all aspects of the 
elicitation process to ensure accurate and representative results. Additionally, performance scores 
do not consider all aspects of the performed elicitated equally but weigh each consideration 
according to their impact on the accuracy of the elicitation. For example, the verification process 
should be heavily weighted as a failure of any of its criteria calls for a revision of the elicitated 
risk distribution. How the CNSC wishes to weigh these considerations is at their discretion 
informed by the recommendations made in this thesis and the literature on the subject. 
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 The DRDC is a useful source for the CNSC when developing an expert elicitation policy. 
The DRDC aim to deliver technical solutions and advice to federal departments such as the CNSC. 
Accordingly, it may be constructive for the CNSC to consult with the DRDC regarding the 
development of regulatory expectations for expert elicitations.  
 Type certification is a design certification process that can help the CNSC accommodate 
the novel deployment strategies of SMRs. Type certification requires the assurance that the design 
of the SMR meets the safety requirements of the CNSC and is capable of being reproduced 
consistently and to the specification of the original design. type certification can be implemented 
as a parallel certification regime that is conducive to the overall licensing process. It may be 
conducted during or prior to the licensing of the SMR at the discretion of the vendor. To achieve 
certification, performance of the assessment of SMRs will occur according to the requirements of 
the normal licensing process. The CNSC already provide an optional pre-licensing vendor diagram 
review that can assess to a high degree the safety of reactor design. The pre-vendor diagram review 
provides a basis for what criteria should be considered within the certification. However, the 
certification process will require a more substantive assessment of the demonstrated safety of the 
SMR than the vendor diagram review process to be binding.  
 The CNSC must conduct audits of the vendor’s manufacturing facilities to confirm that 
designs are reproducible. The U.S. aviation regulations provide an inclusive list of quality 
assurance criteria to consider for assuring the reproducibility of aircraft and may lend direction on 
the matter for the CNSC.477 Audits of the manufacturer's facilities may also provide the CNSC 
with the opportunity to inspect the physical reactor and accompanying components of the SMR 
design in question during its manufacturing process, which becomes challenging once completed 
as the finished unit may obstruct access for inspectors. Without the assurance of the design’s 
reproducibility, the CNSC cannot be sure that the deployed unit conforms to the original design or 
the inspected unit.  
 The maritime shipping industry and the FAA provide insight into how type certification 
may operate. Both industries approach type certification in a two-step process of assessing the 
design and assuring the reproducibility of the vessel. Though both industries use independent 
                                                 
477 Regulations list 14 criteria to consider when auditing a manufacturers quality system, see 14 CFR § 21.137 (a)–
(c) (2009). 
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bodies to perform assessments, they provide two different perspectives into how type certification 
can be employed and provide insight into how industries regulate mass produced and complex 
products. Due to the complexity of aircraft designs and the amount of work required in each 
assessment, the FAA relies heavily on the manufacturer's employees to perform assessments and 
other key regulatory tasks. This approach is heavily criticized because it creates a conflict of 
interest and the potential for regulatory capture and should be avoided by the CNSC when 
developing a type certification regime. 
 The maritime transport industry relies on classification societies to assess whether vessels 
conform to the specifications required by maritime shipping laws. Classification societies can 
remain neutral in their performance of assessments because of their independence from the 
shipbuilders. Additionally, the oversight and standards of the IACS help to ensure the 
independence of classification societies. However, the competition among classification societies 
can affect the quality of assessments. This competition can force classification societies to reduce 
their prices so that they can compete within the market. Reducing costs can affect the quality of 
the assessment performed. 
 The maritime shipping industry and the FAA rely on third-party assessments because of 
the complexity of the designs they review and the large amount of work each assessment entails. 
In the infancy of the SMR industry, it is unlikely that the CNSC will need to rely on third parties 
for the assessment of SMRs because the number of SMRs being deployed are manageable within 
the CNSC’s resources. It is true that the lack of expertise of the CNSC with SMR technologies 
will be challenging. However, the deployment of SMRs will not occur at any great numbers 
incapable of being handled by the CNSC.  
 However, as the popularity of the technology grows it is possible that SMRs will become 
widespread across Canada. Proponents of SMRs assert that SMRs must become widespread to 
benefit from their advantages fully. In this case, assessment activities could surpass the resources 
of the CNSC to administer regulatory oversight. If this were to occur, the CNSC should take 
precaution not to follow the direction of the FAA. Instead, the CNSC should consider independent 
bodies capable of performing the necessary assessments. In this case, the IAEA may administer 
assessments, either directly through themselves or as a governing body similar to the IACS. This 
would be beneficial as it reduces the costs of individual regulators. Additionally, this is in line with 
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efforts to standardize nuclear regulation internationally, creating a bigger market for proponents 
to deploy SMRs. 
 This thesis argues that SMRs can be regulated within the existing Canadian nuclear 
regulatory framework, in light of existing regulatory principles, and that challenges associated with 
that regulation can be accommodated through regulatory flexibility and by bolstering risk 
management approaches. Regulatory flexibility provides adaptability to Canada’s regulations so 
that the variability and novel design of SMRs can be appropriately assessed. The improved risk 
management techniques and elicitations of expert judgement to generate risk distributions mitigate 
novel and uncertain risks commonly associated with SMRs. Finally, type certification provides an 
adjunct but parallel certification process to address novel deployment strategies of SMRs and 
mitigate the challenges of inspecting reactors caused by their modularity.  
 However, this thesis does not alleviate all of the regulatory challenges posed by SMRs. For 
one, the lack of operational history will be a significant challenge for the deployment of new SMR 
designs. Additionally, challenges raised by DIS-16-04 such as the reduction of exclusionary zones, 
whether physical barriers are needed, the consultation with indigenous peoples, the use of 
automation, and the decreased number of personnel still pose challenges and will need to be dealt 
on a case-by-case basis. It is the hope that the suggestions made in this thesis will help regulators 
address these issues within the appropriate scope, detail and content according to the assessed 
design. 
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Glossary 
 
ALARA, as low as reasonably achievable is an aspirational objective common among 
nuclear regulators within the OECD and is 
revealed through years of practice. It is 
imposed within the CNSC’s Radiation 
Protection Regulations and is an important 
objective of their radiation protection and 
acceptance safety objective. ALARA is 
achieved not only by respecting appropriate 
dose limits, but also by explicit effort take 
measures to reduce doses beyond those limits 
where practical. 
Aspirational objective is a performance-based regulatory objective 
determined discretionally by the regulatory by 
considering the best practices and the 
performance of the proposed project. 
Aspirational objectives are a as a qualitative 
criterion revealed in practice over several 
years. Aspirational objectives used by the 
CNSC include keeping radiation exposures 
ALARA and the prevention of unreasonable 
risk. 
Best-estimate method is used within probabilistic and deterministic 
safety assessments to generate realistic 
results. 
Complementary safety objectives include the radiation protection and 
acceptance safety objective, the 
environmental protection safety objective and 
the technical safety objective. Complementary 
safety objectives are subordinate to the 
primary safety objective to prevent 
unreasonable risks. 
Conservative analysis method a method deliberately leading to results that 
are intended to be limiting relative to 
specified safety acceptance criteria. 
Conservative decision making Fundamental regulatory principle 
underpinning nuclear regulatory decision-
making. Conservative decision-making aims 
to place the reactor and its facilities in a 
condition known to be safe or that have 
reasonable risks 
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Defence-in-depth is a regulatory principle administered through 
overlapping measures to prevent and mitigate 
risks to design related safety and security 
activities. The CNSC administer defence-in-
depth through five levels of differing safety 
objectives. 
Deterministic risk assessment may refer to the regulatory guidance provided 
by the CNSC in its regulatory document 
Safety Analysis: Deterministic Safety Analysis 
also referred to as REGDOC-2.4.1, or the risk 
assessment strategy. As a risk assessment 
strategy, deterministic risk assessment 
assesses risk on less quantifiable criteria such 
as political or security considerations and 
focuses on engineering principles such as 
safety measures, redundancy and diversity to 
prevent the consequences of an event. 
Expert elicitation Is a scientific consensus methodology to 
generate risk distributions or uncertainty 
distributions for risk events. 
Fundamental principle of “control, cool and 
contain” 
refers to the control of the reactor power, the 
cooling of the reactor fuel, and the 
containment of radioactivity using safety 
mechanisms and measures to achieve safety 
objectives. Defence-in-depth is indispensable 
in achieving this principle. 
Graded approach ensure the satisfaction of fundamental safety 
objectives in a risk-informed manner 
commensurate with the risk complexity and 
novelty of the project. The graded approach 
instructs that regulatory requirements be 
applied in accordance with the circumstances, 
and the likelihood and possible consequences 
of, and the level of risk associated with, a loss 
of control. 
Performance-based regulation is regulatory basis that sets out targets with 
the onus of the proponent to demonstrate, 
rather than prescriptive requirements. 
Precautionary principle is the principle that the introduction of a new 
product or process whose ultimate effects are 
disputed or unknown should be resisted or 
handled with precaution. There are various 
strengths of the precautionary principle, of 
which the CNSC adopt a weak one closely 
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resembling the “Margin of Safety 
Precautionary Principle” which requires 
regulatory control to incorporate a margin of 
safety and activities to be limited below the 
level at which no adverse effect has been 
observed or predicted. 
Prescriptive-based regulation Is a regulatory basis that provides a 
comprehensive and detailed regime based on 
standards and regulations that apply equally 
to every applicable activity 
Primary safety objective is the primary objective of the Nuclear Safety 
and Control Act. See unreasonable risk 
Probabilistic risk assessment is a comprehensive and integrated assessment 
of the safety of the reactor facility. It 
considers the probability, progression and 
consequences of equipment failures or 
transient conditions, to derive numerical 
estimates that provide a consistent measure of 
the safety of the reactor facility. 
Process-based regulation is a regulatory basis that hinges safe operation 
of the nuclear power plant on effective 
organizational processes of the licensee for 
the operation, maintenance, modification and 
improvement of the facility. 
Proportionality principle is the principle that requires measures carried 
out by conservative decision-making to be 
inversely proportional to the level of 
understanding of risk and safety. 
Reproducibility principle is the assurance that the vendor or 
manufacturer can and does produce products 
that are consistent with the original design. 
RIDM, Risk-informed decision-making is a deliberative process that measures risk 
against a set of performance or safety 
objectives, along with other considerations, to 
inform decisions. 
Risk distribution is a probabilistic distribution that provides the 
probabilities of occurrence of different 
outcomes of a risk event. 
Safety by design is the prevention of harm through design. 
Achievement of safety by design occurs at 
early stages of design to minimize hazards.  
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Type approval See type certification 
Type certification is the process of certifying a design and 
approving its manufacturing process such that 
productions of that design are assured to meet 
regulatory requirements without further proof. 
Uncertainty analysis is the process of identifying and 
characterizing the sources of uncertainty in an 
analysis, evaluating their impact on the 
analysis results, and developing, to the extent 
practicable, a quantitative measure of this 
impact. 
Unreasonable risk is a primary objective of the Nuclear Safety 
Control Act. 
 
